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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This thesis investigates the philosophical  assumptions which underpin established 
theories of the British constitution, paying particular attention to the influence of 
traditional (and sometimes outdated) theories of legal positivism.  I attempt to identify, 
analyze and challenge these assumptions, exploring  how recent developments in legal 
theory can inform and enrich our approach to British constitutional theory. Drawing, in 
particular,  on the anti-positivist theory  of Ronald Dworkin, I contend  that  an 
understanding of the British constitution must begin with an understanding of the 
principle of legality: that is, the principle that government may only exercise coercive 
force in accordance with standards established in the right way before that exercise.   The 
principle of legality (properly understood as reflecting the value of integrity), I argue, 
shapes or controls the many other principles that underpin British constitutional practice, 
principles such as the separation of powers, democracy and individual human rights.    
Once it is appreciated that each and every fact about British constitutional practice 
must be justified by arguments of political morality, there is little difference, I argue, 
between the so-called ‘unwritten’ British constitution and the ‘written’ constitution of, 
say, the United States.  In particular, there is no plausible  philosophical  basis for 
ascribing unlimited legislative powers to the Westminster Parliament.   The extent of 
Parliament’s legislative powers (and the extent of the powers of the executive branch of 
government), I suggest, must depend on how we conceive of the legal principles that 
justify Parliamentary power, most notably  the principle of democracy.    Democracy, 
properly understood, I argue, means that Parliament (or government) has a duty to treat 
each member of the British community as an equal; or,  to state the  right which 
corresponds to that duty, democracy means that individuals have a moral right against 
government to be treated as an equal.    
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Introduction 
 
In this thesis, I set out to hold a  moral lens up  to British constitutional theory and 
practice.    My central argument is that a theory of the British constitution must begin 
with an understanding of what it means for officials to exercise power in accordance with 
law; the theory must begin, that is, with an understanding of the principle of legality.   It 
is only once we have settled the meaning of legality, I will argue, that we can make sense 
of  the many other political principles  that  underpin British constitutional practice, 
principles such as the separation of powers, democracy and individual rights.    While the 
primary aim of this thesis is to recommend the argumentative framework for British 
constitutional theory just described, my secondary aim is to propose a particular moral 
reading of the British constitution, one based on the Dworkinian conception of legality as 
integrity (or equality under the law, properly understood).    It will be argued that the 
value of integrity best explains and justifies the way in which the different political 
principles (of the sort referred to above) figure in the scheme of the British constitution.   
  I will advance the central argument of this thesis by way of an attack on a cluster 
of ideas, derived from different versions of legal positivism, which I take to represent the 
orthodoxy in British constitutional theory.    Most prominent amongst these are the twin 
ideas that Parliament is sovereign and that, given Parliament’s sovereign powers, the role 
of judges must be to give effect to Parliament’s intentions.     In spite of the increasing 
vigour with which several judges and leading academics have sought to qualify the idea 
of Parliamentary sovereignty, I will suggest that this idea  continues  to impede the 
development of British constitutional theory.  Once it is appreciated that neither the idea 
of Parliamentary sovereignty, nor the  idea  that judges give effect to Parliament’s 
intentions  can withstand philosophical scrutiny, a very different picture of British 
constitutional theory emerges.   What are, on their face, rather arid, conceptual debates on 
such questions as the possible limits on Parliamentary sovereignty and the meaning of 
Parliamentary intentions, may be recast as a set of rich debates in political morality about 
the proper powers of Parliament and courts, and the rights of individuals in a Western 
liberal democracy.       9 
Before outlining the arguments of individual chapters, it will be helpful to lay down three 
caveats about the general ambitions of this thesis.   My principal aim, I have said, is to 
offer a fresh  perspective on British constitutional theory and practice.  Given the 
centrality of the principle of legality to this project, it will be necessary to enter into a 
range of controversial questions in legal philosophy, most notably the age-old question 
about the nature and meaning of the concept of law.   While I endeavour to justify my 
position on  this  question  and others, this  thesis  is not intended as a work in legal 
philosophy, and so no attempt is made to explore all (or even most) of the arguments 
which may be made either in favour of or against the positions that I adopt.   If nothing 
else, it is hoped that dissatisfied legal philosophers will appreciate my more modest aim, 
which is to emphasize the foundational importance of legal philosophy to constitutional 
theory.   
  The second caveat is aimed, on the one hand, at constitutional lawyers whose 
principal interest is in the  merits of contemporary constitutional reforms, and, on the 
other hand, at public lawyers  who eschew abstract arguments of political morality  in 
favour of extensive and detailed doctrinal analysis.    I have confined this thesis to an 
inquiry about the nature of, and inter-relationship between, certain organizing principles 
in the British constitution.   As a consequence, I have not addressed a great many issues 
which, it might be objected, ought to belong to any account of the British constitution.    
For instance, I have not directly addressed the topic of devolution, or the many changes 
occurring under Constitutional Reform Act 2005, or questions about electoral systems 
and reform.   Similarly, while I have much to say in this thesis about the way in which 
judges do and should decide cases, and about the principles which underpin particular 
doctrinal areas of law, it might be objected that there is insufficient analysis of the current 
state of the law.      Suffice it so say in response to these types of objections that, before 
we can appraise particular constitutional reforms or particular judicial decisions, we first 
must have in mind a general background moral theory against which such appraisals can 
be made.    It is this challenge which I take up in this thesis.        
  The third caveat is aimed at political scientists or sociologists of law.   My project 
in this thesis is to offer a normative justification for the powers of institutions and the 
rights of individuals in the British constitution.   As such, I have not sought to offer any   10 
views on sociological questions about the different trade-offs and strategies that one 
might identify in the decision-making of judges or politicians.  For instance, some 
theorists have argued that judges routinely defer to the opinion of elected politicians for 
the sake of achieving ‘comity’ or good relations between the different branches of 
government;
1 or that we can explain the willingness of ministers to answer questions in 
Parliament in terms of the sense of co-operation that this might engender in members of 
the House of Commons.
2     These types of observations are important to be sure; but, in 
my view, they cannot help with the normative questions with which I am concerned in 
this thesis.  Indeed, it will be seen that I am consistently resistant to the notion that we 
can explain the powers of institutions and the rights of individuals by reference to the 
behavioural or attitudinal characteristics of particular constitutional actors.
3
In chapter 1 (Debunking the Idea of Parliamentary Sovereignty: the Controlling 
Factor of Legality in the British Constitution), I attempt to remove the central plank 
from traditional theories of the British constitution, namely the idea that Parliament is 
sovereign.  I suggest that  a commitment to Parliamentary sovereignty  –  or, for that 
matter, judicial sovereignty – only makes sense against a background commitment to the 
jurisprudence of the 19
th century jurist, John Austin (whose ideas have been perpetuated 
through the work of Dicey).   While traditional British constitutional theory has arguably 
remained frozen in the 19
th century, legal theory has moved on apace.   Generations of 
legal theorists, most notably Herbert Hart, have discredited the Austinian ‘command’ 
theory and offered rival theories in its place.    Common to the work of both Hart and 
Hart’s own chief critic, Ronald Dworkin, is the idea that the powers of Parliament must 
be explained, not by the  conceptual necessity of an ultimate sovereign, but by  the 
existence of a normative standard that comes prior to those powers.   By way of a case 
study of Jackson  v Her Majesty’s Attorney-General,
  
4
                                                 
1 See, for instance, Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of 
Politics (2
nd edn, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986); D Oliver, Constitutional Reform in the UK 
(Oxford University Press, 2003) ch 2 and at 95. 
  I suggest  that that normative 
standard  cannot be an empirically determined rule  as Hart supposed. Since  judges 
disagree about Parliamentary and judicial powers, and given the principled character of 
2 I am grateful to Dawn Oliver for this example. 
3 See, in particular, chapters 1-3 and, especially, chapter 6. 
4 [2005] UKHL 56.   11 
those disagreements, the normative standard must be a principle of political  morality.   
This principle, I suggest, is the principle of legality. 
In the last part of chapter 1, having rejected each of the prominent philosophical bases 
for  idea of Parliamentary sovereignty, I  lay the groundwork for the remainder of the 
thesis.   After putting forward a preliminary  formulation of the concept of legality, I 
illustrate the way in which different conceptions of legality will shape or control our 
understanding of many other principles which underpin the British constitution, 
principles such as the separation of powers, democracy and individual human rights.   A 
theory of the British constitution, I suggest, may be thought of as a ‘web of conviction’ 
whereby the way in which a theorist conceives of the principle of legality will influence 
his views about the place of other political principles in the scheme of the British 
constitution. 
In chapter 2 (Understanding the Principle of Legality), building on the last part of 
chapter 1, I offer an account of how to make sense of the concept of legality.    In order to 
understand the principle of legality it is crucial, I argue, that we understand the character 
of disagreement about the meaning of this principle.   All theorists of legality must be 
taken to accept (albeit implicitly) the same abstract concept of legality: they must all be 
in the same ball-park when they debate the meaning of legality.    I suggest (after Ronald 
Dworkin) that this abstract concept may be expressed as the idea that officials should only 
exercise power in accordance with standards established in the correct way before that 
exercise.    Disagreement about the meaning of legality is a disagreement about the nature 
of those ‘standards’ and the way in which they must be ‘established’.   These things will 
depend, I suggest, on the value that a theorist finds in the ideal of requiring officials to 
exercise power in accordance with pre-existing standards.    The familiar debate between 
so-called ‘formal’ and ‘substantive’ theorists of legality, I suggest, fails adequately to 
capture the sense of disagreement just described. 
In part 2, I consider two potential challenges to the account of disagreement just 
described.   The first challenge broadly represents the position of so-called ‘descriptive’ 
positivists: it denies that there is any necessary connection between legality and morality.    
It is mistaken, according to this argument, to suggest that disagreement about legality is a 
disagreement about the value of that principle.    The second challenge seeks to pre-empt   12 
disagreement about the meaning of legality in a very different way.   This argument 
accepts that the meaning of the principle of legality does depend on an understanding of 
its underlying value, but it maintains, for epistemological reasons, that this value can only 
be a formal or procedural ideal; it can have nothing to say about the substance of the law.     
In part 3, I employ the argumentative framework set out in part 1 to contrast two 
different conceptions of legality (and the model of adjudication implied by each different 
conception).  The first conception is based on such values as certainty, predictability and 
protected expectations.   These types of values, it is suggested, provide the best 
justification for many of the theories that fall under the umbrella of legal positivism.  The 
second conception is based on the value of integrity or equality before the law.   This 
account of legality supposes that the truth conditions for any proposition of law depend 
on the interpretation of the principles of justice, fairness and procedural due process that 
best justifies the past decisions of Parliament and courts.  Only this latter (Dworkinian) 
conception of legality and adjudication, I argue, can justify the abstract formulation of 
legality identified at the start of the chapter: it is only this latter conception that accounts 
for the way in which officials (including judges) exercise power according to existing 
standards.  
In  chapter 3  (‘Principles of (Administrative) Law’),    I  attempt to show how a 
conception of legality as integrity can help us to make sense of English law adjudication 
and, more broadly, how this conception of legality and adjudication informs the 
separation of powers between courts and the political branches of government.  By way 
of illustration, I focus on adjudication in the doctrinal area of administrative law, for it is 
in relation to this area of law, perhaps more than any other, that English public lawyers 
have had most to say about the grounds of legal validity and about the proper powers of 
institutions.   Indeed, a secondary aim of this chapter is to demonstrate the problematic 
nature of the traditional debate in English public law about the constitutional foundations 
of judicial review.    
At the start of the chapter, I pose the following general question: which standards, 
established in which way, provide the best justification for administrative law decisions? 
In the remainder of the chapter, I then consider several different responses to that 
question, asking in each case whether the response can be said both to ‘fit’ and ‘justify’   13 
(to adopt Ronald Dworkin’s two dimensions of interpretation)
5
Before we can assess possible  justifications  for the intentions theory, it is first 
necessary, I argue, to establish whether or not the very notion of a collective 
Parliamentary intention is intelligible, or whether the intentions  theory ‘fits’ English 
administrative law adjudication.    If not, then the intentions theory will fall at the first 
hurdle.   On close inspection, it rapidly becomes apparent that the task of identifying a 
single, collective, Parliamentary intention is hopeless.   The intentions theorist must 
decide which types of motivations, of which of the hundreds of people directly or 
indirectly involved in the legislative process, at which point in time, should determine the 
meaning of the statutory text.   This is a task, I argue that lies beyond most assiduous and 
resourceful team of psychologists and sociologists, let alone a judge or panel of judges 
sitting in a courtroom.   The intentions theory fails, I conclude, for the reasons that the 
theory mistakenly looks to the ‘conversational’ intentions of the author of a statute rather 
than the ‘constructive’ intent (in the sense of ‘aim’ or ‘purpose’) of a statute imposed on 
that statute by the interpreter of the statute.      
 the way in which judges 
decide administrative law cases.   I describe the first response to the general question as 
the ‘intentions theory’.    This response, which has received most critical attention in the 
guise of the ultra vires theory of judicial review, supposes that a proposition of law is 
true or valid when  it  in some way reflects the intentions of Parliament.     The most 
plausible justification for the intentions theory, ultra vires theorists of judicial review 
contend, is one based on the principles of democracy and judicial legitimacy: legal rules 
and principles necessarily reflect the will of the elected Parliamentary assembly; and 
judges possess the constitutional warrant to ensure that ministers or other officials act in 
accordance with that parliamentary will.     
In part two, I consider two further responses to the question posed at the start of the 
chapter (viz. which standards, established in which way, provide the best justification for 
administrative law decisions?)   These responses are based on the two conceptions of 
legality and adjudication described in chapter 2: first, the rule-based or ‘conventionalist’ 
account, and, secondly, the conception of legality as integrity.   By way of an analysis of 
                                                 
5 Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1986) 139.   14 
the decisions in Simms
6 and Coughlan,
7
Having laid the groundwork in the first three chapters of the thesis for an account of 
the British constitution based on a conception of legality as integrity, I turn in chapter 4 
(‘Democracy, Human Rights and the Proper Role of Judges’) to a set of questions 
which must lie at the heart of any theory of the British constitution.  These questions 
relate to the proper constitutional relationship between the political branches of 
government, courts and citizens. The first question concerns the extent of the legislative 
powers that Parliament possesses.   Can Parliament ‘make or unmake any law’ in the way 
that Dicey suggested, or are there certain things that Parliament does not have the power 
to do?     The second question for consideration is inextricably connected to the first, 
although the precise nature of that relationship will require careful accounting.  The 
question is this: in what senses, if any, can it be said that individuals possess moral rights 
against the state?    The final question is an institutional question.  If individuals possess 
moral rights against the state, then what role, if any, should courts have in giving effect to 
those rights?     More particularly, given our understanding of democracy and human 
rights as moral ideals, what is the proper adjudicative role of judges under the Human 
Rights Act 1998? 
   I attempt to demonstrate the way in which the 
abstract arguments of chapter 2 generate two competing theories of administrative law 
adjudication.   It is only a conception of legality as integrity, I conclude, that can make 
sense of these two decisions and which, more broadly, can make sense of the standards 
that provide the best justification for administrative law adjudication. 
In part 1, I suggest that the powers of Parliament are justified by the principle of 
democracy.  The key question is therefore how to understand this principle.   Drawing on 
the account of disagreement outlined in chapter 2 (in relation to the concept of legality), I 
suggest that different theories of democracy necessarily revolve around a single point, 
purpose or value, which all theorists take to represent the bare concept of democracy.  
This value, I suggest, is that each member of a political community should have an equal 
stake in the way that they are governed or, more broadly, that they should be treated in a 
way that respects the value of equality.  
                                                 
6 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte, Simms and Another [2000] 2 AC 115. 
7 Regina v North and East Devon Health Authority ex p Coughlan [2000] 2 WLR 622.   15 
In order to test our understanding of the value of an equal stake or equality, I consider 
three different conceptions of that value. The first two conceptions each  place 
majoritarian decision-making at their heart; they each emphasize the process by which 
decisions are taken, rather than the outcome of those decisions; and, in that sense, they 
each reflect the procedural ideal of treating people equally.  While the two majoritarian 
theories share these theoretical tenets, they do so for very different reasons.     The first 
conception rests on a utilitarian or (more broadly) consequentialist background political 
theory, a theory which is sceptical of the existence of moral rights; the latter conception, 
by contrast, is premised on the very fact that individuals do enjoy certain moral rights – 
of  which  the paramount right is the right to participate in decisions on matters of 
principle or rights.     
Having rejected the former of these accounts, I question whether the latter rights-based 
account (advanced, most notably, by Jeremy Waldron) can stand as an adequate account 
of an equal stake for the purposes of understanding the principle of democracy.    I 
conclude that it cannot.   The procedural right to participate – which  is foundational 
within Waldron’s theory – cannot be availed of, I argue, unless certain prior substantive 
rights have been secured, rights such as freedom of expression, association and assembly.    
A better account, and the third conception of an equal stake that I consider in this section, 
rejects majoritarianism in favour of the idea that individuals enjoy rights against the 
majority.    This conception rests on the idea that officials should exercise power in a way 
that treats people as equals,  both in terms of the choice of procedures and in the 
outcomes of those procedures.       
Being treated as an equal (as opposed to being treated equally), I explain, implies full 
‘moral membership’ of a political community;  this  is a condition  precedent  for the 
democratic ideal that each member of a political community has an equal stake in the 
way that they are governed.  Furthermore, if the principle of democracy entails a duty on 
the part of a state to treat each member of a political community  as equals, then 
democracy further entails that individuals have a corresponding moral right to be treated 
as an equal.   Democracy and rights are, in this sense, complementary.  The right to be 
treated as an equal – and the concrete rights that flow from it – I suggest, operates to 
block or ‘trump’ certain inegalitarian (and typically, utilitarian) reasons for state action.       16 
In part 2, building on the foregoing discussion of democracy and rights, I address a 
question which I label  the ‘institutional question’:  namely,  which  people  or which 
institution should have responsibility for determining which concrete, legal rights flow 
from the abstract moral right to be treated as an equal?     Before it is possible to answer 
the institutional question directly, I suggest that it is first necessary to appreciate that 
there is (and should be) a necessary division of functions or powers in the processes of 
government.    The important division for the purposes of addressing the institutional 
question is the division between the judicial and political functions.   This division is well 
accounted for, I argue, in Ronald Dworkin’s distinction between matters of principle (or 
‘rights’) and matters of policy (or ‘collective goals’), where the former type of decision 
defines the judicial function, and latter type of decision defines the political functions.  
That judges (non-elected, apolitical individuals, with security of tenure, who exercise 
the judicial function alone or with others in an institution that is separate from the 
legislature)  should not decide questions of policy  is largely uncontroversial; more 
controversial, I suggest,  is the question of whether the people who make political 
decisions on questions of policy should also make judicial decisions on matters of 
principle.  I argue by way of a critique of the rights-based defence of majoritarian 
decision-making advanced by Jeremy Waldron that the principle of fairness requires that 
an independent branch of government safeguards the conditions of equal treatment under 
which Parliamentary and governmental decision-making must take place.     
In part 3, I offer a sketch of how the background theories of democracy, rights and 
adjudication discussed in this chapter can inform our understanding of adjudication under 
the  ECHR and  HRA 1998.     In line with the approach taken in earlier sections, I 
approach this exercise with two distinct questions in mind: first, what is the nature of the 
legal rights under the Act; secondly, what role should judges have in giving effect to 
those rights.   In response to the first of these questions, I suggest that the rights 
enumerated in the Convention are best  understood in terms of the theory of rights as 
trumps described in part 1.   This is to say that these rights represent the types of grounds 
on which the institutions of the state are most likely to treat certain individuals or groups 
as inferiors.  It follows, in relation to the second question, that the primary role of judges 
under the Convention and Act is to block impermissible reasons for state action, a task   17 
that judges achieve under sections 3 and 7 of the Act.   The granting of a declaration of 
incompatibility under section 4 of the Act can only be justified (if it can be justified at 
all), I argue, by the principle that certain categories of human rights violations – those 
with particularly far-reaching social ramifications  –  are best rectified by Parliament 
through legislation.    
In  chapter  5  (‘Legal Duties and Constitutional Duties in the British 
Constitution’), I attempt to meet the first of a series of potential objections to the account 
of British constitutional theory and practice advanced  in previous chapters (objections 
which I describe collectively as the ‘political objection’).  The British constitution, the 
first limb of the political objection runs, is dominated not by questions of legality, courts 
and  individual rights, but by a network of informal, unwritten rules or ‘constitutional 
conventions’. While these conventions are occasionally ‘recognized’ by courts, they are 
rarely  ‘enforced’  by courts; and this is for good reason.  According to the political 
objection, those areas of British constitutional practice that are governed by convention 
are,  by definition, political  and  non-justiciable  in character.   In this way, the 
law/convention dichotomy is said to serve two purposes.   First, it underscores the sense 
in which the British constitution is a ‘political’ and ‘unwritten’ constitution rather than a 
‘legal’ and ‘written’ constitution.  Secondly, it clearly demarcates those areas in which 
law and judges have or do not have a constitutional role to play.   
In part 1 of chapter 5, I suggest that the law/convention dichotomy makes better sense 
as a distinction between two different types of moral duties: legal duties on the one hand, 
and political or constitutional duties on the other.     Political philosophers have often 
theorized on an abstract level about the difference between different types of moral 
duties; but if – as the political objection holds – it is thought that these two different types 
of duties are the key to differentiating  the political and legal parts of the  British 
constitution, then there must be some sort of categorical litmus test for knowing when 
one or other type of duty arises.     
In part 2, I consider two different attempts at devising such categorical tests.   The first 
attempt involves designating a duty as a legal duty when it is enforced or enforceable in a 
court of law.  This test, I suggest, mistakenly conflates two separate questions: first, the 
question of what makes it the case that a particular proposition of law is true or valid (the   18 
question of legality); and, secondly, the question of which institution or institutions (if 
any) should enforce true or valid propositions of law (the question of enforcement)?     In 
short, before a judge can enforce a legal rights, duties or powers, that judge must already 
have settled as at an analytically prior stage the question of what makes it the case that 
there is a legal right, duty or power to enforce.     The enforcement/enforceability tests, I 
suggest, relies implicitly on the discredited legal theory of nineteenth century command 
theorists such as John Austin whose argument is that law must emanate directly from the 
sovereign (or indirectly from judges).     
The second attempt to distinguish legal and constitutional duties rests on the rule-
based legal theory of Herbert Hart (and reflects, more generally, the legal positivist view 
that legal duties can be readily distinguished from other types of duties).  According to 
this theory, a non-legal duty (such as a constitutional or political duty) exists in virtue of 
the fact that a certain group of people accept (i.e. take the Hartian ‘internal view’ 
towards) a particular standard or set of standards.    If we apply this theory to those 
aspects of the British constitution that are commonly said to be governed by convention – 
for instance, the doctrines of Ministerial responsibility – we would say something like the 
following: a minister has a constitutional duty to account to Parliament for the failings of 
his or her department because most ministers, other political actors and citizens accept 
this as a standard of conduct by which they will criticize their own conduct and the 
conduct of others.    
In part 3, I attempt to explain how the Hartian account of  non-legal duties cannot 
provide the categorical test that the political objection requires.   In the first place, the fact 
that a particular group of people do accept a particular standard of conduct by which they 
will criticize their own conduct and the conduct of others, is not to say that those people 
are under a duty to act in the way that the standard prescribes: an is does not make an 
ought.   Secondly,  people  disagree  about  which ‘standards’ govern the conduct of 
ministers and other political actors.   In the face of these disagreements, legal positivists 
must either say (implausibly) that ministers  have no constitutional duties (because it 
cannot be said that they accept any particular, ascertainable standard or norm), or they 
must concede (contrary to the central plank of legal positivism) that the existence of a 
duty necessarily depends on complex judgments of political morality about why a   19 
minister should have particular duties and powers.   Such a concession, I argue, would be 
to deny that any aspect of British constitutional practice is governed by convention.   
There are two further reasons, I argue throughout chapter 5, as to why it is not possible 
to  draw a sharp distinction  between the legal and political parts of the British 
constitution.   First, whatever we have to say about the rights, duties and powers of 
constitutional actors reflects some proposition of law.  If the Queen has a duty to dissolve 
Parliament when so advised by the Prime Minister, then it is the law that the Queen has 
such a duty.  And if it is the case that the Prime Minister has the power to sack a minister, 
or to force a Minister to resign for intentionally misleading Parliament, then it is the law 
that the Prime Minister possesses such a power; and it is the law that the Minister has no 
right not to be sacked.    In other words, the law is not silent (to speak metaphorically) on 
any feature of constitutional practice (or any other social practice).   Secondly, the same 
action or decision by a constitutional actor may engage legal rights, duties, or powers and 
other types of rights, duties and powers.   A minister may have the legal power to fund an 
overseas project and  the minister may be under a constitutional  duty to justify this 
decision in Parliament.   For these additional reasons, any attempt to compartmentalize 
different areas of constitutional practice into the legal and conventional is bound to fail. 
In the final part of the chapter, I attempt to illustrate the arguments of earlier sections.  
I focus principally on decisions relating to the judicial review of prerogative powers.   
While, on the face of things, judges have historically sought to draw a bright line between 
‘justiciable’ and ‘non-justiciable’ questions according to the area or subject matter in 
which an official is operating, a closer analysis reveals that it is not possible to 
compartmentalize different areas of government (or, more accurately, different types of 
duties) in this way.    The question of whether an official has one type of duty or the other 
(or both), I argue, depends on a complex moral judgment about the principles which best 
justify the powers and duties of a particular official in the relevant context.    
At the start of  chapter 6  (Conclusion: The Moral Reading of the British 
Constitution), I offer an overview of the thesis  in the course of which I attempt to 
explain the sense in which the arguments of previous chapters recommend the ‘moral   20 
reading’ – to use Dworkin’s celebrated phrase – of the British constitution.
8
The first limb of the political objection rests, I contend, on the false assumption that 
the law of the constitution is only that which is found in the clear language of statutory 
texts (or indeed the text of a written constitution) or  in judicial decisions; and that any 
norm or standard which is operative in the constitution, but which cannot be found in 
such texts, is necessarily non-legal or conventional.  In response to this objection, I return 
to the argument made in previous chapters that the law of the constitution is determined 
not by the words in legal texts, but by the principles which justify the force and meaning 
of those legal texts.   In this respect, constitutional adjudication in the British constitution 
should be understood in much the same as that in the United States.    
   In the 
remainder of the chapter, I return to the ‘political objection’ described at the start of 
chapter 5 (broadly the objection that the British constitution is ‘political’ rather than 
‘legal’).  This objection, I suggest, can be reduced to two propositions: first, that the 
British constitution is unwritten  and  therefore  largely  based on informal rules or 
constitutional conventions; second  that,  given the absence of a written constitution, 
judges do not (or should not) have the power to bring their own liberal theories to their 
adjudicative task; and, above all, judges should not have the power to strike down or 
invalidate Acts of Parliament.   
In relation to the second limb of the political objection, I return to the arguments of 
chapter 4.  The idea that a constitution founded on the principle of legality and judicial 
review is a recipe for juristocracy rather than democracy, I  suggest,  rests on a 
misunderstanding of democracy, and a misunderstanding of the precise nature of the 
judicial role vis-à-vis the political branches of government.    Once it is appreciated that 
democracy means government subject to certain constraints, the principle of fairness 
demands that it be an independent branch of government which gives effect to those 
constraints.  However,  far from being an opportunity for judges to impose their own 
liberal philosophies, or to decide questions of policy or politics, the judicial role is itself 
constrained by the value of (constitutional) integrity.  This is to say that  judges are 
                                                 
8 R Dworkin, Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 1996).   21 
confined to applying the legal rights and duties which flow from principles to which the 
British political community is committed through its past institutional decisions.    
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Chapter 1: Debunking the Idea of Parliamentary Sovereignty: the Controlling 
Factor of Legality in the British Constitution 
 
On what basis can it be said that Parliament is sovereign in the British constitution; and, 
if there is no adequate philosophical basis for this idea, how can we make sense of long-
running debates in British constitutional theory about the meaning and possible limits on 
Parliamentary sovereignty?
1  These are the questions that I want to address in this 
opening chapter.   In part 1, I will use the work of Dicey as a gateway into two general 
types of claims that theorists make in support of the idea of Parliamentary sovereignty.
2  
The first type of claim is found, most notably, in the work of John Austin.
3  It supposes 
that law, wherever it is found, must derive its validity from an ultimate sovereign 
(whether in the form of a Parliament or something else).     The second type of claim is 
found in its strongest form in the work of Herbert Hart who supposes that we can identify 
the ultimate criteria of legal validity and political power in a state or constitution by 
means of an empirically determined ‘rule of recognition’.
4    For Hart, Parliament is 
sovereign, if it is, in virtue of the fact that most officials accept this to be so.
5
In part 2 of the chapter, after rejecting the first type of claim described above, I will 
examine the Hartian account by way of an analysis of the decision in the recent Jackson
     
6 
case.   It will be argued that this account too must be rejected as an explanation for the 
idea of Parliamentary sovereignty.  It makes little sense to explain the basis of legal 
validity and political power in the British constitution by an empirically determined rule.
7
                                                 
1  For a helpful overview of these debates, see A Bradley, ‘The sovereignty of parliament, form or 
substance?’ in J Jowell and D Oliver (eds), The Changing Constitution (6th edn, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 2007).  
  
Judges determine these things, not by means of an empirical survey of what most other 
judges and officials accept, but through normative arguments that speak directly to the 
powers of Parliament, government and courts, and to the rights of individuals.    This is 
brought out clearly, I will say, by the fact of disagreement amongst judges on such 
2 See AV Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1982 
[reprint of 8th ed.,1915] 
3 J Austin, Wilfred E Rumble (ed.) The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (1832) (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 1995). 
4 See H L A Hart, The Concept of Law (2nd edn, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1994). 
5 Ibid, ch 6. 
6 Jackson v Her Majesty’s Attorney-General [2005] UKHL 56. 
7 In making this argument, I will draw upon Ronald Dworkin’s sustained critique of Hart’s work.   See R 
Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press, 1977), Law’s Empire (Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1986), Justice in Robes, (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts 2006).       23 
questions as the meaning of the concept of ‘Parliament’; the required ‘manner and form’ 
of legislation; the meaning of legislation enacted by Parliament; and the question of 
whether certain things lie altogether beyond the legislative competence of Parliament.  
But even where judges agree on such questions, their agreement, it will be suggested, is 
based on moral arguments and not, as Hart perhaps implies, for reason of other judges’ 
and officials’ acceptance.
8
Given the philosophical inadequacy of each of the prominent arguments in support of 
the idea of Parliamentary sovereignty, it will be argued in part 3  that this idea is 
misconceived.   The key to understanding the British constitution can instead be found by 
building on Hart’s central insight in the Concept of Law.  In his claim that there must be 
some normative basis for the powers of Parliament and courts, it will be argued that Hart 
lays the foundations for a theory of the British constitution based on the ideal of 
government under law or the principle of legality.     In this way, traditional debates in 
British constitutional theory (ostensibly) about the meaning and possible limits on 
Parliamentary sovereignty are best understood as disagreements about the legal principles 
that condition the exercise of political power.    Drawing on the work of Ronald Dworkin, 
it will be argued that the nature of these principles will depend on the putative value that 
we find in requiring officials to exercise power in accordance with law.  It is in this sense 
that the principle of legality is, as Lord Hope suggests in Jackson, the ‘controlling factor 
on which our constitution is based’.
    
9
 
 
1. In Search of the Philosophical Foundations of Parliamentary Sovereignty 
  
Towards the beginning of his seminal work, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the 
Constitution, Dicey suggests several ways in which the idea of Parliamentary sovereignty 
represents the ‘dominant characteristic’
10
                                                 
8 I endorse what I take to be Dworkin’s reading of Hart on this point: that, on the best reading of The 
Concept of Law (both the original edition and the postscript), Hart is committed to a conventionalist 
understanding of the rule of recognition.   This is to say that there must be moral reasons to count the 
convergent attitudes of officials as being partly determinative of what we count as law.  For a meticulously 
argued defence of a non-conventional reading of Hart, see Julie Dickson, ‘Is the Rule of Recognition 
Really a Conventional Rule’ (2007) 27 OJLS  373-402.  Dickson argues that there is a distinction – which, 
as a biographical matter, Hart accepted – between the existence conditions of the rule of recognition and 
any reasons that judges may have for following it.    
  in the British constitution.    For ease of 
9 Above (n 6) 107. 
10 Above (n 2) 3   24 
reference, I have highlighted these with bold numbering.   He describes his project as an 
attempt to  
 
‘[C]arry a step further the proof that, under the English constitution, Parliament [1] does constitute such a 
supreme legislative authority or sovereign power as, according to Austin and other jurists, [2] must exist in 
every civilised state, and for that purpose to examine into the validity of the various suggestions, which 
have from time to time been made, as to the possible limitations on Parliamentary authority, and to show 
that none of them are countenanced by English law’
11
 
 
He continues some pages later: 
 
‘In England [3] we are accustomed to the existence of a supreme legislative body, i.e. a body which can 
make or unmake every law; and which, therefore, cannot be bound by any law.  This is, from a legal point 
of view, the true conception of a sovereign, and the ease with which the theory of absolute sovereignty has 
been accepted by English jurists is [4] due to the peculiar history of English constitutional law.   So far, 
therefore, from its being true that the sovereignty of Parliament is a [5] deduction from abstract theory of 
jurisprudence, a critic would come nearer the truth who asserted that Austin’s theory of sovereignty is [6] 
suggested by the position of the English parliament...’
12
 
 
In the first place, Dicey distinguishes the view that Parliament does  constitute the 
sovereign power [1] from the view that a sovereign power must exist in a civilised state 
[2]. Let us call the first claim an empirical claim and the second a structural claim.
13
 
   I 
will discuss these in reverse order.    
A. The Structural Claim 
 
There are several versions of the claim that a sovereign must exist in every state or 
constitution.  This type of claim perhaps originated in the idea that a King or Queen rules 
by divine right over his or her subjects.
14
                                                 
11 Ibid 19 
      Hobbes, by contrast, advocates the need for 
12 Ibid 27 
13 It should be stressed that I am not setting out to present Dicey’s theory as either a structural or empirica l 
claim, but rather to use his arguments as a gateway into these different types of theories.  Indeed, in line 
with the general argument in this chapter, it is my view that Dicey can only be understood as making the 
normative claim that it is right and  proper that Parliament should  possess an all-embracing legislative 
authority.  This position, I think, represents a particular conception of legality and not of sovereignty.   See 
part 4 below. 
14 See, for instance, R Filmer, J P Sommerville (ed.) Patriarcha and Other Writings (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge 1991).   25 
an ultimate sovereign as a matter of normative political philosophy.   In every state, he 
says, there must be a Leviathan to lift mankind out of its war-like State of Nature.
15
 
   I 
want to consider two forms of this first type of claim that, I think, have somewhat greater 
resonance within orthodox British constitutional theory.    Both, in different ways, treat 
the existence of a sovereign as part of the structure of a state or constitution. 
(i) Parliament as the Austinian sovereign  
 
Dicey alludes at [5]  to the ‘abstract theory of jurisprudence’ of John Austin as one 
possible basis for the idea of Parliamentary sovereignty.   Austin tells us that wherever 
there is law, there must be a sovereign whom others habitually obey but who is not in the 
habit of obeying any other.
16
 
    Laws take the form of ‘commands’ issued by the 
sovereign to her subjects; and where the law is silent on a given point, judges must make 
new law in the exercise of their discretion, which the sovereign may either overturn or 
tacitly accept.   With his customary clarity, Hart says the following of this type of theory: 
[A] vertical structure composed of sovereign and subjects is, according to the theory, as essential a part of a 
society which possesses law, as a back bone is of a man.  Where it is present, we may speak of the society, 
together with its sovereign, as a single independent state, and we may speak of its law: where it is not 
present, we can apply none of these expressions, for the relation of sovereign and subject forms, according 
to this theory, part of their very meaning.
17
 
   
On this account then, the existence of a sovereign belongs to the very structure of the 
concept of a state. There is a strong sense, I think, in which many judges, lawyers and 
academics conceive of the British constitution in this way.   It is thought to be axiomatic, 
for instance, that the role of judges is to give effect to the express or implied intentions of 
Parliament, and that Parliament has the power to overturn common law doctrines.  These 
features of English legal practice – which judges and lawyers tend to derive from Dicey’s 
statement of the orthodox doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty – arguably take their 
roots in the Austinian ideas that all legal norms must emanate from an all-powerful 
                                                 
15 See T. Hobbes, C.B. Macpherson (ed.) Leviathon  (Penguin Books, London 1986).   For a recent 
interpretation of Hobbes as supporting a theory of the state in which the powers of a legislature is limited 
by the principle of legality, see D Dyzenhaus, ‘Hobbes republican theory of law’, (unpublished). Delivered 
in the UCL Colloquium in Legal and Social Philosophy, Feb 11, 2009. 
16 Above (n 3), Lecture vi. For an excellent discussion of the differences in emphasis in the work of Austin, 
Bentham and Hobbes, see D Dyzenhaus, ‘The Genealogy of Legal Positivism’ (2004) 24 OJLS 39-67.   26 
sovereign, and that the sovereign may either overturn or give tacit consent to judge-made 
law.    If Parliament is the Austinian sovereign then, in Dicey’s words, it must have the 
right to ‘make or unmake any law…’
18 and it must be the case that ‘no person or body is 
recognised by the law of England as having a right to override or set aside the legislation 
of Parliament’.
19
Perhaps the most striking manifestation of this Austinian influence on British 
constitutional theory is the widespread agreement among judges and lawyers that a 
sovereign Parliament may suspend or abrogate even so-called ‘constitutional’ or 
‘fundamental’ rights by sufficiently clear and unequivocal language.
        
20    That Parliament 
possesses the authority to legislate in such extreme and oppressive ways can be easily 
explained if we take Parliament to be the Austinian sovereign.   Similarly, in debates 
about the introduction of European Community Law into domestic law, one can detect 
the view that it is a logical impossibility  that Parliament can have surrendered its 
sovereignty.   Hence most judges and theorists, in the spirit of Austin, are quick to 
explain any apparent threats to the orthodox doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty as 
being willed by a sovereign Parliament.
21    There is also a sense in which long-running 
debates about the constitutional foundations of judicial review take place within an 
Austinian framework.    While  ultra vires theorists insist that ‘what an all powerful 
Parliament does not prohibit, it must authorise either expressly or impliedly’,
22 several 
common law theorists contend that the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty is a doctrine 
created by judges.
23
                                                                                                                                                 
17 Above (n 4) 50. 
  These two views, in common with the other doctrines discussed, are 
each suggestive of the Austinian view that the law-making powers of the sovereign 
18 Above (n 2) 3. 
19 Ibid 3. 
20 See, for instance, R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p. Simms [2000] 2 AC 115 at 131.   
Even the most progressive constitutional theorists seem to accept this position.   See, for example, P Craig, 
‘Ultra Vires and the Foundations of Judicial Review’ [1998] CLJ 63-90 at 86; J Jowell, ‘Of Vires and 
Vacuums: The Constitutional Context of Judicial Review’ [1999] PL 448-460 at 458-9 and J Jowell, 
‘Beyond the Rule of Law: Towards Constitutional Judicial Review’ [2000] PL 671-683 at 675.   But cf. J 
Jowell, ‘Parliamentary Sovereignty under the New Constitutional Hypothesis’, [2006] PL 562-580 at 565-
6.   
21 See the speech of Lord Bridge in R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame (No. 1) 
[1990] 2 AC 85 at 140.  See also, P Craig, ‘Sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament after 
Factortame’ (1991) 11 YBEL 221-55.   Cf. HWR Wade, ‘Sovereignty-Revolution or Evolution’ (1996) 112 
LQR 568-75.    
22 See C Forsyth, ‘Of Fig Leaves and Fairy Tales: The Ultra Vires Doctrine, The Sovereignty of Parliament 
and Judicial Review’ (1996) 55 CLJ 122-40 at 133.    
23 See, for instance, Sir John Laws, ‘Law and Democracy’ [1995] PL 72-93 at 84-7.   For a recent judicial 
endorsement of this view, see the opinions of Lord Steyn and Lord Hope in Jackson above (n 6) 102 and   27 
(whether Parliament, the courts or some other person or body) cannot be derived from, or 
conditioned by, any superior authority or anterior legal rule or principle.
24
 
  I will have 
more to say about this approach below in the course of discussing Hart’s theory.    
(ii) The constitution as a concept of a natural kind 
 
There is a second and slightly different sense in which it might be said that a sovereign 
must exist in every constitution.    This is to claim that a sovereign entity forms part of the 
very essence of a constitution; that, minus this element, it would be a mistake to describe 
something as a constitution.   This type of reasoning – which philosophers associate with 
so-called concepts of ‘natural kinds’ – applies most readily to chemicals or animals.
25   
When we try to identify a chemical or animal, we study their atomic or anatomic 
structure, or their DNA.   This information is a matter of scientific fact: chemicals and 
animals have a molecular structure, even if scientists do not have all the means of 
identifying that structure.    Can the same be said of political ideals such as a state, or a 
constitution or democracy?   It is sometimes said that democracy means majority rule, 
and that anyone who uses the term democracy in any other way is making a mistake 
about what democracy really is.
26  Similarly, people will say that there are limits  to 
democracy, or that democracy conflicts with individual rights, with the implication that 
the meaning of democracy (and rights) 
 is fixed.
27
Unlike a chemical or an animal though, that which we refer to as ‘democracy’ or a 
‘constitution’, or sovereignty are not ‘things’ out there in the world which can be put 
under a microscope.    We cannot take a sample of democracy in the way that we would a 
plant.   It is not at all obvious then how one would go about identifying the structure of 
democracy, a constitution or sovereignty.   Philosophers might claim to be able to unlock 
   
                                                                                                                                                 
126.    I discuss the philosophical significance of these judicial dicta in part 3 below.  See also (below) ch 3 
part 2C. 
24 Austin allowed though for the possibility of non-legal constraints on the action of a sovereign.  See 
above (n 3) 215-6. 
25 For a detailed discussion, see N Stavropoulos, Objectivity in Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1996), ch 2. 
26 See R Dworkin, Justice in Robes above (n 8) 142-3 who offers this example.  It should be stressed that 
this is not Dworkin’s own view for which see R Dworkin, Freedom’s Law, (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 1996) ‘Introduction: The Moral Reading and the Majoritarian Premise’. 
27 One finds this type of argument in relation to the adjudication under the European Convention on Human 
Rights.  Chapters 8-12 of the Convention invite judges, firstly, to decide what the right is, and then to 
decide whether the state can legitimately interfere with that right.   This analysis implies that the right has a 
prior fixed content before the court considers any legitimate reasons that the state may have for its decision 
or action.  For a robust argument against this type of approach, see G Letsas, A Theory of Interpretation of 
the European Convention on Human Rights, (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007), chs 5 and 6.   28 
their structure using special ‘meta-ethical’ techniques that are removed from the day-to-
day arguments of judges and lawyers, but it is difficult to imagine what these could be.
28
 
   
Nonetheless, there is a sense in which Dicey and subsequent theorists of the British 
constitution can be understood as making this type of claim.    The idea of Parliamentary 
sovereignty, the argument might run, forms part of the DNA of a state or constitution; 
and the idea, say, that Parliament has the right to ‘make or unmake any law…’it might be 
said, forms part of the DNA of ‘sovereignty’.  
B. The Empirical Claim 
 
Dicey seemed underwhelmed by the view that a sovereign power must exist in a civilised 
state, hence his rather pejorative characterisation of this view as a ‘deduction from 
abstract jurisprudence’ [5]. Instead, he clearly wanted to make a positive case for the 
view that ‘Parliament does constitute [the] supreme legislative authority or sovereign 
power’ in the British constitution (my italics).  The sovereignty of Parliament, he says, is 
something to which ‘we are accustomed’ [3] and something that is ‘suggested by the 
position of the English parliament’ [6].     This claim – which I will present at this stage 
as an empirical claim – is of an entirely different type to the structural claim above.   The 
existence of a sovereign entity on the structural account is an essential property of a state 
or a constitution.   On the empirical account, by contrast, the existence of a sovereign 
entity is an accidental property of a state or constitution in that it depends on the way in 
which a political community in fact functions.
29   The latter type of theorist must 
therefore decide which types of behaviour are relevant to the question of whether 
Parliament is sovereign.
30
 
 There are a number of possibilities but I will consider just 
three candidates. 
(i) Use of the word constitution 
 
                                                 
28 See, generally, R Dworkin, Justice in Robes above (n 7) ch 6.  
29  For the philosophical distinction between essential and accidental properties, see 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/essential-accidental/  
30 It might be argued that Austin himself treats the existence of a sovereign as an accidental property of a 
state or constitution in so far as its existence is contingent on ‘habits of obedience’ by subjects towards a 
sovereign.   29 
In the first place, we could simply look at the conventional, ordinary usage of the word 
‘constitution’ and the word ‘sovereignty’ as a way of understanding those concepts.
31    
This would be to treat these concepts as criterial concepts, or concepts whose meaning 
depends on uncovering a set of shared linguistic criteria.
32  Many concepts are criterial in 
this sense.  For instance, most people agree that the word ‘bachelor’ means an unmarried 
man, or that the word ‘table’ means a flat surface with legs.   There is no way of 
identifying the meaning of these words other than by tracking their common usage.    Of 
course, people may disagree about precisely which criteria do apply when people use 
words.  They may disagree, for instance, about whether people use the word bachelor as 
much in relation to a lifestyle as a marital status, or whether the concept of a table 
necessarily implies a flat surface.  But these disagreements would be characteristically 
empirical disagreements about the criteria that most people do in fact  use when they 
make use of such concepts.
33    Such disagreements can normally be settled by consulting 
some authoritative source of linguistic practice, most obviously a dictionary.
34
It may be then that Dicey approached the British constitution in this way.   The idea of 
Parliamentary sovereignty, he may have supposed, is one widely accepted linguistic 
criterion of the concept of a state or constitution: it figures in the ordinary usage of those 
words.  Equally, the definition of Parliamentary sovereignty, he may have thought, 
depends on the way in which people use that phrase.   Just as we could confidently say 
that people would be making a mistake about the concept of a table if they suggested that 
it was, say, a flying machine, so we could point to a mistake in the use of the word 
‘sovereignty’ if people supposed that there are limits on the things that Parliament can do 
by legislation.   
 
 
(ii) The attitudes of ‘officials’ 
 
Dicey’s claim that parliament ‘does constitute a supreme legislative authority or power in 
the British constitution…’ arguably reached its philosophical apotheosis in the work of 
                                                 
31  Hart seemed to express some sympathy with this approach, which derives from ‘ordinary language’ 
philosophy.    For instance, he endorses the view of J.L. Austin, that ‘…we are using a sharpened 
awareness of words to sharpen our perception of the phenomena.’  See Hart above (n 4) 14; J L Austin, ‘A 
Plea for Excuses’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. 57 (1956-7) at 8.  Hart later sought to refute 
this association though. See Hart, above (n 4) 246-8.   Cf. N Stavropoulos, ‘Hart’s Semantics’ in Coleman 
(ed.), Hart’s Postscript: Essays on the Postscript to the Concept of Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford 2001). 
32 See R Dworkin, Justice in Robes above  (n 7), Introduction, chs 6 and 8. 
33 Ibid 
34 See, Simon Winchester, The Meaning of Everything (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2003).   30 
Herbert Hart.   Hart identifies a number of difficulties with the first type of structural type 
of claim described above.    Chief amongst these is the difficulty of explaining the 
continuity of legal systems if sovereign law-making powers depend on the ‘habits of 
obedience’ of its subjects.
35  At the same time, Austin’s account, Hart suggests, fails to 
give the sense in which a law-maker exercises power as of right.
36   Hart’s solution is to 
suggest that the law-making powers in a state or constitution are best explained by a 
particular rule telling us where such powers reside.   In every state, he says, one finds a 
master ‘rule of recognition’ providing the ‘the criteria by which the validity of other rules 
of a system is assessed’.
37   This rule ‘exists only as a complex, but normally concordant, 
practice of the courts, officials, and private persons in identifying the law by reference to 
certain criteria.  Its existence is a matter of fact’.
38
In what sense is the rule of recognition a matter of fact?    At first sight, this seems to 
confuse the normative sense of a rule with the descriptive idea of a fact.
     
39   In order to 
understand this idea, we first need to imagine someone looking into a community from 
the outside and observing particular patterns of behaviour amongst its officials. That 
observer takes what Hart describes as the ‘external point of view’ and, for him, those 
patterns amount to nothing more than the coincidence of activity or habit without any 
normative aspect.
40    Those patterns of behaviour take on a normative aspect when the 
officials of the system adopt the ‘internal point of view’ towards them: that is, when they 
‘regard [them] as common standards of official behaviour and appraise critically their 
own and each other’s deviations as lapses.’
41   The rule of recognition is a ‘matter of fact’ 
in that its content depends on a morally neutral description of whichever standard of 
official behaviour officials accept at any given point in time.
42
Hart emphasises the sense though in which the rule of recognition may also be seen as 
a matter of law.   He says 
     
 
                                                 
35 See Hart, above (n 4), chs 2-4. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid 105. 
38 Ibid 110.   
39 See T Endicott, ‘Adjudication and the Law’ (2007) 27 OJLS 311-26 at 312. 
40 Above (n 4) 90. 
41 Ibid 117 
42 Ibid 111-2. For a recent defence of this position, see Marmor, ‘Legal Positivism: Still Descriptive and 
Morally Neutral’ (2006) 26 OJLS 683-704.   31 
‘The case for calling the rule of recognition ‘law’ is that the rule providing criteria for the identification of 
other rules of the system may well be thought a defining feature of a legal system…’
43
 
 
Indeed, by his refutation of the Austinian type of theory described above, there is a sense 
in which Hart moves altogether away from the idea of sovereignty, and towards the idea 
of ‘government under law’ or legality.
44  This can be illustrated quite simply.   On the 
Austinian account, the power of Parliament, say, to overturn the common law principles 
of judicial review (if true) is explained by the fact that all laws necessarily derive their 
validity from the will of the sovereign.   The Hartian account, by contrast, supposes that 
the power of Parliament to overturn common law principles (if true) is explained by the 
fact that most officials accept  that Acts of Parliament are superior to common law 
precedents.
45  For the Austinian theorist then, a sovereign Parliament (or some other 
sovereign), being the source of legal validity is necessarily ‘above the law’.
46  For Hart, 
by contrast, the powers of Parliament derive from a rule which is logically prior to those 
powers.   Parliament must therefore act in accordance with whichever conditions this rule 
sets down.   In this respect, Hart seems an unlikely source of support for any theory of 
sovereignty in the British constitution.   Nonetheless, as we will see below, Hart and 
subsequent theorists have suggested that the prevailing rule of recognition in the British 
constitution is something like ‘what Parliament enacts is law’ and/or the idea that 
Parliament enjoys ‘continuing sovereignty’.
47
There is a further reason though as to why Hart’s theory is perhaps not the ideal theory 
to summon as long-term support for the orthodox view of Parliamentary sovereignty in 
the British constitution.  We can see how Dicey’s account of the constitution might be 
understood in terms of a Hartian rule of recognition.  For instance, in his claim that the 
sovereignty of Parliament is something ‘to which we are accustomed’, we might 
     
                                                 
43 Above (n 4) 111-2. 
44  See J Waldron, ‘Hart and the Principles of Legality’ (unpublished) delivered in The Legacy of H.L.A. 
Hart Conference, Cambridge, July 27-8, 2007 
45 Hart anticipates possible confusion between these two different views where he warns that  ‘It is 
important to distinguish [the] subordination of one criterion to another from derivation, since some 
spurious support for the view that all law is essentially…the product of legislation, has been gained from 
confusion of these two ideas…’ Above (n 4) 101. 
46 Hence, Austin’s theory is often described in terms of the rule of men, rather than the rule of law.  See R 
Cotterrell, The Politics of Jurisprudence: A Critical Introduction to Legal Philosophy, (2nd edn, 
LexisNexis Butterworths, London 2003) at 70.   See also R Bellamy (ed.) The Rule of Law and the 
Separation of Powers, (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, Hampshire 2005) ‘Introduction: the Rule of Law as 
the Rule of Persons’.   32 
understand Dicey as saying that most officials accept it to be so.  Yet, if Hart’s scheme 
helps us to understand Dicey’s conclusions, it does not necessarily endorse them.   The 
features of the constitution will always be contingent on what most officials think them to 
be in that particular place and at that particular point in time.  Indeed, Hart suggests that 
the norms contained within the US constitution, and the power of judges to strike down 
legislation that is incompatible with the constitution, form part of the rule of recognition 
in that country.
48     Equally, there is nothing within the logic of Hart’s argument to 
preclude the notion that the ultimate rule of recognition in Britain today is (or could, in 
future, be) something like: ‘what judges decide is law’.
49
 
    
(iii) The powers and functions of institutions 
 
In his celebrated chapter, The Political Constitution,
50 Professor Griffith argues that there 
are certain realities about the British constitution.    One such reality is that certain actors 
‘happen to exercise power’
51 but have no moral right to do so.  Another reality is that 
individuals do not invoke ‘rights’ but make ‘political claims’.
52
 
   Another reality is that 
conflicts between individuals or groups and those who happen to exercise power are 
political conflicts.  At the same time, Griffith identifies a set of ‘metaphysics’ which, he 
suggests, are designed by natural lawyers to conceal these realities.  The ‘state’ is one 
such metaphysic; ‘rights’ are another.   Indeed, Griffith seems to treat the very idea of a 
‘constitution’ as another metaphysic by his oft-quoted remark that: 
‘… the constitution is no more and no less than what happens.  Everything that happens is constitutional. 
And if nothing happened that would be constitutional also’.
53
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
47 See Hart, above (n 4) 148 and 151.  For a recent defence of Hart’s account of Parliamentary sovereignty, 
see J Goldsworthy, The Sovereignty of Parliament: History and Philosophy (Clarendon Press, Oxford 
1999), especially chs 2 and 10.    
48 Above, (n 4) 247.  See also Hart, ‘Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals’, 71 Harvard Law 
Review 598-629 (1958).   In the posthumously published postscript to The Concept of Law, Hart endorses 
so-called ‘soft’ positivism according to which it is acceptable for moral norms to be incorporated by 
reference into the ultimate rule of recognition. Above (n 4) 250-4.   This is to be contrasted with so-called 
‘hard’ positivism, which does not allow for any recourse to morality in identifying the law.   See, for 
instance, J Raz, The Authority of Law, Essays on Law and Morality (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1979). 
49 Indeed, this is a claim made by a number of eminent constitutional theorists.  See section 2 below.   
50 (1979) 42 MLR 1-21.  
51 Ibid at 16 
52 Ibid. 
53 Above (n 50) 19.  See also Griffith, ‘Judicial Decision-Making in Public Law’ [1984] PL 564-82.   33 
Like Hart, Griffith suggests that the existence and locus of sovereignty in the British 
constitution is an empirical question.
54   But, as if to deny the normative aspect of Hart’s 
claim, Griffith does not look to the attitudes of acceptance by particular officials or 
citizens as a determinant of the ultimate criteria of legal validity.  His approach to the 
constitution rests rather on a description of the function  or  powers  that different 
institutions ‘happen to exercise’, a view that might be likened more to Hart’s ‘external’ 
point of view.   Griffith’s views on the question of sovereignty in the British constitution 
perhaps come out most clearly in his exchange with Sir Stephen Sedley.  Sedley argues in 
favour of the ‘bi-polar sovereignty of the Crown in Parliament and the Crown in its 
courts, to each of which the Crown’s ministers are answerable – politically to Parliament, 
legally to the courts’.
55
 
 In response to this view, Griffith objects that it is the Government 
that in fact exercises sovereign power in the British constitution.  As he says: 
‘first…few would deny that Government, both politically and legally, may overturn judicial decisions by 
legislation made specifically for that purpose…second…it is the Government that has made the legislation 
and, through its majority, has required the Houses of Parliament to consent…’
56
 
  
For Griffith then, if Parliament is sovereign, this is so in virtue of the fact that Parliament 
happens to exercise sovereign power.
57
 
     
2. The Structural and Empirical Claims Considered 
 
I have considered two general bases on which a theorist of the British constitution might 
seek to defend the idea of Parliamentary sovereignty.   The first type of argument 
supposes that a sovereign – whether in the form of a Parliament or something else – 
                                                 
54 For a similar reading of Griffith, see A Tomkins, Our Republican Constitution, (Hart Publishing, Oxford 
2005) at 37-9.  Cf. T Poole, ‘Tilting at Windmills?  Truth and Illusion in ‘The Political Constitution’’ 
(2007) 70 MLR 250-277 at 253 and, especially, at 274-7. See also T R S Allan, ‘The Constitutional 
Foundations of Judicial Review: Conceptual Conundrum or Interpretative Inquiry? [2002] CLJ  87-125 at 
91-2.   
55 See S Sedley, ‘The Sound of Silence’ Constitutional Law without a Constitution’ (1994) 110 LQR 270-
291; ‘Human Rights: a Twenty-First Century Agenda’ [1995] PL 386-400 at 389, and ‘The Common Law 
and the Constitution’, in Lord Nolan of Brasted and Sir Stephen Sedley (eds), The Making and Remaking of 
the British Constitution (Blackstone Press, London 1997) at 26.   
56 See J Griffith ‘The Common law and the political constitution’, (2001) 117 LQR 42-67. 
57 Commentators sometimes refer to Griffith as a ‘functionalist’.  There is some disagreement though as to 
whether such a label implies a ‘descriptive’ or ‘prescriptive’ approach, or both.  See M Loughlin, ‘The 
Functionalist Style in Public Law’ (2005) 55 University of Toronto Law Journal 361-403, 368.  Cf. A 
Tomkins, above (n 54) 39.     34 
belongs to the very structure of a state or constitution.   One can detect the Austinian 
version of this claim, I suggested, behind much of orthodox British constitutional theory.   
If this is correct, then it is highly perplexing.    It suggests that traditional British 
constitutional theory is over a century behind in terms of legal theory.   It has neither 
responded to Hart’s devastating assault on Austin’s theory, nor has it grappled with the 
many recent theories of positivism and ‘anti-positivism’ which seek to refine or challenge 
Hart’s own theory.    I propose to say nothing more about the Austinian type of claim 
beyond disregarding it as an adequate philosophical basis for the idea of Parliamentary 
sovereignty.   Nor, it must be said, does it make any sense to treat a constitution as a 
concept of a natural kind.  It is wholly implausible to suppose that sovereignty is a thing 
‘out there’ in the world whose meaning can be discovered by scientific analysis.   
The second type of argument seems more promising.  It supposes, I said, that we can 
identify the ultimate criteria of legal validity in a state or constitution by looking to 
certain empirically determined facts.  Importantly, each of the different forms of this 
claim implies that the relevant facts can be identified without engaging in any moral 
evaluation.   The theorist who treats the concept of a constitution as a criterial concept 
purports to describe that concept in terms of the agreed linguistic criteria that make up the 
concept.  He does not ask what value there is in those criteria.   Hartian theorists are 
interested in the standards that most officials accept; it is not necessary, they argue, for 
those standards to be morally acceptable.   And for Professor Griffith, the question of 
who wields sovereign power depends simply on ‘what happens’.  There is no question 
about what value there is in those things.   
I now want to test this second type of claim focussing, in particular, on Hart’s account.    
The question for consideration is this: is it possible to capture the idea of Parliamentary 
Sovereignty (and, more generally, the ultimate basis of legal validity and political power 
in a state) in a Hartian rule or set of rules?   The recent decision in Jackson
58 will provide 
the ideal vehicle for exploring this question.    In the first place, the House of Lords broke 
with common law tradition and agreed to rule on the validity of a statute.   Questions 
about the basis of legal validity and legislative power were therefore directly in point.    
Secondly, judges sitting in both the Court of Appeal and House of Lords seemed to be in 
sympathy with a Hartian approach to these questions.
59
                                                 
58 Above (n 6). 
   
59 Ibid.  See, in particular, Lord Hope at 124, Lord Bingham at 36, Lord Nicholls at 63, and the Court of 
Appeal [2005] Q.B. 579 at 97.   35 
 
A. Jackson v Her Majesty’s Attorney General 
 
The legal issues in Jackson are well known.  Briefly, section 2(1) of the Parliament Act 
1911 provides that legislation made in accordance with the procedures set out in that 
section – relating to the number of sessions and years that need to have elapsed before an 
Act will receive the Royal Assent – shall ‘become an Act of Parliament on the Royal 
Assent being signified…notwithstanding that the House of Lords have not consented to 
the Bill.’   The issue in Jackson was whether the Parliament Act 1949 and the Hunting 
Act 2004, both of which had purportedly been passed under the 1911 Act, were valid 
Acts of Parliament.   This turned, in the first place, on whether the 1949 Act was 
delegated legislation (delegated from Parliament as a whole to the House of Commons 
alone) and, if so, whether it improperly modified or enlarged the scope of the 1911 Act.     
The court unanimously rejected this argument.  The purpose  of the 1911 Act, Lord 
Bingham said, was not to delegate power to the Commons but to restrict the power of the 
Lords and to obviate the need for the monarch to create new Peers.
60
Given that the phrase ‘Act of Parliament’ in section 2(1) was not ‘doubtful, ambiguous 
or obscure’, there could be no question, Lord Bingham said, that the 1949 and 2004 Acts 
were both Acts of Parliament.
     The judgments 
focussed mainly then on the construction of section 2(1) of the 1911 Act.   The court was, 
in effect, asked to rule on what it meant for a Bill to be passed ‘in accordance with’ 
section 2(1) of the 1911 Act? 
61    Section 2(1) of the 1911 Act, he said, had created a 
‘new way of enacting primary legislation’.
62    The only limit to the use of the 1911 Act 
(in its current state), he said, was that expressly stated in section 2(1), namely an attempt 
by the Commons to extend the maximum duration of Parliament beyond five years.  In 
using the phrase ‘any public bill’ [my italics] in section 2(1), the Parliamentary draftsmen 
had made it as clear as could be that there were no further limits.
63
                                                 
60 Ibid 25. 
   This was also clear, 
he said, from the historical record of numerous failed attempts to insert additional limits. 
This also meant that the Commons could (legally speaking) use the 1911 and 1949 Acts 
to pass an Act amending the 1911 Act, and then enact legislation allowing for the 
61 Ibid 24. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid 32.   36 
extension of the Parliamentary term beyond five years.
64    The remainder of the court 
agreed that the 1949 and 2004 Acts were validly passed, but most
65 judges disagreed with 
Lord Bingham on the question of whether the Commons could unilaterally extend the 
Parliamentary term using the 1911 Act.  If the Commons could take an indirect route to 
achieve this, Lord Nicholls said, then ‘express legislative intention could readily be 
defeated’.
66   Therefore, he said, ‘this implied restriction is necessary in order to render 
the express restriction effectual’.
67  This, he said, was the only limit on the use of the 
1911 Act though.   On the same point Lord Steyn said that: ‘In the context of a 
Parliamentary democracy the language of section 2(1) and section 7 [entails that the 
indirect route is not available]’.
68
Unsurprisingly, the judgments in Jackson strayed beyond the specific question of how 
to construe the 1911 Act to the broader issue of Parliamentary sovereignty.  Lord Steyn 
said: 
    
 
‘The classic account given by Dicey of the doctrine of the supremacy of Parliament, pure and absolute as it 
was, can now be seen to be out of place in the modern United Kingdom. Nevertheless, the supremacy of 
Parliament is still the general principle of our constitution. It is a construct of the common law. The judges 
created this principle.  If that is so, it is not unthinkable that circumstances could arise where the courts may 
have to qualify a principle established on a different hypothesis of constitutionalism.   In exceptional 
circumstances involving an attempt to abolish judicial review or the ordinary role of the courts, the [court] 
may have to consider whether this is a constitutional fundamental which even a sovereign Parliament acting 
at the behest of a complaisant House of Commons cannot abolish…’
69
 
 
Lord Hope said: 
 
‘It is sufficient to note at this stage that a conclusion that there are no legal limits to what can be done under 
section 2(1) does not mean that the power to legislate which it contains is without any limits whatsoever.   
Parliamentary sovereignty is an empty principle if legislation is passed which is so absurd or so 
unacceptable that the populace at large refuses to recognise it as law’.
70
 
 
                                                 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid. With the possible exception of Baroness Hale at 166. 
66 Ibid 59.  Lord Carswell explicitly agrees with Lord Nicholl’s reading at 175.   
67 Ibid 61. 
68 Ibid 79. Similarly see Lord Roger at 139. 
69 Ibid 102. 
70 Ibid 120.   37 
And Baroness Hale said: 
 
‘The courts will treat with particular suspicion (and might even reject) any attempt to subvert the rule of 
law by removing governmental action affecting the rights of individuals from all judicial scrutiny’
71
 
 
Can the decision in Jackson be explained by reference to one or more rules of recognition 
and, more particularly, a rule that expresses the idea of Parliamentary sovereignty?     In 
other words, can it be said that the court identifies the ultimate criteria of legal validity 
and political power in the British constitution by way of an empirical survey of what 
most other judges and officials accept?      
The first difficulty with this type of explanation is that it is resoundingly rejected by at 
least two of the Law Lords.   Both Lord Steyn and Lord Hope are explicit in saying that it 
is judges alone who ‘created’ the idea of Parliamentary sovereignty through the common 
law, and that judges have the sole power to adopt a ‘new hypothesis of constitutionalism’ 
in the event, say, that Parliament attempted to abolish judicial review.
72    Hartian 
theorists have dismissed these types of dicta as being ‘historically false’
73  and 
‘jurisprudentially absurd’.
74
 
    They are historically false, it is said, because judges did not 
in fact create the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty.  As Goldsworthy puts it: 
‘The historical evidence demonstrates that for several centuries, at least, all three branches of government 
in Britain have accepted the doctrine that Parliament has sovereign law-making authority’
75
 
  
They are jurisprudentially absurd, it is said, because: 
 
‘…judges are no more qualified than Parliament to be regarded as the Hobbesian sovereign, ultimately 
responsible for the creation of all law.  The authority of either Parliament, or the judges, or both, must be 
based on laws that neither was responsible for creating’
76
 
 
                                                 
71 Ibid 159. 
72 Ibid 102 per Lord Steyn and 126 per Lord Hope.  Baroness Hale perhaps implicitly agrees with these 
views given that she entertains the possibility of courts rejecting an attempt by parliament to deny access to 
a court.    
73 See R Ekins, ‘Acts of Parliament and the Parliament Acts’, (2007) LQR  91-115 at 102. 
74 Ibid.  
75 Above (n 47) 236. 
76 Ibid 240.   See also J Goldsworthy, ‘Is Parliament Sovereign? Recent Challenges to the Doctrine of 
Parliamentary Sovereignty’ (2005) 3 New Zealand Journal of Public and International Law 7-37 at 7.   38 
In the second of these contentions Goldsworthy presents the claims of Lord Steyn and 
Lord Hope as an Austinian (or Hobbesean) type of claim (which I have described above 
as a ‘structural’ claim).     While the dicta of Lord Steyn and Lord Hope can clearly be 
interpreted in this way,
77
Does it make sense to characterise the type of disagreement between Goldsworthy and 
Lords Steyn and Hope as a morally neutral, empirical disagreement about what most 
other judges and officials think (or have historically thought)?    The immediate difficulty 
with this type of account is the way in which these Lords and others seek to justify the 
respective powers of Parliament and the courts.   For instance, in their initial decision to 
accept jurisdiction in Jackson (and thereby rule on the validity of the 1949 and 2004 
Acts) the Lords cite the fact, firstly, that the court would not be investigating the ‘internal 
workings and procedures of Parliament’;
  enough has been said, I hope, to show that this type of claim is 
unsustainable as a matter of legal theory.   The important philosophical question for 
present purposes is therefore not whether judges created the doctrine of Parliamentary 
sovereignty, but whether the Hartian type of claim adopted by Goldsworthy can 
adequately explain such law-making power as Parliament and judges do possess.    This 
takes us to Goldsworthy’s first contention.   The Hartian objection to Lords Steyn and 
Hope, he suggests, is as follows: it is an empirical mistake to say that judges have the 
ultimate authority to control Parliamentary action.   If we look closely at the behaviour of 
Parliament, government and the courts, it is clear that each branch of government accepts 
– and has historically accepted – that Parliament is sovereign.   
78  thus, there would be no breach of the 
separation of powers.   Secondly, they state that, since the appellants had raised a 
question of law (the interpretation of s. 2(1) of the Parliament Act) which could not be 
resolved by Parliament, the rule of law  requires that the court should resolve it.
79    
Moreover, Lord Steyn, Lord Hope and Baroness Hale explicitly recognise certain things 
that lie beyond the competence of Parliament, and which the courts would not permit.   
Parliament could not ‘abolish judicial review or the ordinary role of the courts’;
80 nor 
could it pass legislation which is ‘so absurd or so unacceptable that the populace at large 
refuses to recognise it as law.’
81
                                                 
77 This is particularly so in relation to the dictum of Lord Hope (above (n 70)) who seems to suggest in 
characteristically Austinian fashion that the limits on sovereignty are extra-legal rather than legal limits. 
    One does not have to look far for similar arguments of 
78 Distinguishing this case from Pickin v. British Railways Board [1974] AC 765. 
79 Jackson above (n 6) 25 and 110.   
80 Ibid 102 and 159. 
81 Ibid 120.   39 
principle from the academic community.  Sir William Wade,
82 Trevor Allan,
83 and Sir 
John Laws
84 have argued with great force and elegance that the sovereignty of Parliament 
depends on the willingness of the judiciary to recognise Parliamentary enactments as 
valid law.  Others have argued that Parliamentary power depends, say, on the 
agreement
85  or participation
86
 The inadequacy of the Hartian account can be further illustrated by attempting to 
formulate some rule –  on which most officials agree –  which captures the idea of 
Parliamentary sovereignty.   It may be helpful to work backwards from Hart’s own 
suggestion that the rule of recognition in the British constitution is the rule: ‘whatever the 
Queen in Parliament enacts is law’.
  of most citizens.    It seems unreal to describe these 
different views as empirical disagreements about what most officials think. 
87
 
  If this rule represents the rule of recognition, then 
officials must:   
‘regard [it] as [a] common [standard] of official behaviour and appraise critically their own and each 
other’s deviations [from it] as lapses.’
88
 
 
What ‘common standard of official behaviour’ does the phrase ‘whatever the Queen in 
Parliament enacts is law’ provide though?     To begin with, we might ponder what 
‘Parliament’ means.   In Jackson, Lord Steyn distinguishes the ‘static’ concept of 
Parliament, meaning the fixed elements that make up Parliament –  the House of 
Commons, House of Lords and the Queen in Parliament – from the ‘dynamic’ concept, 
which refers to the different ways in which those elements combine to create 
legislation.
89
                                                 
82 Wade ‘the Basis of Legal Sovereignty’ (1955) 13 CLJ 172-197.  
     On what basis though does the notion of Parliament bear either of these 
meanings?      The Hartian story is simple: to the extent that Parliament figures in the 
83  See generally, Allan, Law, Liberty and Justice, the Legal Foundations of British Constitutionalism ( 
Oxford University Press, Oxford 1993); Constitutional Justice: A Liberal Theory of the Rule of Law 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford 2003). 
84 See Sir John Laws, ‘Law and Democracy’, [1995] above (n 23).  For an excellent discussion of the 
similarities, on this point, between Wade and Laws, see Craig, ‘Competing Models of Judicial Review’ in 
Forsyth (ed.) Judicial Review and the Constitution (Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2000).   
85 This reflects the classical ‘social contract’ position whereby citizens give their tacit consent to the 
authority of the state only under certain conditions, say, of liberty and equality.   See, for instance, J Locke, 
Peter Laslett (ed.), Two Treatises of Government (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2003). 
86 This type of approach is found in theories of civic republicanism.  See, for instance, Tomkins, above (n 
54).  See also Lord Woolf CJ in the Court of Appeal in Jackson who includes attitudes of ‘the populace’ in 
the calculation, above (n 63). 
87 See Hart, above (n 4) 148  
88 Ibid 117 
89 See Jackson, above (n 6) 81.   40 
relevant ‘standard of official behaviour’, the meaning of Parliament is that which most 
officials accept.  Indeed, with a clear nod to Hart, Lord Hope says in relation to Lord 
Steyn’s ‘dynamic’ concept of Parliament that 
 
‘The restrictions on the exercise of the power of the House of Lords that the 1949 Act purported to make 
have been so widely recognised and relied upon that these restrictions are, today, a political fact.’   
 
The implications of this type of reasoning, it is suggested, are wholly counterintuitive.   It 
would imply that, given the necessary acceptance by officials, Parliament could mean 
anything.
90  Thus, if most officials were to accept in future that Parliament means ‘the 
Knights Templar and the Freemasons’ then, for that reason alone, this would constitute 
the ‘static’ concept of Parliament.   And if they were to accept that ‘the Most Senior 
Freemason’ has power to legislate unilaterally, say, on all financial bills, then this would 
constitute one manifestation of the ‘dynamic’ concept.     This surely fails to make sense 
of their Lordships’ reasoning on the meaning of Parliament.
91    Baroness Hale, for 
instance, is explicit in offering a justification for the 1911 Act – and for the ‘dynamic’ 
meaning of Parliament that it entails – based on the principle of democracy.
92   Equally, 
in ruling out the unilateral use of the 1911 Act by the Commons to extend the 
Parliamentary term beyond five years, most members of the Lords rule, in effect, that 
such action would be undemocratic.   The latter ruling perhaps makes better sense still as 
being justified by the principle that the House of Lords exists to exert ‘checks and 
balances’ on the Government and House of Commons.
93
                                                 
90 This applies, a fortiori, to Griffith for whom the identity of the ultimate lawmaker does not even require 
acceptance by officials: Parliament is whatever it happens to be. See above (n 50) 16. 
     Contrary to the Hartian 
account then, the reasoning in Jackson  reveals that the meaning of the concept of 
‘Parliament’ is responsive to certain principles.  It is these principles that justify the very 
91 To use Dworkin’s two dimensions of interpretation, this reasoning neither ‘fits’ nor ‘justifies’ the fact 
that Parliament possesses legislative powers in the British constitution.  See R Dworkin, Law’s Empire, 
above (n 7) 139.   
92See Jackson, above (n 6) 157.  This principle, I think, justifies the view expressed by different judges that 
the point of the 1911 Act was to restrict the power of the House of Lords.   
93 The principles of democracy and checks and balances are, of course, precisely the types of principles that 
have historically motivated political debates about the reform of Parliament.  See, for instance, Report of 
the Royal Commission on the Reform of the House of Lords (Chair: Lord Wakeham) Cmnd 4534, 2000).   
It would be odd then if these  principles played no part in the way that judges define the concept of 
Parliament.   41 
fact that it is Parliament – and not ‘the Knights Templar and the Freemasons’ – which 
exercises law-making powers in the British constitution.
94
  This reasoning, it is suggested, must extend to Hart’s parallel claim that the rule 
of recognition in the British constitution entails the fact that Parliament possesses 
‘continuing’ rather than ‘self-embracing’ sovereignty.
   
95   The question of whether 
Parliament can entrench certain procedural or substantive laws (and whether a later Act 
will always impliedly repeal an earlier Act) also cannot be answered by looking to 
whether officials accept that Parliament has ‘continuing’ or ‘self-embracing’ sovereignty.   
The legality of such action will depend, once again, on whether such action is consistent 
with the principles that justify Parliament’s law-making powers.   A decision to entrench 
a Bill of Rights by requiring, say, the support of two-thirds of both Houses of Parliament 
and a positive return in a referendum, it might be supposed, would be consistent with 
such principles.
96   But it could surely not be said that Parliament, acting as a Parliament, 
could alter the procedures by which laws must be enacted in a way that completely 
excludes both Houses of Parliament, for example, by giving the Speaker the sole power 
to assent to a bill.
97
If we return to Hart’s original formulation of the rule of recognition in the British 
constitution viz. ‘what the Queen in Parliament enacts is law’, there is a further difficulty 
still with the idea that judges treat this as an empirically determined ‘standard of official 
behaviour’: judges disagree about the meaning of the thing ‘enacted by the Queen in 
Parliament’.
     
98
                                                 
94 I certainly do not mean to imply that there cannot be law unless there is democracy.   If it were plausible 
to suppose that Freemasons and Knights of the Realm (or whomever) do in fact exercise legislative power 
in British legal practice, then it may be that we could justify that power according to, say, the principle of 
protected expectations or certainty if most people in fact obeyed their edicts.  Cf. Allan, who expresses 
sympathy with Dyzenhaus’s ‘culture of justification’ in that he ‘equates the rule of law with a certain 
conception of democracy’. T R S Allan, Constitutional Justice above (n 83); D Dyzenhaus, ‘Form and 
Substance in the Rule of Law: A Democratic Justification for Judicial Review?’, in C Forsyth (ed.) Judicial 
Review and the Constitution (Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2000) at 71. 
   We see at least five approaches to the question of how to interpret the 
meaning of section 2(1) of the 1911 Act in Jackson.   Lord Bingham looks to express 
Parliamentary intent; Lord Nicholls looks to the implied restrictions that  give effect to 
express legislative intent; Lord Steyn looks to the context of a Parliamentary democracy; 
each of the judges treats the use that Parliament has made of the amended 1911 procedure 
95 See Hart, above (n 4) 151.    
96 For an insightful discussion of the legal and constitutional implications of this type of development in 
Britain, see R Dworkin, A Bill of Rights for Britain, (Chatto & Windus, London 1990). 
97 Baroness Hale plays with these types of ideas but she does so, it is suggested, without recognising that 
there are certain principled limits to the ways in which Parliament qua Parliament can redefine itself.  See 
Jackson, above (n 6) 163.      42 
as being relevant to its meaning;
99 and both Lord Nicholls and Lord Steyn give limited 
support to the use of ministerial statements as an aid to interpretation.
100
If Goldsworthy is to maintain that there is an empirical consensus in favour of the 
view that Parliament is sovereign, then he must find some way of explaining away both 
the principled character of judicial reasoning on questions relating to Parliamentary and 
judicial power, and the fact of widespread disagreement between judges on these 
questions.   There are two different Hartian responses to this challenge.   The first 
response is to treat such disagreements as falling within a ‘penumbra of uncertainty’ 
around the core idea of Parliamentary sovereignty (on which most officials agree).
     Once again, it 
seems unreal to describe these different views as empirical disagreements about what 
most officials think. 
101   
Thus, Lords Steyn and Hope could be taken to be refining or clarifying the rule that 
expresses the idea of Parliamentary sovereignty, or perhaps even proposing some more 
desirable rule of recognition.   But this response is deeply problematic. Unlike 
disagreements about the meaning of the word ‘bachelor’ or ‘table’, there simply is no 
widely accepted ‘core’ of acceptance about the relative powers of Parliament and the 
courts.
102   On the contrary, it is clear from the reasoning of the judges in Jackson (and 
the reasoning of other judges and academics besides) that there is a deep disagreement of 
principle between those who think that Parliament has the power, say, to ‘make or 
unmake any law’, and those who think that judges have the power to block certain types 
of Parliamentary action.  Nor is it open to Goldsworthy to distinguish (and discount) 
‘ideal’ theories of whose attitudes should count, from empirical or factual accounts of 
whose attitudes do count.
103
The second response is to suggest that the many principles that figure in judges’ 
reasoning about the powers of Parliament and courts form part of  the rule of 
recognition.
   In the face of principled disagreement about the powers of 
Parliament and courts, any attempt to privilege one theory over others as being 
empirically or factually true is bound to be question begging.      
104
                                                                                                                                                 
98 See Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously above (n 7) 54-8; and Law’s Empire above (n 7) ch 4. 
    Thus, it might be said that most official accept, say, that Parliament 
must act in accordance with such principles as the separation of powers, the rule of law 
99 See Jackson, above (n 6) 67-9 and 171.   
100 Under the rule in Pepper v. Hart. [1993] 1 All ER 42.  See Jackson, above (n 6) 65, 97 and 98. 
101 See Hart, above (n 4) 123, 147-54 and 251.   
102 See, generally, Dworkin, Justice in Robes above (n 7), chs 1 and 2. 
103  See Griffith, ‘The Brave New World of Sir John Laws’, (2000) 63 MLR 159-76. 
104 Again, this is the position of so-called ‘soft’ or ‘inclusive’ positivists.  See above (n 48).    43 
and democracy.   This seems hopeless though.    Judges will disagree about which 
principles justify the powers of Parliament and courts, and they will disagree about the 
meaning of any such principles.   It would prove impossible then to encapsulate any 
definitive set of principles within a single rule.
105   At the same time, this second response 
would implausibly suppose that judges rely on principles such as the separation of 
powers and the rule of law for the reason that other judges and officials accept those 
principles as the basis of legal and political power in the British constitution.   It is clear 
though that Lord  Hope (and others) advance arguments that speak directly  to the 
respective powers of courts and legislatures, and which do not depend in any way on an 
empirical consensus amongst officials.
106
 
    
3. Legality as the ‘Controlling Factor’ in the British constitution 
 
I have argued in the preceding section that the idea of Parliamentary sovereignty cannot 
be explained as the rule of recognition in the British constitution.   Such an account 
cannot explain the way in which judges justify the law-making powers of Parliament and 
courts through arguments of political principle; and it cannot explain the fact that judges 
disagree deeply about these principles.    Such disagreements do not tell us that the rule 
of recognition is uncertain; they tell us that that there is no rule. This conclusion raises an 
uncomfortable question for those theorists who advocate the idea  of Parliamentary 
sovereignty.   If it can neither be said that Parliament is the Austinian sovereign, nor that 
there is an empirically determined fact or rule which tells us that Parliament is sovereign 
then what work, if any, is the idea of Parliamentary sovereignty doing in the British 
constitution?    
In order to explore this question, we need to think again about how the idea of 
sovereignty figures in orthodox British constitutional theory.   Theorists typically debate 
such questions as whether there are any limits  to the doctrine of Parliamentary 
sovereignty, or whether Parliament can override the rule of law.  At the same time, they 
debate whether, given that Parliament is sovereign, the legitimacy of judicial review 
depends on judges giving effect to Parliamentary intent when reviewing official decisions 
                                                 
105 See R Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, above (n 7) 39-45. 
106 Dworkin helpfully expresses these differences in reasoning in terms of ‘concurrent’ and ‘conventional’ 
morality.  As he says, ‘A community displays a concurrent morality when its members are agreed in 
asserting the same, or much the same, normative rule, but they do not count the fact of that agreement as an   44 
(the ultra vires theory),
107 or whether judges exercise their review function, at least in 
part, independently of such intent (the common law theory).
108
 
  Craig suggests that these 
debates: 
‘[Concern] whether power should be regarded as exclusive or shared…It speaks to the respective powers 
of courts and legislature in a constitutional democracy.  It reflects contending views as to the autonomy of 
courts when developing judicial review.   It encapsulates differing views about the relationship between the 
rule of law and Parliament’
109
 
 
The idea of ‘sovereignty’, it should be noted, is conspicuously absent in this passage.   
The key principles in play are instead democracy, the separation of powers and the rule of 
law.   Elsewhere though, Craig defends the common law model of judicial review – based 
on the notion of ‘shared power’ – as being:  
 
‘in accord with the proper division of power between courts and Parliament in a constitutional democracy, 
and…consistent with the sovereignty of Parliament.  The common law model thus expressed a conception 
of shared sovereignty’
110
 
 
What are we to make of the two uses of the concept of ‘sovereignty’ in this passage?    
The phrase ‘shared sovereignty’, if it is not an oxymoron, seems simply to refer to a 
division of powers,  functions  or  responsibilities  between different branches of 
government.
111      In this case, the use of the word ‘sovereignty’ with its absolutist, 
Austinian connotations, is a particular unhelpful misnomer.
112
                                                                                                                                                 
essential part of their grounds for asserting that rule.  It displays a conventional morality when they do’.  
Ibid at 53.  
  It would be far clearer, it 
107 See, for example, Forsyth, above (n 22).  The so-called ‘modified’ ultra vires theory seeks to preserve 
this basic intuition albeit that Parliament is said to have an abstract intention that judges give effect to the 
rule of law rather than concrete intentions as to particular principles of judicial review.  See C Forsyth and 
M Elliott, ‘The Legitimacy of Judicial Review’ [2003] PL 286-307.   
108 See, for instance, D Oliver: ‘Is the Ultra Vires rule the basis of judicial review?’ [1987] PL 543-69; P 
Craig, ‘Ultra Vires and the Foundations of Judicial Review’, [1998] CLJ 63. 
109 See P Craig, ‘Constitutional Foundations: The Rule of Law and Supremacy’ [2003] PL 92-111 at 93 
110 Ibid. 
111  This, I think, is clearly the meaning afforded to the term ‘sovereignty’ by a number of other leading 
constitutional theorists.   See Sedley above, (n 55); T R S Allan, above (n 83). 
112 UK lawyers commonly use phrases such as ‘shared sovereignty’ or ‘pooled sovereignty’ (among many 
other variations) when they refer to the relationship between the United Kingdom and the EU institutions.  
See, for example, Neil Walker, ‘Late Sovereignty in the European Union’, in Walker (ed.) Sovereignty in 
Transition (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2003) at 10-18.  In the European context, just as in the context of the 
powers of institutions within a state, the word sovereignty, I think, seems to connote something like 
‘power’ or – perhaps more aptly –  ‘competence’.   Other commentators have lately dispensed with the   45 
is suggested, to say straightforwardly that the judicial review debate concerns the 
separation of powers between Parliament, the executive and the judiciary.     Craig says 
further though that the conception of shared sovereignty is consistent with the sovereignty 
of Parliament.    It would make little sense if this latter use of the word sovereignty 
carried the same meaning as the former use. This would produce the truism: Parliament’s 
power/function/responsibility is consistent with Parliament’s 
power/function/responsibility.     What then might this latter use of the word sovereignty 
mean within the scheme of the British constitution?   With what  must the respective 
powers of courts and Parliament be consistent? 
  Before it is possible to talk about the ‘proper division of power between courts 
and Parliament in a constitutional democracy’, we must first establish the basis  of 
Parliamentary and judicial power.  The question is this: why should the decisions of 
Parliament and courts be relevant to the question of what the law is?   It will be useful at 
this point to return once more to the work of Hart.   Hart’s central insight in the Concept 
of Law, it will be recalled, is the idea that the powers of Parliament and courts cannot 
derive from a sovereign person or entity; they can only be explained, he says, by 
reference to a normative standard which is logically prior to those powers.    I have 
argued above (after Ronald Dworkin) that this standard cannot be an empirically 
determined rule: it must be a principle of political morality.
113    More particularly, it 
must be a distinctively legal principle which conditions the exercise of Parliamentary, 
governmental and judicial power, and which speaks to the grounds on which a 
proposition of law is true or valid in the British constitution.     It will by now be apparent 
that Hart and Dworkin together lay the foundations for a theory of the British constitution 
based on the ideal of government under law or the principle of legality  (otherwise 
referred to as the ‘rule of law’).  It must be said that a distinguished minority of judges 
and academics have advocated this position over many years;
114
                                                                                                                                                 
language of sovereignty and described the relationship between member states and the EU as one of ‘legal 
pluralism’.   See N MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty: Law, State, and Nation in the European 
Commonwealth  (Oxford University Press, Oxford  1999); Eleftheriadis, ‘The idea of a European 
Constitution’ (2007) 27 OJLS 1-21 at 14.    In the context of public international law too, there appears to 
be a movement away from the idea of absolute sovereign states towards the idea that there are certain 
normative conditions attached to the exercise of state power.   See Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2005), ch 4.  
 but it is arguably the 
113 As Jowell has recently put it, the allocation of political power depends on ‘a moral claim to its exercise 
(or limitation)’.   See Jowell, ‘Parliamentary Sovereignty’ above (n 20) 565-6. 
114 The most assiduous proponent of this type of theory is T R S Allan.  See above (n 83).  See also Lord 
Woolf ‘Droit Public – English Style’ [1995] PL 57-71.   46 
judgment in the Jackson case that marks the first explicit judicial endorsement of this 
position.
115
 
   Lord Hope memorably says that 
‘The  rule of law enforced by the courts is the ultimate controlling factor on which our constitution is 
based.’
116
 
  
Once it is appreciated that the powers of each branch of government are determined by 
the principle of legality, it is plain that Craig (above) can only be understood as saying 
that the respective powers of Parliament and courts must be consistent with this principle 
rather than the concept of sovereignty.  This conclusion can be seen more clearly still if 
we try to make sense of the familiar claim that there are normative limits to Parliamentary 
sovereignty or – what expresses the same idea – that there are normative justifications for 
Parliamentary sovereignty. Lord Hope articulates something like this claim in the 
following passage in Jackson:   
 
‘Our constitution is dominated by the sovereignty of Parliament. But parliamentary sovereignty is no 
longer, if it ever was, absolute… Step by step, gradually but surely, the English principle of the absolute 
legislative sovereignty of Parliament which Dicey derived from Coke and Blackstone is being 
qualified.’
117
 
    
Leaving to one side the contentious question of how best to interpret the work of Coke, 
Blackstone and Dicey,
118
                                                 
115 It might be argued though that the House of Lords has recognised the primacy of the principle of legality 
through its ‘constitutional rights’ jurisprudence.   See generally Jowell above (n 20); chapter 6 (above) part 
2. 
  to the extent that the position described by Lord Hope 
envisages legal limits to the things that Parliament may do, it is plain that the concept of 
sovereignty is entirely redundant.   To say that there are legal limits to Parliamentary 
power is to say (as Lord Hope himself does elsewhere) that such powers as Parliament 
possesses are determined by the principle of legality.  In this case, it makes no sense to 
debate whether the principle of legality (or any other legal principle for that matter) limits 
116 Jackson above (n 6) 107 (my italics).  And see O Dixon, ‘The Law and Constitution’ (1935) 51 LQR 
590-611 at 596. 
117  Jackson  above (n 6) 104.  See also similarly P Craig above (n 109) 107-111 who suggests that 
sovereignty does not mean ‘absolute’  sovereignty; judges place a variety of different constraints on 
sovereign power through various different forms of statutory interpretation.   Craig makes his argument in 
response Allan’s view that the idea of Parliamentary cannot permit of any limits to Parliament’s power.    
See T R S Allan, ‘Conceptual Conundrum’ above (n 54) 89-90.   47 
or qualifies Parliament’s powers: Parliament’s powers are what they are.   And it is 
paradoxical to debate whether Parliament could override the principle of legality: this 
puts the cart before the horse.
119
  To summarise the last part of the argument, I have suggested that the foundational 
principle of British constitutional theory and practice is the principle of legality.    This is 
not to rank the principle of legality above Parliamentary sovereignty; nor is it to suggest 
that the principle of legality limits or qualifies Parliamentary sovereignty; nor is it to 
make a choice between two equally viable concepts: it is to reject altogether the currency 
of the concept of sovereignty.    Given that Parliament derives its powers from law, we 
have a normative reason  to erase the concept of sovereignty from our constitutional 
landscape.   Of course, the significance of this renewed perspective on the British 
constitution can hardly be overstated.  It demands that Parliament may only exercise 
power in accordance with the principles – whatever they may be – that justify that power.     
    If, on the other hand, the position described by Lord 
Hope envisages the existence of a Parliament with legally unlimited (and unjustified) 
legislative power (albeit that there may be certain moral, political and other non-legal 
limits to the exercise of that power), then we are forced to pose our original question once 
again: what is the philosophical basis of that absolute legislative power?     I have argued 
at length in this chapter that neither Austin nor Hart – at least when taken to provide a 
morally neutral theory – can provide an adequate answer to that question.    
I now want to leave the idea of Parliamentary sovereignty behind and think about 
what it means to say, as Lord Hope puts it, that the principle of legality is the ‘ultimate 
controlling factor’ in the British constitution’.
120
 
 This claim will no doubt trigger a flurry 
of objections about judicial supremacy, and the subordination of politics and democracy 
to law.  On its face though, it does not imply anything about the respective powers of 
Parliament, government or the judiciary. These things must depend on precisely how we 
understand the principle of the rule of law or legality.   Lord Hope tells us that  
                                                                                                                                                 
118 For detailed discussion on this question, see, for instance, Goldsworthy above (n 47) 250, P Craig, 
Public law, political theory and legal theory [2000] PL 211-39 at 217-222. 
119 Indeed, even if one were to adopt an Austinian or Hartian account of the power of law-makers, it would 
make no sense to speak in terms of legal limits on sovereignty.   The Austinian sovereign is, by definition 
legally unlimited; and for Hart, the law-making powers of Parliament (or some other law-maker) are 
determined by a rule of recognition.   In this respect, it is submitted that Allan (above (n 117)) must be 
correct. 
120 Jackson above (n 6) 107.   48 
‘[I]t is of the essence of supremacy of the law that the courts shall disregard as unauthorised and void the 
acts of any organ of government, whether legislative or administrative, which exceed the limits of the 
power that organ derives from the law’
121
 
    
This formulation captures the basic idea discussed above in relation to the work of Hart 
and Dworkin: that government or officials (which, it should be said, must also include 
courts) must exercise power in accordance with the legal principle(s) that justify that 
power (which principles must be established in advance of the exercise of that power).
122   
This only takes us so far though.  It is not enough simply to say that officials must act in 
accordance with legal principle(s); we need to know what these principles are.  This, it is 
suggested, will depend on the value we find in requiring officials to exercise power in 
accordance with law.
123
Consider a judge who thinks that laws must be certain, predictable, and authoritative 
so that individuals can plan their lives freely in the knowledge that they are not acting 
illegally.
    
124    For him, whether something counts as law will depend on these types of 
values.    Such a judge is therefore likely to be satisfied that a statute is a statute when it is 
enacted by procedures that are clear, well-known and widely accepted.
125   Similarly, this 
judge is likely to be satisfied that a common law doctrine or rule is a common law 
doctrine when most judges accept that rule or doctrine, and when that rule or doctrine is 
clear in its terms.
126
                                                 
121 Ibid. 
    In terms of identifying the meaning of a statute, this judge is likely 
to advocate the literal or plain-meaning-of-words interpretation of statutes in so far as 
these different modes of interpretation promote certainty, predictability and authority.   
At the same time, such a judge is likely to have firm views about the proper role of 
judges.   Judges, he might think, should generally ‘apply’ the law and should not 
legislate.   For them to do otherwise would present judges with challenges for which they 
122 See Dworkin, Justice in Robes above (n 7) 170. 
123 For a good overview of different conceptions of legality, see P Craig ‘Formal and Substantive 
Conceptions of the Rule of Law: An Analytical Framework’ [1997] PL 467-87.   See, more recently, J 
Jowell, ‘The Rule of Law and its Underlying Values’, above (n 1) 210. 
124 See Hart above (n 4) 91-7. Raz, The Authority of Law above (n 48), 210. 
125 Hence, many judges require only that a document appear ‘on the Parliamentary roll’.  See Lord Hope in 
Jackson above (n 6) 112.    
126 These conditions equate roughly to Hart’s emphasis on consensus and the core meaning of words.   See 
sections 1 and 2 above. Dworkin recasts Hart’s ‘descriptive’ theory as an ‘interpretive’ morally-engaged 
theory which he describes as ‘conventionalism’.  See Dworkin, Law’s Empire  above (n 7)  ch  4.    
According to this interpretation  of British legal practice, there are moral  reasons to count clear, well-
known and widely accepted rules as the operative standards in the constitution.  As I have explained above 
(n 8), I endorse this reading of Hart.      49 
are institutionally unsuited; it would also be undemocratic and unfair in so far as it should 
be elected Parliamentarians, and not unelected judges, who should decide what the law 
should be.
127
Consider a  different judge who thinks that the point of law is to ensure that the 
principles of justice, fairness and procedural due process to which a political community 
is committed should apply equally to all citizens in that community.
    Above all then, judges should not have the power to ‘strike down’ statutes 
(assuming that they have been passed by the necessary clear, well-known and widely 
accepted procedures).    This would entail the invalidation of perfectly valid law; and it 
would entail the direct usurpation by judges of the Parliamentary role.     
128
It will be apparent, I hope, that these two stories broadly reflect the two different 
approaches to the Jackson case discussed in part 3 above.    Crucially, each story is 
driven by the distinctive value that a judge finds in requiring officials to act in accordance 
   For this judge, 
what counts as a legal right or duty will depend on the interpretation of the past political 
decisions in that community that best captures these different principles. Accordingly, 
this judge will look to the principles that justify the fact that the decisions of Parliament 
and courts count as law in that community.   Parliament’s law-making powers, she might 
think, are justified by the principle of democracy; and the powers of courts by the need 
for an independent branch of government to stand as a bulwark between the individual 
and the state, functioning to ensure that officials do not act in a way that treats individuals 
as inferiors.   The meaning of a given statute or judicial decision will depend for this 
judge on the different principles of justice, fairness and procedural due process that make 
best sense of the past enactments of Parliament, and the past decisions of courts on the 
particular doctrinal issue in question.   This interpretive task, she believes, does not entail 
judicial legislation since she is giving effect to existing legal principles.   Nor is such a 
role undemocratic.   Democracy, properly understood, she thinks, means that officials 
should only be able to act in a way that respects certain individual rights.  Judges, she 
believes, are particularly well placed to give effect to such rights.  For this judge, it may 
well be conceivable that she and her colleagues will have reason to strike down an 
(purported) Act of Parliament at some stage in so far as Parliament seeks to act in a way 
that negates the very principles that justify its law-making role.     
                                                 
127 This is the position taken by so-called ‘ethical’ positivists.  See, for instance, Campbell, Prescriptive 
Legal Positivism: Law, Rights and Democracy  (Routledge-Cavendish, 2004); Waldron, ‘Normative (or 
Ethical) Positivism’ in J Coleman (ed.), Hart’s Postscript above (n 31), ch 12. 
128 This is a rough account of Dworkin’s theory of law as integrity.   See Dworkin, Law’s Empire above (n 
7) ch 6.   50 
with law.   We see in these stories, moreover, that that value will shape the way in which 
a judge thinks about the many other principles that determine the powers of officials – 
principles such as the separation of powers, democracy, equality, liberty and individual 
rights.   This is not to conflate the principle of legality with these other principles,
129 but 
to appreciate that each of these principles can only be understood in the light of each 
other as part of a ‘web of conviction’.
130 It is in this special sense, it is suggested, that the 
principle of legality – and, more specifically, the value of that principle – is the ‘ultimate 
controlling factor on which our constitution is based’.
131  Of course there will be 
disagreement about which value does make best sense of the ideal of officials acting in 
accordance with law.   The stories that I have offered above, as I have said, reflect a 
disagreement between those theorists who take this value to be something like certainty, 
and those who take the value to be something like integrity or equality.
132
 
  While I have 
given implicit support to the latter account in part 3 (above), my purpose in this chapter 
has not been to press a particular conception of legality.   Rather it has been to reorientate 
British constitutional theory towards this type of inquiry, and away from obsolete debates 
about Parliamentary sovereignty.   It will be the task of the next two chapters to examine 
more closely the nature of disagreement about the principle of legality, and to propose an 
account of legality which best justifies that concept.    
 
 
 
 
                                                 
129 A number of theorists have objected to an expansive definition of the concept of legality on the basis 
that it robs the concept of any independent value.  See Raz, above (n 48) 299.  See also Jowell, ‘The Rule 
of Law and its Underlying Values’ above (n 1) 16. 
130 Dworkin, Justice in Robes above (n 7) 172.  
131 Jackson above (n 6) 107. 
132 Others have argued in support of some other value or values.   Sir John Laws, for example, has placed 
the value of autonomy at the heart of his constitutional theory.   See Sir John Laws ‘The Constitution: 
Morals and Rights’ [1996] PL 622-35.   51 
Chapter 2:  Understanding the Principle of Legality  
 
In the previous chapter, I suggested that the idea of Parliamentary sovereignty is 
redundant in British constitutional theory and practice.   It is an unfortunate legacy of the 
once-widespread belief that the laws and law-making powers in a state must derive from 
a single, sovereign entity.  While several contemporary constitutional theorists and judges 
have recognized the deficiencies in this Austinian jurisprudence, few have been willing to 
abandon the  idea of Parliamentary sovereignty altogether.  Some have argued that 
Parliamentary sovereignty remains a general principle in the British constitution, but that 
it is qualified or limited by other principles such as the rule of law and the separation of 
powers.
1    This strategy, I suggested, leaves no logical space remaining for a concept of 
sovereignty.
2   Others have turned to Austin’s chief critic, Herbert Hart.
3   The traditional, 
Diceyan account of Parliamentary sovereignty – that Parliament can make or unmake any 
law, and that no person or body may set aside an Act of Parliament – is true, they argue, 
in virtue of the fact that most officials accept this to be so: these are the ‘standards of 
official conduct’ that constitute the Hartian rule of recognition in the British 
constitution.
4
It is ironic, it might be thought, that Goldsworthy and others summon the work of 
Hart in support of a theory of sovereignty.  In so far as the idea of sovereignty implies the 
existence of an all-powerful person or body at the apex of a legal system from which all 
law derives, this is precisely the idea that Hart takes as his target in the Concept of Law.    
Such a theory, Hart demonstrates, fails to account for the way in which Parliament (or 
some other institutional authority) exercises power as of right; and it fails to explain how 
power can pass from one Parliament to the next.
     
5
                                                 
1 See, for example, P Craig, ‘Constitutional Foundations: The Rule of Law and Supremacy’ [2003] PL 92-
111.  For a clear judicial statement of this approach, see Jackson v Her Majesty’s Attorney-General [2005] 
UKHL 56 per Lord Hope at 104.   
   In the light of these difficulties, it 
must be the case, Hart suggests, that the power of Parliament, and the grounds of legal 
2 See generally ch 1 (above), part 4.    
3 See, for instance, J Goldsworthy, The Sovereignty of Parliament: History and Philosophy (Clarendon 
Press, Oxford 1999), especially chs 2 and 10; R Ekins, ‘Acts of Parliament and the Parliament Acts’, 
(2007) LQR  91. 
4 H L A Hart, The Concept of Law (2nd edn, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1994), chs 5 and 6. 
5 Ibid, esp. chs 4 and 5.   52 
validity in a state or constitution flow from a normative standard which is logically prior 
to those powers.  Far from supporting a theory of an all-powerful sovereign then, Hart 
suggests that the extent of the powers of any institution will depend on the content of this 
normative standard.   
In the last chapter, I argued that Hart takes us only so far with this powerful insight.   
The normative standard at the base of the constitution cannot be a morally neutral, 
empirically determined rule as Hart himself supposed.   Such an account fails to capture 
the sense in which judges, lawyers and academics advance competing arguments of 
political morality by way of justification for the powers of Parliament, government and 
courts.  The normative standard at the base of the British constitution, I suggested, is best 
understood as the principle of legality, otherwise referred to as the rule of law.
6  It is this 
principle that determines the powers of Parliament and courts; and it is this principle that 
determines the grounds of legal validity – or the test by which we identify the law – in a 
state or constitution.
7
While the conclusion that the British constitution rests on the principle of legality 
may help to move British constitutional theory away from philosophically obsolete 
debates about Parliamentary sovereignty, this conclusion admittedly presents a new set of 
questions.  What does it mean to say that the principle of legality determines the powers 
of institutions and the grounds of legal validity?   And in what sense does the principle of 
legality shape our understanding of other political principles such as the separation of 
powers?   Towards the end of the previous chapter, I offered an outline response to these 
questions.   The powers of institutions, the grounds of legal validity, and our 
   In this way, the principle of legality, I suggested, will control or 
shape the way in which we conceive of other political principles such as the separation of 
powers and individual rights: it is hardly possible to theorise about the powers of 
Parliament and the grounds of legal validity without theorising at the same time about 
such things as the proper role of judges and the nature of individual human rights.  
                                                 
6 I will use these terms interchangeably throughout this chapter.  Some theorists do make a distinction 
however, in so far as they take the term ‘legality’ to denote a formal conception of the rule of law, and the 
term ‘rule of law’ itself, to denote a substantive conception.   See, for example, C Gearty, Principles of 
Human Rights Adjudication (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004); T.R.S. Allan, ‘The Rule of Law as 
the Rule of Reason: Consent and Constitutionalism’ (1999) 115 LQR 221, 243.  For a critique of the 
formal/substantive distinction, see part 1below. 
7 See R Dworkin, Justice in Robes, (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts 2006), 13.   53 
understanding of other political principles, I suggested, must depend on the value that we 
find in the ideal of officials acting in accordance with law.
8
I  now  want to develop that  response and examine in more detail  the types  of 
arguments that will help us to understand the principle of legality (and its relationship to 
other political principles).  In part 1, I shall elaborate the sense in which judges, lawyers 
and citizens disagree about the meaning of the principle of legality.  Such disagreements, 
I will say, necessarily imply a background of agreement about roughly what this principle 
refers to.  When judges, lawyers and citizens refer to the principle of legality, we must 
suppose that they possess a shared understanding of the abstract point or purpose of 
legality. Disagreement about the meaning of legality, I will suggest, is a disagreement 
about which value(s) justifies this abstract point or purpose.    In order to bring out the 
nature and importance of this type of disagreement, I  shall  offer a critique of the 
traditional debate in English public law on the question of whether legality is a formal, 
procedural  or  substantive  ideal.      In my view, this debate  suffers from three 
shortcomings.  In the first place, it fails to take cognizance of the sense in which judges 
and lawyers disagree  about the same concept  of legality.  Secondly, it assumes a 
problematic distinction in political morality between questions of form and substance.  
Finally, it fails to connect the legality debate with the day-to-day arguments of judges, 
lawyers and citizens.    
    
In part two, I shall attempt to clear the way of two arguments which threaten to pre-
empt the approach to disagreement that I have just described.   The first argument broadly 
represents the position of so-called ‘descriptive’ positivists: it denies that there is any 
necessary connection between legality and morality.    It is mistaken, according to this 
argument, to suggest that  the concept of legality does have a distinctive value.  The 
second argument seeks to pre-empt disagreement about the meaning of legality in a very 
different way.   This argument accepts that the meaning of the principle of legality does 
depend on an understanding of its underlying value, but it maintains, for epistemological 
reasons, that this value can only be a formal or procedural ideal; it can have nothing to 
say about the substance of the law.     
                                                 
8 See chapter 1, part 4.   54 
Finally, in part three, I shall develop the two conceptions of legality (and the theory of 
adjudication that each conception recommends)  outlined in chapter 1.  The first 
conception holds that the principle of legality is justified by values such as certainty and 
predictability.   I will argue that this conception, while familiar and intuitively appealing 
to English lawyers, fails to justify the abstract point or purpose of the political ideal of 
legality.    The second conception is one that recognises the value of integrity or equality 
before the law (properly understood).    This second conception, I will say, provides the 
most morally compelling account of legality and adjudication, and it is by reference to 
this account that we should seek to identify the truth conditions of particular propositions 
of English law.    
 
 
1. Disagreement about the Meaning of Legality 
 
References to the principle of legality or the rule of law are a familiar part of everyday 
life.   Judges, politicians, journalists and civil libertarians may speak of there being an 
‘affront to the rule of law’  when they wish to criticize an instance of heavy handed 
policing, or a particular policy  of the Government,  or a piece of legislation,  or  an 
oppressive regime overseas.    On the other hand, they may speak of the ‘vindication of 
the rule of law’, or a ‘proud day  for the rule of law’  when somebody is successfully 
prosecuted for a crime, or when the decision of a Government minister is quashed by the 
High Court, or when the Government fails in its bid to push through some particularly 
illiberal legislative proposal.    As often as not, these references to the rule of law are 
accompanied by references to other political principles.   The rule of law is sometimes 
said to be the hallmark of a democratic state (and the antithesis of a dictatorship), and a 
necessary precondition for liberty and human rights.    Indeed, the rule of law often seems 
to operate as shorthand for the many political ideals that figure in the political morality of 
a state.   
Whether or not we are able to articulate precisely what such references to the rule 
of law mean, and whether we agree or disagree with any particular appeal to the rule of 
law, there is a sense in which we must all share (albeit implicitly) a common view about   55 
roughly what the principle of the rule of law refers to.  This is to say that we must agree 
on some abstract level, about the point or purpose of this principle as an ideal.   It would 
be hopeless if one theorist took the concept of legality to refer, say, to the laws of 
physics, or to the alignment of the stars, if another took the concept to refer to the laws 
that concern courts and legislatures.  This type of exchange could not be characterised as 
a disagreement about the concept of legality; it would simply be two people talking past 
each other.
9
In the last chapter,  I suggested  that  when we refer to the rule of law, we are 
referring roughly to the ideal that government or officials act in accordance with law.   
Thus, if a Police Commissioner prohibits a public demonstration, or a Minister approves 
the construction of a new airport terminal, we  might object to these decisions on the 
grounds that these decision-makers had no lawful authority to act in that way.   And we 
may praise the decision of the High court to quash each respective decision for the reason 
that this gives effect to the law.   Many theorists throughout history have distinguished a 
political system in which officials act in accordance with law from one in which officials 
exercise power arbitrarily or at their pleasure or discretion.
   
10
 
   As far back as ancient 
Greece, Aristotle wrote:  
‘He who commands that law should rule may thus be regarded as commanding that God and reason alone 
should rule; he who commands that a man should rule adds the character of the beast.’
 11
 
 
And John Locke famously said: 
 
‘Wherever law ends, tyranny begins, if the Law be transgressed to another’s harm.’
12
 
 
                                                 
9 See, generally, R Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1986) ch 
1; Justice in Robes above (n 7) ch 1.   
10 See for instance, Dicey, A.V. Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (Indianapolis: 
Liberty Fund, 1982 [reprint of 8th edn, 1915], 110.   
11 Politics, III, 16, 146.  For an excellent survey of historic theories of legality, see M Loughlin, Sword & 
Scales, (Oxford, 2000), ch. 5.   
12 J Locke, Peter Laslett (ed.), Two Treatises of Government (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
2003), Second Treatise, ch XI, para. 202.   56 
These  are  powerful  claims, but such  claims  often  leave  unanswered  an important 
question: on what basis can it be said that an official has acted in accordance with law 
(and not acted at their own pleasure)?   To put this differently, what makes it the case that 
an official has acted in accordance with law?    
English lawyers might be tempted to answer this question in the following way: an 
official acts in accordance with law when that official can point to a recognised source of 
law – principally statute law, common law or the royal prerogative – before they exercise 
power.    As Lord Coke put it in Entick v Carrington (a case which is often said to 
represent the high watermark of the ideal of government under law): ‘if it is law, it will 
be found in our books. If it is not to be found there, it is not law’.
13    This is too quick 
though.  While judges, lawyers and academics may all agree that the past decisions or 
enactments of Parliament, Government and Courts confer powers, and  generate legal 
rights and duties, they disagree deeply about why this is so, and they disagree about when 
it is the case that such powers, rights and duties have been generated.     They disagree, 
for instance, about what Parliament has to do in order to enact a valid Act of Parliament; 
and they disagree about how to  interpret  statutes,  and  how to apply common law 
precedents.
14
We are in need of a more focussed statement of the abstract principle of legality, 
one  which  identifies  the  points on which theorists of legality agree –  their shared 
assumptions about the point or purpose of legality – and those on which they disagree.   
Dworkin helpfully suggests the following formulation:  
  The meaning of the phrase ‘in accordance with law’ will therefore depend 
on what position a judge takes on these types of questions.    
 
‘Legality is engaged, we might say, when political officials deploy the state’s coercive power directly 
against particular persons or bodies or groups…  Legality insists that such power be exercised only in 
accordance with standards established in the right way before that exercise.’
15
 
    
Adopting this formulation, most theorists agree, we may suppose, that the principle of 
legality is a political ideal in the sense that it concerns the exercise of state power against 
                                                 
13 (1765) 19 Howell's State Trials 1030. 
14 See ch 1, part 2.     
15 Dworkin, Justice in Robes, above (n 7), 169.   57 
particular persons or bodies or groups.
16  They recognise too that legality concerns the 
exercise of coercive state power (as opposed, say, to the power of the state to advise or 
warn its citizens).  Finally, they recognise, crucially, that legality concerns certain 
standards that have been established in advance of the exercise of power.    It is in this 
sense that official action is guided by the rule of law and not the rule of men (or the 
beast!).
17    Against this background of agreement, we can now see more clearly the basis 
of disagreement about the principle of legality: theorists disagree about which types of 
standards, established in which way, count as legal standards.
18    For example, some 
judges treat the intentions of Parliament as the relevant standards; others treat the literal 
meaning of words in a statute as the relevant standards; others treat widely accepted rules 
as the relevant standards; others treat  certain principles of political morality  as the 
relevant standards.
19
  Now, assuming that there is an objectively correct understanding of the concept of 
legality (an understanding which reflects the true basis of legal rights and duties),
    
20
                                                 
16 It should be emphasized that the different propositions within Dworkin’s formulation are not intended to 
represent conceptual truths about the meaning of the concept of legality.   They are merely a starting point 
from which to launch moral disagreement about the meaning of the concept.   For an interesting example of 
a potential misreading of Dworkin on this point, see J Gardner, ‘Law’s Aims in Law’s Empire’ in S 
Hershovitz (ed.) Exploring Law’s Empire (Oxford University Press, 2006). 
 we 
are need some way of appraising different responses to the question of which standards, 
established in which way, count as legal standards.   Why, that is, should a theory of 
legality based, say, on Parliamentary intentions, or on the literal meaning of words fail 
where a theory based on particular principles of political morality succeeds?   And what 
17 Cf. Bellamy, who argues that the rule of law must ultimately mean the rule of men (legislators).    
Bellamy distinguishes the rule of law (made by legislators), from the rule by law (where legislators 
themselves are bound by certain legal standards).   See R Bellamy (ed.), The Rule of Law and the 
Separation of Powers, ‘Introduction: the Rule of Law as the Rule of Persons’ (Ashgate Publishing, 
Aldershot, Hampshire 2005).   This type of approach, I suggested in chapter 1, springs from the legal 
theories of such ‘command’ theorists as Austin, Bentham and Hobbes.  See chapter 1, part 1.  
18 See R Dworkin, Justice in Robes above (above) n 7.  Dworkin describes political concepts such as 
‘legality’ and ‘democracy’ as interpretive concepts.  See R Dworkin, Law’s Empire above (n 9) chs 2 and 
3.  For a contrasting account of disagreement about political concepts, see J Waldron, ‘Is the Rule of Law 
an Essentially Contested Concept (In Florida)’ (2002) 21 Law and Philosophy 137.  
19 See, generally, chapter 3 (above). 
20 I will assume although I will not spend any time defending the position that disagreement about a 
concept or practice presupposes the existence of a correct understanding of that concept or practice.  For a 
sample of the vast literature on this issue, see B Williams, Morality, An Introduction to Ethics (Canto, 
1993); R Dworkin ‘Law and Indeterminacy’ in Guest (ed.), Positivism Today; ‘Objectivity and Truth: 
You’d Better Believe it’ Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Spring, 1996), 87-139; N 
Stavropoulos, ‘Objectivity in law’ (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1996).      58 
do the terms ‘succeed’ and ‘fail’ denote in this context?  Here, I think,  is the key to 
answering these questions.  Given that there can be no empirically determinable test as to 
which standards count as legal standards (for the reasons I offered in chapter 1),
21 each 
different theory  must  be understood as  a  set of interlocking arguments of political 
morality about which value or principle provides the best justification for the practice of 
officials exercising power in accordance with standards established before that exercise.  
To put this differently, each different theory must be understood as a moral conception of 
the abstract concept of legality.
22
 
  Let us think about how we might construct such a 
conception.     
First, we must propose some putative value or principle for each different theory.   For 
instance,  we might say that a  theory which takes the relevant standards to be the 
intentions of Parliament rests on the principle of (majoritarian) democracy, or on the 
value of fairness; and a theory which takes the relevant standards to be the literal 
meaning  of words arguably rests on the values of certainty and predictability.     
Importantly, the value we attribute to a given theory must in fact be capable of justifying 
the standards we associate with the theory.   If  the principle of democracy (properly 
understood) means that the will of Parliament should not always determine the existence 
of legal rights and duties  (because fundamental rights should sometimes supersede 
Parliament’s  will), then there would clearly be a disjunction between the justifying 
principle and the standards that are supposed to instantiate the principle.
23  Equally, if it 
not possible to ascertain a single ‘literal’ meaning of words in a statute (for the reason 
that people disagree  about the meaning of words), then the values of certainty  or 
predictability could not justify a theory based on these standards.
24
 
 
Secondly, having imposed some value on a given theory of legality, we need to consider 
whether that value – and the standards which embody that value – is capable of making 
sense of our suggested central point or purpose of legality.  For instance, if we take the 
                                                 
21 See, ch. 1, part 3.  See also part 2A below. 
22 For the distinction between a concept and a conception of a concept, see R Dworkin, Law’s Empire 
above (n 9) 71-2.   
23 See ch. 3, part 1. 
24 See R Dworkin , Law’s Empire above (n 9) ch, 1.   59 
relevant standards to be ‘the requirements of justice’, then we would have to ask whether 
the  distinctive value in officials exercising power in accordance with standards 
established in the right way before that exercise is to ensure just outcomes.    It might be 
argued in the negative that judgments about justice are forward looking, in which case 
this conception of legality would fail to capture the virtue in officials exercising power 
according to standards established in advance of that exercise.
25
At this second stage, the facts  of legal practice are particularly important.   Our 
ultimate objective is to understand the grounds on which propositions of law within the 
English  legal system are true or valid.   For this reason, a theory of legality must be 
capable of explaining and justifying the salient features of English legal practice.
     
26
 
   For 
instance, a theory must be able to explain the fact that it is a Parliament which enacts 
legislation, and that it is courts which make common law decisions; in this case, the 
theory must include some account of how to interpret statutes, and it must include an 
account of the doctrine of precedent or stare decisis.   Finally, the theory must be able to 
account for the fact that judges, lawyers and citizens  frequently disagree about legal 
rights and duties.    In particular, the theory must explain how, notwithstanding such 
disagreements, it can be said the judges apply legal standards established in past 
decisions to decide present cases.    
A. Formal and Substantive Conceptions of Legality 
 
Before considering two potential challenges to the general argumentative framework 
described above, I first want to emphasize certain aspects of this framework by way of a 
critique of the debate in English public law about the meaning of the principle of legality.   
English public lawyers have theorised about the principle of legality in terms of whether 
legality is a formal or substantive ideal (where the term ‘formal’ is sometimes taken to 
                                                 
25 See part 3 (below). 
26 See, further, chapter 3 (above) 9-10.  For two excellent accounts of the relationship between facts about 
legal practice and normative justifications for the concept of legality see N Stavropoulos, ‘Interpretivist 
Theories of Law’ in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.  Available at 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/law-interpretivist/; Mark Greenberg ‘How Facts make Law’ Legal Theory 
Vol. 10, 157-198 (2004).   60 
embrace both formal  and  procedural  conceptions of legality).
27
 
    Craig helpfully 
summarises this distinction in the following passage:
  
Formal conceptions of the rule of law address the manner in which the law was promulgated (was it by a 
properly authorised person, in a properly authorised manner, etc.); the clarity of the ensuing norm (was it 
sufficiently clear to guide an individual's conduct so as to enable a person to plan his or her life, etc.); and 
the temporal dimension of the enacted norm. (was it prospective or retrospective, etc.). Formal conceptions 
of the rule of law do not however seek to pass judgment upon the actual content of the law itself. They are 
not concerned with whether the law was in that sense a good law or a bad law, provided that the formal 
precepts of the rule of law were themselves met. Those who espouse substantive conceptions of the rule of 
law seek to go beyond this. They accept that the rule of law has the formal attributes mentioned above, but 
they wish to take the doctrine further. Certain substantive rights are said to be based on, or derived from, 
the rule of law. The concept is used as the foundation for these rights, which are then used to distinguish 
between ‘good’ laws, which comply with such rights, and ‘bad’ laws which do not.
28
 
 
Both  formal and substantive conceptions of the principle of legality  seek to provide 
answers to the questions posed above.  Each conception tells us which types of standards, 
established in which way, count as legal standards.   There are three potential difficulties 
with the terms of the formal/substantive debate though, each of which, I think will help 
us  to appreciate more clearly the argumentative approach that I have recommended 
above.    
The first difficulty with the formal/substantive debate, in my view, is that it fails to 
give  the sense in which judges, lawyers and academics  disagree  about  how best to 
understand the political ideal of  legality.   The legality debate, as described by Craig 
above and  in the remainder of his article,  has the feel of  a  mechanical  exercise in 
pigeonholing different theorists into either one slot or the other.    Dicey, Raz and Unger 
are said to be formal rule of law theorists, while Dworkin, Sir John Laws and Trevor 
Allan are said to be substantive rule of law theorists.
29
                                                 
27 For a helpful discussion, see P Craig, ‘Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law: An 
Analytical Framework’ (1997) P.L 467-87.  The leading proceduralist account is that offered by Jeremy 
Waldron.  See Waldron, ‘The Rule of Law as a Theatre of Debate’ in Justine Burley (ed.) Dworkin and his 
Critics with replies by Dworkin.  I discuss Waldron’s theory in part 2 (below) and in chapter 4. 
  When presented in this way, one 
28 Craig ‘Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law: An Analytical Framework’ above (n 27) 
467. 
29 Ibid at 470-7   61 
is left with the impression that the legality debate is entirely polarized and rather futile.
30 
Indeed, some theorists have even implied that these two sets of theorists are talking about 
different concepts: where the former set of theorists advances a theory of legality, the 
latter set advances a theory of the rule of law.
31
I have tried to emphasise above that different theorists of legality offer competing 
justifications of the same shared concept.  Each theorist is attempting to offer the most 
morally compelling account of the ideal that the power of officials be exercised only in 
accordance with standards established in the right way before that exercise.   Moreover, 
different theorists set out to demonstrate that their account is somehow better than rival 
accounts.
 
32
The second difficulty with the formal/substantive debate, in my view, is its central 
premise: that there is a sharp distinction in political morality between questions of form 
and substance.
   Those theorists who argue, for instance, that the principle of legality must be 
insulated from other political ideals presumably think that our understanding of legality 
would be poorer if were we to assimilate this principle to those other ideals.  And those 
theorists who argue that the principle  of legality implies certain substantive rights 
presumably have something to say about the supposed deficiencies of an account that 
denies that thesis.    Once again, the measure of success of any particular conception of 
legality is its ability to justify the central ideal of that principle.   As we shall see in part 3 
below, it must be considered a failing for a theory of legality if, for instance, that theory 
implies  that  officials generally do not exercise power in accordance with standards 
established before that exercise.       
33
                                                 
30 A theorist who is sceptical of there being an objectively correct meaning to the concept of legality may 
purposefully present the debate in this way.   As if to lay the ground for this view, Craig notes that ‘There 
are 1,076 entries to the ‘rule of law’ in the list of periodicals.  This is the tip of the iceberg: the figure can 
be multiplied twenty-fold if one includes literature on individual aspects of doctrine, or particular 
constitutional rights…’ See P.P. Craig, ‘Legislative Intent and Legislative Supremacy: A Reply to 
Professor Allan’ (2004) 24 OJLS 585. 
   This distinction, it is suggested, is illusory.   A theorist who argues that 
laws must be clear, certain and predictable – the types of values which Craig associates 
with a formal conception of legality – will necessarily be committed to some background 
story about why laws should reflect these values.    Some theorists may argue, as Craig 
31 See above (n 4). 
32 See above (n 20). 
33 I will explore an argument in part 2 (below) which denies this claim.      62 
points out, that these values promote the deeper value of autonomy or freedom
34  in that 
people can ‘plan their lives’. Other theorists may argue that the values of certainty and 
predictability are instrumental to certain goals such as efficiency
35 or co-ordination.
36    
There is no plausible sense then in which ‘formal’ values such as clarity, certainty and 
predictability can be completely separated from deeper ‘substantive’ political and ethical 
ideals.
37   This can be no more clearly illustrated than in the work of John Finnis who 
offers a philosophically rich story about why laws must be predictable.   Those in power, 
Finnis says, have a duty to further the ‘common good’ of human flourishing (derived 
from the requirements of practical reasonableness) through the institution of law (and all 
other human institutions).
38     A legal order exists in order to ‘shap[e], suppor[t], and 
further[r]  patterns of co-ordination…’
39
The final difficulty with the formal/substantive rule of law debate is its failure to 
connect with the day-to-day arguments of judges, lawyers and citizens.  The 
formal/substantive debate tend to focus either on extreme hypothetical cases – such as 
whether  the Nazi ‘legal system’ created valid laws
  Such co-ordination is achieved  by rules, 
procedures and understandings which are designed to secure the predictability necessary 
for individuals to flourish.   It is in this way that law serves the common good.     
40
                                                 
34 We see the connection between ‘formal’ values and deeper substantive values reflected in the following 
oft-cited passage from Maitland: ‘known general laws, however bad, interfere less with freedom than 
decisions based on no previously known rule.’  Maitland, Collected Papers (1911) i. 81.   
  –  or on the most controversial 
35 This is the type of value associated with utilitarianism or the economic analysis of law.   See, for 
instance, Posner, Richard A. [1973] Economic Analysis of Law, Boston: Little Brown (1
st edition)  
36 See J Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1980), X. 
37 As Allan puts it: ‘nor can substantive and procedural fairness be easily distinguished: each is premised on 
respect for the dignity of the individual person…’  See T R S Allan, Law, Liberty and Justice (Oxford, 
Clarendon Press 1993) 21; Constitutional Justice: A Liberal Theory of the Rule of Law (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford 2003) 20.  This is not to say though that every theory of legality must be committed to the 
values of clarity, certainty and predictability.    Craig suggests that ‘substantive’ rule of law theorists 
‘accept that the rule of law has…formal attributes [such as clarity, certainty and predictability], but they 
wish to take the doctrine further. Certain substantive rights are said to be based on, or derived from, the rule 
of law’. Craig, above (n 27) 467.  We will in part 3 (below) though that the theory of legality espoused by 
Ronald Dworkin – which Craig treats as the paradigm of a substantive theory of legality – rejects values 
such as certainty and predictability as justifications for the ideal of legality.     
38 J Finnis above (n 36) IX.4 and XII.      
39 Ibid at X. 3, 267. 
40 The famous exchange between Hart and Fuller Hart revolved around this question.  See H.L.A. Hart, 
‘Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals’ (1958) 71 Harv. L. Rev. 593-629; L Fuller, ‘Positivism 
and Fidelity to Law – a Reply to Professor Hart’ (1958) 71 Harv. L. Rev. 630-672.    63 
Parliamentary or Governmental action of the day.
41     In my view, this focal point for 
debate tends to detract from the way in which a theory of legality underpins the whole of 
our legal practice, ranging from the most important constitutional cases down to the most 
mundane traffic offences.
42    Whenever a judge makes a decision, her decision (if true or 
valid)
43
 
 is true or valid in virtue of a general theory of what makes any proposition of law 
true or valid; and whenever a lawyer is asked by their client to advise them on their 
respective rights and duties, the advice the lawyer gives will necessarily be based on 
some general background theory about how to work out what the law is on the point in 
question.     There is a direct connection then between a general theory of legality and the 
question of what the law is on any given issue.     Dworkin captures this connection in the 
following passage: 
‘Conceptions of legality differ…about what kinds of standards are sufficient to satisfy legality and in what 
way these standards must be established in advance; claims of law are claims about which types of 
standards of the right sort have in fact been established in the right way.  A conception of legality is 
therefore a general account of how to decide which particular claims of law are true’
 44
 
 
In the next chapter, I will focus explicitly on the way in which different abstract theories 
of legality help us to understand concrete propositions of  English administrative law 
                                                 
41 The concept of the rule of law tends to be invoked, in particular, in debates about the extent to which 
individual liberties (e.g. against detention without trial) should be sacrificed for greater collective security.  
Indeed, there is a sense in which academic debate about the rule of law is concerned primarily with the 
question of whether Parliament of government can abandon the rule of law in extreme circumstances.   See, 
for instance, D Dyzenhaus, The Constitution of Law, Legality in a Time of Emergency, (Cambridge 
University Press, 2006); Lord Steyn, ‘Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole’, (2004) 53 International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly, 1-15.   
42 Increasingly, judges and lawyers have been forced to address the question of legality in a very direct 
way.  This is seen most clearly in adjudication under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) – 
and now the Human Rights Act 1998.  Under Articles 8-11 of the ECHR the court (whether international or 
domestic) must determine whether an interference with one of these rights by a state (or public authority) 
was ‘in accordance with law’ (see, for example, art 8(2)) or ‘prescribed by law’ (see, for example, Art. 
9(2), 10(2) and 11(2)).   These provisions effectively require courts to enter into the question of which 
types of standards, established in which way, count as legal standards in the British constitution.    See 
Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 26 April 1979, Series A, No. 30: (1979-80) 2 EHRR 245; 
Malone v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 2 August 1984, Series A, No. 82; (1985) 21 EHRR 14.  For a 
detailed analysis of the relevant case law under the ECHR see Jacobs & White, European Convention on 
Human Rights, 3
rd edition, Oxford 2002, pp 201-204. 
43 As I will explain below and in subsequent chapters, the law is not necessarily what judges say or think it 
is.  It may be that a judge is mistaken about what the law requires.   See R Dworkin, Taking Rights 
Seriously (Harvard University Press, 1977) 118-123.  See chapter 3, part 1C (above). 
44 See R Dworkin, Justice in Robes above (n 7) 170.      64 
(and, at the same time, help us to understand the models of adjudication that different 
theories of legality recommend). 
 
2.  Two Threshold Objections  
 
I have so far been attempting to describe the types of arguments that will help us to 
understand the political ideal of legality.   It may help briefly to summarise what I have 
been saying.    I have suggested that all theorists of legality – judges, lawyers, academics 
and citizens – share the same concept of legality: all theorists implicitly accept when they 
refer to the ideal of legality that this principle refers, in its most abstract form, to the ideal 
that officials should only be able to exercise power in accordance with standards that 
have been established in the right way before that exercise.  Theorists of legality disagree 
deeply though about what these standards should be; and they disagree about how these 
standards should be established.  These disagreements, I have suggested, revolve around 
the value or principle that any theorist takes to justify the central point of legality.   It is 
in this sense that theorists of legality construct competing justifications  for,  or 
conceptions of, the same concept of legality.    These different conceptions of legality, I 
have suggested, cannot be neatly divided into ‘substantive’ and ‘formal’ conceptions.  
Amongst several shortcomings with such a distinction, it is not possible to draw a sharp 
distinction in political morality between form and substance.     
I now want to clear the way of two threshold objections to the idea that theorists of 
legality disagree about the value of the political ideal of legality.   The first objection will 
take us back to the discussion in the previous chapter about Herbert Hart’s  ‘rule of 
recognition’.    It is the objection made by many legal positivists that the identification of 
the types of standards that count as legal standards in a state or constitution is a morally 
neutral  and  descriptive  exercise  rather than an evaluative one.  Call this the moral 
neutrality objection.   The second objection seeks to pre-empt the legality debate in a 
quite different way.  This objection accepts that the political ideal of legality must be 
justified according to some value, but it contends that this value can only be formal or 
procedural  in character.   A conception of legality which makes the validity of law 
dependant on certain substantive moral rights, the objection holds, is unworkable given   65 
that there is no way of knowing whether a particular law does capture those rights. Call 
this the epistemic objection.   I shall now consider each of these objections in turn. 
 
A. The Moral Neutrality Objection 
 
The moral neutrality objection may be stated  very  succinctly: if (‘analytic’ or 
‘descriptive’) legal positivism is true, then the account of disagreement about legality that 
I have offered in section 1 above is false.  Legal positivists are united in arguing that the 
validity of law depends on its sources, not its merits.
45    We saw in the last chapter that 
the leading version of this theory is that offered by Herbert Hart who tells us that the 
criteria of legal validity (and political power) in a state or constitution can only be 
identified by describing as a morally neutral, empirically determined fact the common 
standards of official behaviour that most officials accept.    These common standards of 
official behaviour constitute the  ‘rule of recognition’ in that state or constitution.     
According to the moral neutrality objection then, the identification of the criteria of legal 
validity  in a given state or constitution  is  an exercise which is entirely distinct from 
questions of political morality, including questions about the value in officials exercising 
power in accordance with standards established in the right way before that exercise.
46
  In the previous chapter, I argued by reference to the decision in Jackson
    
47 that it is not 
possible to describe empirically a set of standards, accepted by most officials, which 
constitute a normative  rule  about the grounds of legal validity and the power of 
institutions.
48
                                                 
45 For a witty and informative account of the different ways in which theorists supposedly misrepresent 
legal positivism, see J Gardner ‘Legal Positivism: 5½ Myths’, 46 Am.  J. Juris. 199 (2001).   
  An understanding of the concept of legality, I argued, inescapably 
demands arguments of political morality about the value of legality.   It may now be 
useful to revisit the central argument in support of that position, an argument to which we 
will return to in part 3 (below).  In short, descriptive legal positivism cannot adequately 
46 For a robust defence of this distinction, see M Kramer, Objectivity and the Rule of Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007).   Endicott has gone further in suggesting that different versions of legal 
positivism are altogether unable to accommodate the ideal of the rule of law (for the reason that judicial 
decisions will often involve a quasi-legislative role in which a ‘new’ legal rule is applied retroactively to 
the case at the bar).   See T Endicott, ‘The Impossiblity of the Rule of Law’ (1999) 19 OJLS 1-18.  See 
further part 3 (below).   
47 Jackson v Her Majesty’s Attorney-General [2005] UKHL 56. 
48 See chapter 1, part 3.   66 
account for the way in which judges, lawyers and citizens routinely disagree as a matter 
of political morality  about the grounds of legal validity and political power.  They 
disagree, for instance, about the  meaning of the concept of ‘Parliament’; the required 
‘manner and form’ of legislation; the meaning of legislation enacted by Parliament; and 
the question of whether certain things lie altogether beyond the legislative competence of 
Parliament.   
Hartian positivists, I said, have employed two strategies in an attempt to explain away 
these disagreements.   The first strategy is to treat such disagreements as falling within a 
‘penumbra of uncertainty’ around a core of agreement about the grounds of legal validity 
and political power (which core of agreement constitutes the rule).
49  I tried to show in 
chapter 1 through an analysis of the judgments in Jackson  that  this strategy cannot 
succeed: there simply is no underlying core of acceptance around which judges, officials 
and lawyers disagree; their disagreements go all the way down to the deepest convictions 
in political morality of these different constitutional  actors.  If there is no core of 
agreement, then there can be no rule.
50   The second strategy is to concede that judges 
and other constitutional actors draw upon principles of political morality in the way just 
described, but to contend that these different principles can all be captured by the rule.
51    
This second strategy  fails, I argued, on the basis that it will never be possible to 
enumerate the many different principles, and their shifting dimension of  weight and 
intensity, which figure in legal argument.
52
Far from pre-empting the type of disagreement that I have described in part 1 above, 
the theory espoused by Hart, I suggested in chapter one, must be seen as part of that 
disagreement.   This is to say that Hart’s theory of primary and secondary rules itself 
must be taken to represent a morally engaged conception of legality, one that takes the 
grounds of law and the powers of institutions to be determined by values such as 
certainty and predictability (I will examine this conception of legality in detail in part 3 
below).     It is in this sense that the ‘moral neutrality’ objection, as I have described it, is 
   
                                                 
49 See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law above  (n 2) at 123, 147-54 and 251.   
50 Jules Coleman has attempted to meet this objection by formulating the Hartian rule in the most abstract 
terms.   See J Coleman, The Practice of Principle: In Defense of a Pragmatist Approach to Legal Theory, 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press 2001).  For a devastating review of Coleman’s argument, see R Dworkin, 
‘Thirty Years On’ (Book Review) Harvard Law Review, Vol. 115, No. 6 (Apr., 2002), 1655-1687 
51 This manoeuvre gives rise to the idea of so-called ‘soft’ positivism.   
52 See R Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously above (n 43) Model of Rules I and II.   67 
unfounded.  Before leaving this objection behind though, it is worth pausing to note the 
connection between the positivist/anti-positivist debate and the formal/substantive 
legality debate discussed above.  In his summary of the formal/substantive debate, Craig 
tells us that  
 
‘Formal conceptions of the rule of law do not…seek to pass judgment upon the actual content of the law 
itself. They are not concerned with whether the law was in that sense a good law or a bad law, provided that 
the formal precepts of the rule of law were themselves met…  [according to] substantive conceptions of the 
rule of law [c]ertain substantive rights are said to be based on, or derived from, the rule of law. The concept 
is used as the foundation for these rights, which are then used to distinguish between ‘good’ laws, which 
comply with such rights, and ‘bad’ laws which do not.’
53
 
 
There is a sense, I think, in which both ‘formal’ and ‘substantive’ theories of legality (at 
least as described by Craig)  reflect  the  (descriptive)  positivist  view of legality just 
described (which, when taken on its own terms, is not a conception of legality at all).  It 
is only if we accept that the grounds of legal validity may be determined without recourse 
to questions of political morality that it makes sense to speak of judging ‘the actual 
content of the law itself’ and to speak of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ laws.  If we adopt the anti-
positivist position, then the very identification of law is inextricably bound up with moral 
judgments: in this case, there is no ‘actual law’ which can be identified independently of 
those moral judgments.
54
     
  To put this point differently, questions such as ‘is law distinct 
from morality?’  or  ‘is law ‘good’ law’,  arguably  already have  built into them  the 
positivist premise that law and morality are distinct.     
B. The Epistemic Objection 
 
Jeremy Waldron has articulated what he describes as a ‘proceduralist’ theory of legality.  
As he puts it: 
 
                                                 
53 Craig above (n 17) 467. 
54 This point requires some clarification however.  It is still intelligible for an anti-positivist to say of a 
particular legal right or duty that the law is unjust (and, in this sense ‘bad’), or that it is just (and in this 
sense ‘good’).  As I will contend in part 3 (below) and in chapter 5 (above), the principle of legality 
occupies a part of political morality which is distinct from (ideal) justice.        68 
‘A society is ruled by law in [the proceduralist] sense when power is not exercised arbitrarily, but only 
pursuant to intelligent and open exercises of public reason in institutions and forums set up for that 
purpose…’
55
 
 
The value of legality on this account is something like fair decision-making.     It is more 
important, Waldron suggests, that officials exercise power according to standards that 
have been established through fair decision-making procedures than it is to ensure that 
those standards reflect the true moral rights of individuals on some theory of justice.
56     
Of particular interest for present purposes is a secondary argument with which Waldron 
seeks to buttress his defence of the proceduralist account.    This argument may be stated 
as follows: given the impossibility of knowing whether or not a particular exercise of 
official power captures the legal rights and duties of individuals (according to some 
theory of justice), we can only assess such a decision by reference to the procedures by 
which the decision is made.
57
Waldron summons support for this position from an unlikely source in the work of 
Ronald Dworkin.
   To put this differently, if it is not possible to demonstrate 
the true legal rights of individuals, then it is better (or even unavoidable) to focus on a 
theory of decision-making.   This secondary defence of the proceduralist account of 
legality is based, not on arguments of political morality, but on an argument of 
epistemology.    
58    As we shall see in part 3 (below), central to Dworkin’s theory of 
legality  as integrity  is the idea that a fictitious judge, Hercules, decides legal cases 
according to the scheme of principle that best justifies the past political decisions in a 
given community.
59
                                                 
55 See J Waldron, ‘The Rule of Law as a Theatre of Debate’ above (n 27). 
  Where theorists such as Hart have argued that many questions of 
law – those on which there is no consensus amongst judges – are indeterminate, Dworkin 
contends that there are objectively correct answers to all questions of law (the ‘right 
56 For a fuller consideration of Waldron’s views, see ch. 4. 
57 The epistemic objection as I have called it is not a sceptical or anti-realist objection about the non-
existence of right answers to questions of morality.  See Waldron, Law and Disagreement  (Oxford 
University Press, 1999) ch. 8. 
58 Waldron focuses, in particular, on the Dworkin’s argument that a state should be committed to the 
institutionalisation of the background moral rights of individuals.   See, in particular, R Dworkin, A Matter 
of Principle (Harvard University Press, 1985), ch. 1. 
59 See R Dworkin, Law’s Empire above (n 9) chs 6 and 7   69 
answer’ thesis).
60     For this reason, Waldron suggests, Dworkin is commonly interpreted 
as ‘us[ing] the idea of objective rights answers…to subvert conceptions of the rule of law 
orientated towards settlement, predictability, and determinacy’.
61    Waldron interprets 
Dworkin differently though.   Given that it is not possible to demonstrate whether a judge 
has identified the true moral rights of individuals, Dworkin, Waldron suggests, is forced 
to privilege questions of procedure  (who should make decisions)  over  questions of 
substance or outcomes (which decision would constitute the correct decision).
62   In this 
case, Waldron’s argument runs, Dworkin has met the positivist (‘rule-book’) argument 
mainly by reference to proceduralist points rather than objectivist points.
63
In my view, the proceduralist account of legality rests on two false assumptions 
which sit one on top of the other.     The first assumption is one that I have already taken 
issue with above, namely that there is a clear distinction in political morality between 
questions of form, procedure and substance.
 
64   It is not possible, in my view, to isolate 
the ideal of fair decision-making  and democracy from other (substantive)  political 
principles such as equality and individual rights.   The ideal of fair-decision making 
presupposes  certain substantive rights  which enable people to participate in political 
decision-making under conditions of fairness.
65
The second assumption – which forms the basis of the epistemic objection itself – 
is that the question of whether a particular procedure  is  fair or just can be answered 
without controversy, but that the question of whether a given outcome reflects the true 
legal rights of an individual on some theory of justice is a controversial question of 
political morality which lies beyond our knowledge.    There are at least two responses to 
this type of assumption or argument.   First, the question of what counts as a fair 
procedure is itself a controversial question of political morality with a right answer.
    
66
                                                 
60 This is a thesis that runs throughout Dworkin’s work on legal theory.   For an early account, see A Matter 
of Principle Harvard University Press, 1985) ch. 5. 
   
61 J Waldron ‘The Rule of Law as the Theatre of Debate’ above (n 27) 325. 
62 Ibid at 323. 
63 Ibid at 320 et seq.   
64 See part 1 (above). 
65 See T R S Allan, Constitutional Justice: A Liberal Theory of the Rule of Law (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 2003) 26-27.  See further ch 4 (below), part 1C. 
66 See R Dworkin ‘Reply to Critics’ in Dworkin and his Critics above (n 27) 387. See also A Kavanagh 
‘Participation and judicial review: a reply to Jeremy Waldron’ Law and Philosophy 22, 451-486, 467; J   70 
We disagree just as much (if not more) about which institution should have ultimate 
decision-making authority, as we  do about the proper outcome of a legal dispute.     
Indeed, Waldron implies as much himself where he says in relation to the judicial review 
procedure: 
 
‘The case for judicial review must be won or lost on the moral and political merits of the matter, on the 
basis of moral arguments about fairness, justice and democracy.   And that is likely to be an area where 
there is no less disagreement…than on the merits of the substantive decision itself’
67
 
 
Secondly, according to a conception of legality as integrity (which I will defend in part 3 
below), the question of whether a given outcome reflects the true legal rights of an 
individual will depend, in part, on the ‘rights people have to particular procedures’.
68
In summary, the epistemic objection – as I have labelled it – cannot pre-empt the type 
of inquiry into the meaning of legality that I proposed in part 1 (above).   In so far as a 
proceduralist account of legality can plausibly  be separated from deeper substantive 
values (something which I have doubted above), such an account must be defended by 
arguments of political morality, and not by arguments of epistemology.
  In 
other words, we cannot disentangle the question of which rights individuals have from 
the question of which institutional procedures should be available for the determination 
of those rights.   
69
 
   
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Raz, ‘Disagreement in Politics’, American Journal of Jurisprudence 43 (1998) 47; C Fabre, ‘The Dignity 
of Rights’ (2000) 20 OJLS 271-282, 275.   
67 See J Waldron, Law and Disagreement above (n 57) 185.   John Finnis makes a similar point where, 
having set out eight formal requirements for the rule of law, he emphasises the implications of each formal 
point for the ‘qualities of institutions and processes’.   See Finnis, Natural law and natural rights above (n 
36) X, 271. 
68 See R Dworkin ‘Reply to Critics’ in Dworkin and his Critics above (n 27) 388. 
69 Given the force with which Waldron has argued for the ‘irrelevance of moral objectivity’ it is surprising 
that he should attempt to use arguments of moral objectivity to support the proceduralist account.  See 
Waldron, Law and Disagreement above (n 57) ch 8.   71 
3. Two Conceptions of Legality 
 
Having spent some time confronting possible objections to the type of argumentative 
technique described in section  1 (above), I now want to employ this technique and 
develop the two conceptions of legality outlined in chapter 1.
70
 
     The nature of this 
exercise,  I hope, will by now be clear.  It will involve proposing a putative value to 
justify the ideal of requiring officials to exercise power in accordance with standards 
established in the right way before that exercise.     This value will inform both the nature 
of the standards that count as legal standards, and it will inform the way in which those 
standards must be established.    The exercise will then involve considering which value 
provides the best justification for the principle of legality in the sense that that value 
offers the most morally compelling account of the abstract purpose of that principle.      
A. The Values of Certainty and Predictability 
 
In setting out his blueprint for the post-State of Nature Commonwealth, John Locke 
famously says the following about the value of legality: 
 
 ‘[W]hatever Form the Common-wealth is under, the Ruling Power ought to govern by declared  and 
received Laws, and not by extemporary Dictates and undetermined Resolutions…For all the power the 
Government has, being only for the good of the Society, as it ought not to be Arbitrary and at Pleasure, so 
it ought to be exercised by established and promulgated Laws: that both the People may know their Duty, 
and be safe and secure within the limits of the Law, and the Rulers too kept within their due bounds, and 
not to be tempted, by the Power they have in their hands, to imploy it to such purposes, and by such 
measures, as they would not have known, and own not willingly’
71
 
 
Similarly, Dicey begins his definition of the rule of law as follows: 
                                                 
70 The two conceptions on which I have chosen to focus by no means exhaust the different ways in which 
theorists have sought to explain or justify the ideal of legality but they represent what I take to be the most 
plausible accounts of legality.      
71 Above (n 12) ch XI, para. 136.   Locke was writing primarily against the existing regime of rule by an 
all-powerful Monarch. He was careful to emphasis though that the evil in this regime lay, not in rule by a 
Monarch, but in ‘absolute Arbitrary Power [W]hatever Form the Common-wealth is under’ (my italics). 
This is crucial argument, I think, against those who maintain that absolute power passed from the King to 
Parliament.      72 
 
In the first place, [the principle of the rule of law means] that no man is punishable or can be lawfully made 
to suffer in body or goods except for a distinct breach of law established in the ordinary legal manner 
before the ordinary Courts of the land.  In this sense the rule of law is contrasted with every system of 
government based on the exercise by persons in authority of wide, arbitrary, or discretionary powers of 
constraint.
72
 
 
Both Locke and Dicey seek to justify the ideal of legality in a way that will be both 
familiar and intuitively appealing to many  English lawyers.  The  value in requiring 
officials to exercise power in accordance with standards established in the right way 
before that exercise, they suggest, is to enable individuals and officials to know, with 
reasonable certainty  and predictability, their legal  rights, duties and powers.  As 
discussed earlier, different theorists offer a variety of different stories about why  it is a 
good thing for laws to be certain and predictable.   For Joseph Raz laws that are certain 
and predictable promote efficiency in the sense that they will ‘…be capable of guiding the 
behaviour of its subjects’.
73  Law must therefore possess a number of ‘virtues’:  ‘it must 
be prospective, open and clear and relatively stable; and the making of particular laws 
should be guided by open, stable, clear and general rules.’
 74
 
   Finnis, by contrast, argues 
that the values of certainty and predictability promote co-ordination.  In this case, law 
should have no ‘gaps’ such that:  
‘every present practical question or co-ordination problem has, in every respect, been so ‘provided for’ by 
some such past juridical act or acts (if only, in some cases by provisions stipulating precisely which person 
or institution is now to exercise a discretion to settle the question, of defining what precise procedure is 
now to be followed in tackling the question’
75
 
 
                                                 
72 Dicey, A.V. Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1982 
[reprint of 8th ed., 1915], 110.   
73 J Raz, The Authority of Law, (Oxford, 1979) 226.   
74 Raz is careful though to distance himself from the idea that any of these ‘virtues’ of law are moral in 
character.   The rule of law, he says, is purely instrumental to law.  As he puts it: ‘Law has special virtue 
which is morally neutral in being neutral as to the end to which the instrument is put.  It is the virtue of 
efficiency; the virtue of the instrument as an instrument.  For law this is the rule of law.  Thus the rule of 
law is an inherent virtue of the law, but not a moral virtue as such.’ Ibid.  
75 See J Finnis Natural Law and Natural Rights above (n 36) 269.   73 
An important dimension to this first conception of legality is its ambition to keep law and 
morality distinct.    To this end, both Raz and Finnis argue (for the different reasons I 
have described) that law should provide individuals with ‘exclusionary reasons’ to obey, 
in the sense that it should not  be necessary  for individuals  to re-enter questions of 
morality in order to identify the demands of law.
76
A number of theorists who describe themselves variously as ‘normative’, ‘ethical’ or 
‘democratic’ positivists  offer  a different story about the value in keeping law and 
morality distinct.   The virtue in the separation of law and morality, such theorists argue, 
is twofold.   In the first place, it inculcates a sense of public vigilance and public 
participation on moral issues.
     
77   Secondly, it keeps controversial disagreements about 
morality away from unelected judges who lack both the legitimacy and expertise to 
decide such matters, a position which Sunstein helpfully describes as ‘judicial 
minimalism’.
78
 
  As Waldron puts it,  practical instances of judges making moral 
judgments are: 
‘unsatisfactory aspects of the law to be condemned and minimized.  The legal system should be reformed 
so that moral decision-making, by judges or officials, is eliminated as far as possible’
79
 
   
Finally, Raz suggests that there would be something lost by merging the rule of law with 
more general questions of morality.  As he puts it: 
 
‘if the rule of law is the rule of the good law then to explain its nature is to propound a complete social 
philosophy.  But if so the term lacks any useful function’.
80
 
   
                                                 
76 Cf. J Raz, Practical Reason and Norms (Oxford University Press, 1999), 35-48, 58-73; J Finnis, Natural 
law and natural rights above (n 36) IX.2, 233-234 
77 See, for instance, Liam Murphy, ‘The Political Question of the Concept of Law’ in Coleman (ed.) Hart’s 
Postscript (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001) at 371; T Campbell, The Legal Theory of Ethical 
Positivism (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing, 1996). 
78 See C Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1999) discussed in D Dyzenhaus, The Constitution of Law, Legality in a Time of 
Emergency above (n 42) ch. 1. 
79 J Waldron, Law and Disagreement above (n 57) 167.  See also, H.L.A. Hart, ‘The Separation of Laws 
and Morals’ 71 Harvard Law Review 593-629 (1958). 
80 Raz, The Authority of Law above (n 73)   74 
Let us now try to construct this first conception of legality.   Which types of standards, 
established in which way, would best reflect the values of certainty and predictability?  
Locke suggests that power ought to be exercised by ‘declared and received laws’ or by 
‘established  and Promulgated  laws’,  and Dicey talks about laws that have been 
‘established in the ordinary legal manner’;  but  neither  Locke nor Dicey provide an 
account of which particular standards, established in which way, should count as legal 
standards for the purpose of promoting certainty and predictability.   As we have seen 
above and in chapter 1, it is Hart to whom many constitutional theorists have turned for 
such an account.   Hart tells us, it will be recalled, that  a  legal system  should  be 
understood as a system of rules (reflecting the particular standards of conduct accepted 
by most officials) which identify the law-maker(s), and which identify the ways in which 
laws must be made and interpreted.
81
  It is clear how this Hartian conception of legality seeks to promote values such as 
certainty and predictability.   If it is the case that officials may only exercise power in 
accordance with rules which have been established by institutions and procedures which 
are widely recognised and accepted, then people will be able to identify for themselves 
which rights and duties they possess.  A legal right or duty exists where there is a settled 
rule to that effect: where there is no such rule, there is no right or duty.    At the same 
time, the Hartian conception seems to recommend an attractive model of adjudication.   It 
supposes that  the identification of  legal rights and duties does  not depend on the 
individual moral convictions of judges: even where judges disagree with a settled rule, it 
is his or her duty to respect that rule.    It is only in  ‘hard cases’ – cases in which there is 
     Thus, as we saw in chapter 1, it might be said of 
the British constitution  that there is a rule  to the effect that Parliament exercises 
legislative power – expressed in terms of ‘what the Queen in Parliament enacts is law’ – 
and a rule that ranks statute law above judge-made law.   There will also be a series of 
rules which tells us how Parliament must act.   There will be a rule, for instance, about 
when it is necessary for both Houses of Parliament to consent to the enactment of a Bill; 
and there will be rules about the circumstances in which only the House of Commons 
need give its consent.  Finally, there will be rules about how judges should interpret the 
text of a statute.    
                                                 
81 H L A Hart, The Concept of Law above (n 4) esp. chs 5 and 6.     75 
no settled rule – that judges should exercise their extra-legal discretion and make law in 
accordance, say, with what is ‘just’ or ‘economic’, or according to the way in which the 
legislature would have decided the case.
82
I suggested in section 1 (above) that a conception of legality must satisfy two levels of 
justification.   First, the relevant standards must truly reflect the value or principle which 
supposedly justifies those standards.  Secondly, the conception must be capable of 
justifying our abstract concept of legality  (viz.  that officials only exercise power in 
accordance with standards established before that exercise), and it must be capable of 
explaining and justifying the salient features of English legal practice.   We are now in a 
position to see precisely how the Hartian story fails on both of these levels.    Beginning 
with the second level of justification, given the characteristic place of disagreement in 
judicial decision-making,  it follows  that  most judicial decisions do not represent the 
application of existing  legal rules (which, on the Hartian account,  depend for their 
existence on judicial consensus).    To put this in terms of our abstract formulation of the 
concept of legality, it cannot be said that officials  generally  exercise power ‘in 
accordance with standards established before the exercise of power’; rather, they exercise 
power  in accordance with (strong) discretionary ‘standards' created ex post facto and 
applied retrospectively to the case in hand.
    
83    It is clear that this story defeats each of the 
values put forward on this first conception as justifications for the principle of legality.  It 
supposes that the outcome of most legal cases will be determined according to standards 
which  neither party to a lawsuit could have known or predicted which, in turn, must 
undermine any deeper goals of the rule-based account such as promoting efficiency or 
predictability.
84
                                                 
82 Ibid. ch 7 and Postscript 
    At the same time, the rule-based conception of legality affords judges 
83 This is a crude summary of Dworkin’s original set of objections to legal positivism.  See R Dworkin, 
Taking Rights seriously, (Duckworth, 1977), Model of Rules I and II.   
84 This is the case, a fortiori, for so-called ‘hard’ positivists.  Joseph Raz’s legal theory arguably leads to 
the counterintuitive conclusion that the abstract clauses of the US constitution are not law.  See J Raz, 
Ethics in the Public Domain; Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994).   
For a powerful critique of Raz’s theory, See R Dworkin, ‘Thirty Years On’ (Book Review) Harvard Law 
Review, Vol. 115, No. 6 (Apr., 2002), pp. 1655-1687.   Several theorists have explicitly recognized the 
challenge for legal positivists to account for the ideal of the rule of law.  See, for example, T Endicott, ‘The 
Impossiblity of the Rule of Law’ above (n 46); J Waldron, ‘Hart and the Principles of Legality’ 
(unpublished) delivered in The Legacy of H.L.A. Hart Conference, Cambridge, July 27-8, 2007.     76 
the role of a deputy-legislator and thus undermines the value in  there being ‘judicial 
minimalism’ on controversial matters of morality and policy.
85
On the first level of justification, if it is thought that law should be certain and 
predictable, then we would surely conceive of the principle of legality in a way which is 
radically different to the Hartian conception.   Rather than allow legal disputes to be 
settled by the retrospective application of extra-legal, discretionary standards (as the 
Hartian conception recommends), we would do better to stipulate that a litigant should 
only win if he or she can point to an existing, explicit rule.
       
86  And where no such rule 
exists, we might propose that the particular issue should be referred to the legislature for 
it to create an explicit rule for the future.
87
 
   
B. The value of Integrity or Equality before the law 
 
In order properly to understand the conception of legality as integrity, and the particular 
sense in which this conception of legality reflects the ideal of equality before the law, it 
will be helpful briefly to consider how the value of integrity relates to the principles of 
fairness or (ideal)
88 justice.   Our starting point, it is suggested, must be the assumption 
that ‘each person or group in the community should have a roughly equal share of control 
over the decisions made by Parliament [and courts].’
89
                                                 
85 Different positivist thinkers have attempted to mitigate the sense in which judges act as legislators, for 
instance, by assigning to judges the task of legislating in the way that the legislature itself would have 
decided.   See, for example, J Raz, ‘Intention in Interpretation’ in R George (ed.) The Autonomy of Law 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996).  For an excellent discussion of the application of Raz’s theory to 
adjudication under the HRA 1998, see A Kavanagh, ‘The Elusive Divide between Interpretation and 
Legislation under the Human Rights Act 1998’ (2004) 24 OJLS 259-285. 
    But this assumption creates a 
conundrum:  people (judges, lawyers, officials and citizens) disagree about which laws 
86  In this connection, Dworkin proposes a theory which he describes as ‘unilateral conventionalism’: 
‘Roughly unilateralism provides that the plaintiff must win if he or she has a right to win established in the 
explicit extension of some legal convention’.  See R Dworkin, Law’s Empire above (n 9) 142.   
87 This type of approach is perhaps most recognisable in the work of Jeremy Bentham.  See J Bentham, An 
Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, J.H. Burns and H.L.A. Hart (eds) (London: 
Athlone Press, 1970); J Postema, Bentham and the Common Law Tradition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1986) . Of course, we would have to reject this conception of legality for the reason that it could not begin 
to explain or justify the salient facts about how legal practice in fact works.    
88 I have placed the word ‘ideal’ in parenthesis in order to emphasise the difference between the best theory 
of justice (in the abstract), and the particular conception of justice to which a political community is 
committed through its past institutions decisions.    The latter account belongs to a conception of legality as 
integrity (see below) 
89 R Dworkin, Law’s Empire above (n 9) 178.    77 
Parliament should pass, and which decisions courts should make.   We are therefore in 
need of some way of ensuring, in the face of these disagreements,  that the collective 
decisions made by a political community somehow afford to members of the community 
some form of equal control. 
  One potential solution to the problem of equal control would be to ensure that the 
standards by which a community is governed (through its institutions) are those which 
produce the greatest overall fairness.   But, as Dworkin points out,  this solution can 
produce some surprising and counterintuitive results.   The fairest method of legislating, 
we might say, is for Parliament to create ‘checkerboard’ statutes which accurately reflect 
the division of opinion in the community.  For example, if 50% of the community are 
pro-abortion, and 50% of are pro-life, then the fairest legislative scheme would arguably 
be one, say, of permitting woman born in even years to have an abortion, but denying the 
same to women born in odd years.
90
  Can the principle of justice furnish an account of the ‘equal control’ desideratum?   
Most theorists of legality  make a distinction between the principle of legality and the 
principle of (ideal) justice.
    Yet such a solution would surely be inimical to 
both pro-abortion and pro-life advocates for the reason that it creates an arbitrary 
distinction between different women.    
91  In particular, very few theorists hold the view that an unjust 
law is no law (lex iniusta non est lex).   The theory (or group of theories) which we might 
most readily associate with the principle of justice is natural law theory.    But John 
Finnis, the leading contemporary natural lawyer, has argued forcefully  that even Sir 
Thomas Aquinas –  whose work is commonly perceived as supporting the non lex 
principle – did not in fact hold this view.
  92    Equally, to the extent that Lon Fuller falls 
within the natural law camp, we see in his work an explicit distinction between legality or 
the rule of law (in the form of the ‘inner morality of law’) and justice (in the form of the 
‘external’ morality of law).
93
                                                 
90 Ibid. 
 
91 See D Dyzenhaus ‘Form and Substance in the Rule of Law: A Democratic Justification for Judicial 
Review’ in Forsyth (ed.) Judicial Review and the Constitution, (Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, 
Oregon, 2000) 147.   For an interesting exception, see S Guest, ‘Integrity, Equality and Justice’ in Allard, 
Frydman (eds.) Dworkin with his replies.  Revue Internationale de Philosophie series (Bruxelles: Diffusion: 
Presses Universitaires de France) 335-362. 
92 Above (n 36) II.   
93 L Fuller, The Morality of Law (Yale University Press, 1964).   78 
 What is the difficulty with assimilating the principle of legality to the principle of (ideal) 
justice?     We commonly speak of judges ‘doing justice’; and when we discover that a 
person has  been wrongly convicted and imprisoned for a criminal offence, it seems 
natural to describe this as a ‘miscarriage of justice’.
94   Notwithstanding these familiar 
references, the difficulty with a conception of legality as justice, it is suggested, is its 
inevitable failure to produce some coherent and consistent scheme of principle across the 
institutional decisions of a community.  If judges were enjoined to decide legal disputes 
according to ‘what is just’ then we could expect a constant stream of fresh judgments 
about the requirements of the law (read: the requirements of justice) from judge to judge 
and from case to case.  The libertarian judge would routinely reach different views to the 
utilitarian or economic egalitarian judge, and so on.
95 There could then be no plausible 
sense in which members of a political community could claim equal control over those 
decisions:  for the collective decisions of the community would be riddled with 
inconsistencies – or inequalities – in treatment which may or may not result in a net gain 
in justice.
96
  The value of integrity, it is suggested, captures the special sense in which individuals 
can claim equal control over the enactments of Parliament and the decisions of courts.   A 
political community acts with integrity, Dworkin argues,  when it ensures that the 
particular scheme of principle (the  particular  conception  of justice, fairness and 
procedural due process) to which the community is committed through the past decisions 
of its political and legal institutions is applied equally to all members of that 
community.
    
97   Importantly, the value of integrity is not, as Guest has suggested, a 
compromise between the principles of justice and fairness, or the ‘second best’ substitute 
for a system based on one or other principle.
98
                                                 
94 See S Guest, ‘Why the Law is Just’ [2000] Current Legal Problems 31.   
  To the contrary, as Dworkin puts it: ‘in a 
community divided in moral and political judgment and instinct, [the value of integrity] is 
95 For a very effective thought experiment on conflicting theories of justice, see Amartya Sen, The Idea of 
Justice (forthcoming, Cambridge University Press) ‘Introduction’ at 13.   A draft of this chapter was 
presented at the UCL colloquium in Legal and Social Philosophy, on Jan 28, 2009. 
96 See R Dworkin ‘reponse aux articles’ in Dworkin with his replies (above) n 91 at 437; Law’s Empire, 
189. 
97 Law’s Empire 227. 
98 See S Guest ‘Integrity, Equality and Justice’ above (n 91).   79 
a peculiarly important dimension of equal respect’.
99   More specifically, it is the 
distinctive dimension of equal respect that we associate with the ideal of ‘equality before 
the law’ or ‘treating like cases alike’.
100
As we will see in chapter 3, a conception of legality as integrity recommends a very 
particular  programme  of adjudication.  It implies that the judicial role is one of 
identifying the principles that are presupposed or entailed by the past political decisions 
of courts and legislatures.   This judicial task cuts across the traditional debate about 
whether judges ‘make’ or ‘discover’ law, or whether adjudication is ‘inductive’ or 
‘deductive’.
       
101   It supposes that the judicial role is forward and backward looking; 
conservative and creative.   It is backward looking in the sense that judges are constrained 
by  the principles that justify past  political decisions within a community; and  it is 
forward looking in the sense that it is the task of judges, like authors in a chain novel, to 
apply those principles to meet the demands of new factual situations.
102
Can we justify the conception of legality as integrity against the parameters of our 
abstract concept of legality?   It will be apparent that this conception differs markedly 
from the first conception of legality described above.    On the first conception, I said that 
very few cases will be decided according to the existing legal rights and duties of the 
parties.   The decisions will instead generally depend on the way in which judges draw 
upon extra-legal principles and policies in the exercise of their discretion.     According to 
this second conception, by contrast, we have seen that there is always a ‘right answer’ to 
a legal dispute (based on the best understanding of legal principles across each doctrinal 
area of law), and a judge will almost always be under a duty to decide a case according to 
the existing legal rights and duties of the parties in the case.
     
103
                                                 
99 See R Dworkin ‘reponse aux articles’ in Dworkin with his replies above (n 91) at 436. 
    A conception of legality 
as integrity, it is suggested, captures exactly the point and purpose of the abstract concept 
of legality described above.   It supposes that officials will always exercise power in 
accordance with standards, established in the correct way, before that exercise, namely, 
100  Dworkin finds further connections between the value of integrity or equality before the law, and 
‘fraternity’ or ‘community’. Law’s Empire, 185-190. 
101 Ibid. 228. The locus classicus of the ‘declaratory’ theory is Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of 
England (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977). 
102 For the chain-novel analogy, see R Dworkin, Law’s Empire ch 7.   
103 Save in cases where the judge has a moral duty to ignore the law.   Dworkin refers to this as the 
‘adjudicative stage’ of legal theory.   See Justice in Robes above (n 7) 18.   80 
the principles of justice, fairness and procedural process that justify past political 
decisions in a given political community.    In addition, a conception of legality as 
integrity maintains the ideal  separation of powers in that judges are in no sense 
legislating in their adjudicative function.       
  In the following chapter, I want to consider the way in which the abstract conception 
of legality as integrity just described can help us to understand particular doctrinal areas 
of British constitutional law.   I shall focus, in particular, on administrative law decisions, 
an area  which  has attracted a particularly rich body of academic writing, and judicial 
reasoning, about the justification for the supervisory role of courts.   The task will be to 
try to locate the different strands of traditional administrative law theory  within the 
debates explored in the present chapter, and to try to interpret past legislative and judicial 
decisions in the light of a conception of legality as integrity.
104
 
    It will be seen that much 
of the academic literature and judicial dicta in this area of law mistakenly presupposes 
something like the rule-based account of legality described and rejected above.    
 
                                                 
104 This process may be likened to the way in which Dworkin brings together his ‘aspirational’ and 
‘doctrinal’ concepts of law.  Ibid. 13.   81 
Chapter 3: Principles of English (Administrative) Law 
 
What makes it the case that any proposition of administrative law is true or valid?  When 
a judge decides that a minister acted unlawfully, say, because the minister failed to afford 
a fair hearing to an individual, or because she acted for improper purposes, what makes it 
the case that the minister acted unlawfully?  English public lawyers have long debated 
this type of question, not as a question about the grounds of legal validity, but as a 
question  about  the  constitutional  justifications  for judicial review.  As is very well 
known, ultra vires theorists contend that judges are justified in quashing the decision of 
an official when that decision is in some way contrary to the intentions (or ‘intent’)
1 of 
Parliament.
2  Common law theorists reply that this is not the whole story.   Judges, they 
say, also apply principles of the common law that are wholly independent of Parliament’s 
intentions.
3    Others have argued that judges give effect to the principles that belong 
‘within  the framework of a liberal European Democracy’,
4  or to the ‘fundamental 
precepts of the rule of law –  those basic commitments that almost everyone  can 
reasonably be taken to endorse, at least at a suitably abstract level’.
5
It is not difficult to see the relationship between the question (of legal philosophy) 
about the grounds on which a proposition of administrative law is true or valid, and the 
question (of political philosophy) of how best to justify judicial review.  If it is accepted 
that the primary role of judges is to identify and give effect to the existing legal rights, 
duties and powers of individuals and officials, then a theory of judicial review must rest 
on a theory of how we determine those legal rights, duties and powers.
  
6
                                                 
1 For the distinction between ‘intentions’ and ‘intent’, see part 2 (below). 
   It must rest, that 
is, on a theory of legality.   It is only once we have established the meaning of legality 
that we will be in a position to advance a theory of adjudication and, more broadly, a 
2 See, for instance, C Forsyth, ‘Of Fig Leaves and Fairy Tales: The Ultra Vires Doctrine, The Sovereignty 
of Parliament and Judicial Review’ (1996) 55 CLJ 122-40 
3 See, for instance, P Craig, ‘Competing Models of Judicial Review’ in Forsyth (ed.) Judicial Review and 
the Constitution (Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2000) 
4 R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p. Pierson [1998] A.C. 539 at 575 per Lord Steyn; 
and see, generally, J Jowell, ‘Of Vires and Vacuums: The Constitutional Context of Judicial Review’ 
[1999] PL 448-460. 
5 See T R S Allan, ‘Constitutional Dialogue and the Justification of Judicial Review’ (2003) 23 OJLS 563, 
571; ‘The Rule of Law as the Rule of Reason: Consent and Constitutionalism’ (1999) 115 LQR 221, 224. 
6 Of course, many (positivist) theorists deny that the primary role of judges is to give effect to existing legal 
rights and duties.  See, for instance, T Endicott ‘Adjudication and the Law’ (2007) 27 OJLS 311-26, 311.  
At the opposite end of the spectrum, Dyzenhaus has argued (correctly in my view) that judges have a duty 
to apply legal principles even in times of emergency.   See, generally, D Dyzenhaus, The Constitution of 
Law, Legality in a Time of Emergency, (Cambridge University Press, 2006).  
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theory of the separation of powers between courts and the political branches of 
government: the question of legal philosophy drives the questions of political philosophy.   
In the last chapter, I argued after Ronald Dworkin that the principle of legality – the 
principle that officials may only exercise power in accordance with standards established 
before that exercise – is best understood as reflecting the value of integrity or equality 
before the law.   My general aim in this chapter is to show how a conception of legality as 
integrity can help us to make sense of English law adjudication.   As indicated above, I 
will focus on administrative law decisions (specifically, the practice of judicial review), 
for it is in relation to this doctrinal area of law perhaps more than any other that English 
judges and lawyers have had most to say about the grounds of legal validity, and about 
the proper role of judges.
7   Indeed, English judges and lawyers often give the impression 
that questions concerning the principle  of  legality and the proper role of judges  are 
peculiar to administrative law; that the principles of administrative law are peculiarly 
rule of law principles.
8    It is hoped that enough was said in chapter 2 to show that this 
view is misleading.  A  theory of legality  (and the model  of adjudication that  it 
recommends), I argued, must be capable of explaining decisions in any doctrinal area of 
law, and it  must be able to explain both  statutory interpretation and common law 
adjudication.
9
In order to bring out the virtues of a model of administrative law adjudication as 
integrity, I will consider  three  contrasting  models  of adjudication.  The focus for 
comparison will be the way in which each model addresses the following question: which 
standards, established in which way, provide the best justification for administrative law 
decisions?  It will be apparent that this question echoes the question posed in chapter 2 in 
relation to the meaning of the abstract concept of legality.
    It is for this reason that I have placed the term ‘administrative’ in 
parenthesis in the title and at various points in the chapter.  
10
                                                 
7 This is reflected in the vast body of literature on the question of the constitutional foundations of judicial 
review.  See, for instance, C Forsyth and I Hare (eds), The Golden Metwand and Crooked Cord: essays in 
honour of Sir Williams Wade Q.C. (Oxford University Press, 1998); Forsyth (ed.) Judicial Review and the 
Constitution (Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2000).   
   Our purpose in this chapter, 
as I have said, is to consider how that abstract account of the concept of legality informs 
concrete decisions in the area of English administrative law.     
8 See, for instance, R (on the application of Corner House Research and Others) v. Director of the Serious 
Fraud Office [2008] EWHC 714 (Admin), para. 67 per Moses LJ:  ‘The courts fulfil their primary 
obligation to protect the rule of law, by ensuring that a decision-maker on whom statutory powers are 
conferred, exercises those powers independently and without surrendering them to a third party.’ 
9 See chapter 2, part 1. For a similar point, see P Craig, ‘The Common Law, Shared Power and Judicial 
Review’ (2004) 24 OJLS 237, 241 
10 See chapter 2, part 1.       83 
The first model of adjudication, which I will address in part 1, lies at the foundations of 
the ultra vires theory of judicial review.   It supposes that judges should give effect in 
some way to the meaning that Parliament intended in the relevant statute.   I will argue 
that the idea of a Parliamentary intention (in its various different forms) is an empty 
metaphor which may only be cashed out in terms of principles of political morality.    The 
meaning of the text in a statute will depend, not on the intentions of the author of the 
statute, but on ‘intent’ imposed on a statute by the interpreter of that statute, which intent 
will flow from the general background theory of legality favoured by that interpreter.   In 
part 2, I will consider two further models of adjudication, using the cases of Simms,
11 and 
Coughlan
12
Alongside the project just described, a secondary aim of this chapter is to make sense 
of the long-running debate in English public law about the constitutional foundations of 
judicial review (which, for convenience, I will refer to as the ‘ultra vires’ debate).   My 
general argument – which I will make by way of a series of discussions interspersed 
throughout the chapter – will be that theorists on all sides of the ultra vires debate have 
paid insufficient critical attention to the background theory of legality that their theory 
assumes.  As a consequence, this debate, I will suggest, has done more to obscure than 
illuminate our understanding of administrative law adjudication.   
 as case studies.  The second model derives from the rule-based conception of 
legality described in chapter 2.  It supposes that judges should give effect to the clear and 
settled meaning of words in a statute.  In ‘hard cases’ – cases in which the text admits of 
no clear and settled meaning – judges should legislate interstitially in a way that accords, 
say, with what Parliament would have done, or what is just or efficient.  Finally, I will 
develop and defend  a model of adjudication based on the  conception of  legality as 
integrity discussed above and in the last chapter.      
 
1. The ‘Intentions Theory’ 
 
So embedded in the mindset of English judges, lawyers and academics is the idea that 
judges give effect in some way to the intentions of Parliament (which, for convenience, I 
will call the ‘intentions theory’) that it almost seems heretical to call it into question.
13
                                                 
11 R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte, Simms and Another [2000] 2 AC 115. 
    
But why should any judge, lawyer or academic be committed to the intentions theory?    
12 Regina v North and East Devon Health Authority ex p Coughlan [2000] 2 WLR 622 
13 For the leading account of the traditional approach to statutory interpretation, see R. Cross, Statutory 
Interpretation, J. Bell & G. Engle (eds) (London: Butterworths, 3rd edn, 1995) 14.   84 
We can quickly dispense with one familiar response to that question.    It is not enough to 
say, as ultra vires theorists of judicial review frequently do, that judges give effect to the 
intentions of Parliament simply because Parliament is sovereign, and that, as matter of 
‘constitutional logic’,
14  ‘what an all powerful Parliament does not prohibit, it must 
authorise either expressly or impliedly’.
15   I argued in chapter 1 that this view, which 
seemingly  relies on  the  jurisprudence of the 19
th  century jurist John Austin,  cannot 
withstand the devastating assaults of legal philosophers such as Hart, Dworkin and Raz.
 
16
  The intentions theorist (like every other theorist of (administrative law) adjudication), 
it is suggested, faces a double challenge.   In the first place, she must demonstrate that the 
intentions theory is capable of providing a general and plausible explanation for the way 
that judges in fact decide cases.   This is to say that the intention theory must fit English 
administrative law adjudication.  At the same time, the intentions theorist must be able to 
offer some justification for the intentions theory in terms of the value(s) that the theory 
serves.
   If the intentions theory is to succeed as a theory of administrative law adjudication, 
then the arguments in its defence must be found elsewhere.  
17    This is to say that the theorist must show that the intentions theory places the 
practice of administrative law adjudication in its best (moral) light.
18  The most likely 
justification  for the intentions theory may  be expressed as follows:  the  principle of 
democracy  entails  that the  will  of elected representatives, and not unelected judges, 
should constitute law.
19
 
     As  Elliott and Forsyth put it  in relation to the so-called 
‘modified’ ultra vires theory: 
                                                 
14 See C Forsyth and M Elliott, ‘The Legitimacy of Judicial Review’ [2003] PL 286-307, 288-289 
15 Forsyth, ‘Of Fig Leaves and Fairy Tales: The Ultra Vires Doctrine, The Sovereignty of Parliament and 
Judicial Review’ (1996) 55 CLJ 122, 133.    
16 See chapter 1, part 2.  As if to betray their adherence to Austinian positivism, ultra vires theorists of 
judicial review have conceded that a successful challenge to the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty will 
necessitate some basis for judicial review other than Parliamentary intention. See Forsyth and Elliott, ‘The 
legitimacy of judicial review’ op.cit.  291; M Elliott, ‘The Demise of Parliamentary Sovereignty?  The 
Implications for Justifying Judicial Review’ (1999) 115 LQR 119, 136-7. 
17  Dworkin describes the requirements of ‘fit’ and ‘justification’ as two dimensions of ‘constructive 
interpretation’.  As he puts it: Roughly, constructive interpretation is a matter of imposing purpose on an 
object or practice in order to make of it the best possible example of the form or genre to which it is taken 
to belong. See R Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1986)) 52 
18 Ibid.  See also chapter 2, part 1 (above). 
19   This democratic justification for – what I have described as – the intentions theory has its parallel in US 
constitutional theory in the form of ‘originalist’ or ‘textualist’ theories of interpretation.   See, most notably, 
A Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law (Princeton University Press, 2007).   For 
a recent critique of originalist approaches to the interpretation of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, see G Letsas, A Theory of Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights, (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 2007), ch. 3.   85 
‘…most importantly, [the modified ultra vires doctrine] reconciles constitutional orthodoxy – in which the 
judiciary is in the final analysis subject to the democratic will as expressed through Parliament – with the 
reality that the extension of judicial review was a process in which judicial creativity and ingenuity played 
a prominent role.’
20
 
 
We need to be careful with a claim based on ‘democratic will’ though.   While it may be 
the case that there is a democratic justification for treating the text of a statute as relevant 
to the content of administrative law, it does not necessarily follow from this that the text 
of the statute must reflect the intentions of Parliament.   To put this differently, a 
democratic justification for the legislative powers of Parliament may be compatible with 
– or even better reflected in – some theory of legality and adjudication other than the 
intentions theory.
21   Indeed, I will argue below that democracy is best served when 
judges give effect to the principles which provide the best justification for the past 
enactments of Parliament, and the past decision of courts.
22
 
  
A. Unpacking the Idea of a Parliamentary Intention 
 
In our everyday conversations, we try to understand what people mean when they speak, 
often with some difficulty.   In so doing, we determine the meaning of the words or 
phrases used primarily by reference to the mental state of the speaker – the meaning that 
they desire or hope to convey.   Can we treat the intentions of a Parliament in this same 
way?     The first difficulty lies in the fact that, unlike the words used in everyday 
conversation, statutory language typically takes a very sparse and open-textured form. 
Administrative lawyers, for instance, are highly accustomed to making arguments about 
the meaning of such phrases as ‘the Minister may act as he/she thinks fit’ or ‘the Council 
may act in a way that benefits its area’.  Given these  linguistic difficulties, and the 
obvious impossibility of entering into any kind of dialogue with the statute, the intentions 
theorist must decide where to look for clarification.   
Since he considers the text of a statute to be a form of speech or communication, it 
must be people to whom he looks for clarification, most obviously the people involved in 
                                                 
20 Forsyth and Elliott, ‘The Legitimacy of Judicial Review’ op. cit. at 287. 
21 See P Craig, ‘The Common Law, Shared Power and Judicial Review’ above (n 9) 243.  See further p 10 
(below) 
22 See part 2B (below).   86 
the legislative process.
23
 
  But, as Dworkin notes, this immediately raises  a  host  of 
difficult threshold questions: 
‘Which historical people count as the legislators?  How are their intentions to be discovered?  When these 
intentions differ from one to another, how are they to be combined in the overall, composite institutional 
intention?   [The] answers [to these questions] must, moreover, establish a fixed moment when the statute 
was spoken, when it acquired all the meaning if ever has’
24
 
 
In order to answer these types of questions, a judge must embark on a series of complex 
investigations.  He must decide which types of motivations, of which of the hundreds of 
people directly or indirectly involved in the legislative process, at which point in time, 
should determine the meaning of the statutory text.   It might be argued, for instance, that 
the intentions of only those who voted should count, or that the intentions of only those 
who attended each of the legislative debates should count.   It may even be thought that 
the decision (if it can be called that) of most Parliamentarians today not to repeal a given 
Act of Parliament, should be of paramount importance in determining the meaning of a 
statutory text.
25   At every turn, the judge committed to the intentions theory is faced with 
difficult choices about what counts as the relevant intention.   It is clearly not open to him 
to look to Parliamentary intentions as a guide to  making these choices, for he is 
attempting to work out what it means to look to Parliamentary intentions.
26    And, even if 
a judge can justify focussing on one particular type of motivation, of one set of people, at 
one particular time, the task of assembling this data surely lies beyond the abilities of the 
most assiduous and resourceful team of psychologists and sociologists, let alone a judge 
or panel of judges sitting in a courtroom.
27
  Do the types of difficult questions just described present an insuperable obstacle to the 
intentions theory?    In Pepper v. Hart,
    
28
                                                 
23 See R Dworkin, Law’s Empire above (n 17) 335-336 (hereafter ‘Law’s Empire’). The arguments that 
follow are largely based on those advanced by Dworkin.   
 the House of Lords proposed a solution to some 
of these difficulties.   Lord Brown-Wilkinson laid down certain conditions under which 
24 Ibid at 316. 
25 Ibid at 317 
26 Ibid at 319. 
27 Waldron argues further that the text of a statute ‘has canonical status in legislation that is different in 
kind from any common view or shared sense of purpose that one might discern in the committee rooms or 
in the parliamentary corridors’.   See J Waldron, Law and Disagreement (Oxford University Press, 1999) 
145. 
28 [1993] AC 593.   87 
judges would be able to examine Parliamentary materials as an aid to identifying the 
intentions of Parliament:   
 
‘The exclusionary rule [precluding the courts from referring to Parliamentary materials] should be relaxed 
so as to permit reference to Parliamentary materials where: (a) legislation is ambiguous or obscure, or leads 
to an absurdity; (b) the material relied on consists of one or more statements by a Minister or other 
promoter of the Bill  together if necessary with such other  Parliamentary material as is necessary to 
understand such statements and their effect; (c) the statements relied on are clear…’
29
 
 
Two questions arise out of this dictum, which broadly reflect the first and second of the 
series of questions posed by Dworkin above.   The first question is one of constitutional 
principle: why should the courts take the statement(s) of a ‘Minister or other promoter of 
the Bill’ to represent the meaning of an Act of Parliament?    The second question is a 
practical one: having decided whose  intentions should count, how is it possible for a 
judge to identify precisely what those intentions were?    
In response to the first of these questions, Lord Steyn (writing extra-judicially) has 
argued that the ruling in Pepper v Hart constitutes a flagrant breach of the separation of 
powers.  As he puts it: 
 
‘To give the executive, which promotes a Bill, the right to put its own gloss on the Bill is a substantial 
inroad on a constitutional principle, shifting legislative power from Parliament to the executive’
30
 
 
There is a sense though in which this  objection of principle  (or, to use Dworkin’s 
interpretive language, ‘justification’) to the ruling in Pepper v Hart lies downstream from 
a more serious objection of ‘fit’.     In objecting to the idea that special weight should be 
given to the intention of a Minister (or other sponsor of a Bill), Lord Steyn presupposes 
an answer to the second, practical question posed above: he presupposes that judges will 
often be able to ascertain the intention of Parliament by reference to the statement of a 
minister or other proposer of a Bill, in combination with the text of the Bill itself and 
‘other such Parliamentary materials as is necessary…’  In my view, there is good reason 
to doubt this presupposition, in which case Lord Steyn’s argument of principle needs to 
                                                 
29 Ibid at 640C. 
30 See Lord Steyn, “Pepper v Hart: A Re-examination” (2001) 21 OJLS 59, 68.  Cf. Vogenauer, “A Retreat 
from Pepper and Hart?: A Reply to Lord Steyn” (2005) 25 OJLS 629; Lord Cooke, ‘The Road ahead for 
the Common Law’ (2004) 53 ICLQ 273.     88 
be understood somewhat differently.     In short, there is a crucial distinction between the 
intentions of an individual legislator, Minister or other sponsor of a Bill  and  the 
intentions of an ordinary person in discussion.  As Dworkin puts it: 
 
‘People who talk to each other in the ordinary way can choose their words, and so choose words they 
expect to have the effect they want.  They expect to be understood the way they hope to be understood.  But 
some people are not in charge of their own words: a hostage telephoning at gunpoint may very much hope 
not to be understood the way he expects to be.  Or someone who signs a group letter he cannot rewrite for 
the group, or the author of that letter who drafts it to attract the most signatures possible.’
31
 
 
In order to ascertain the intentions of the sponsor of a Bill – unlike the intentions of a 
person in ordinary conversation –  a judge  faces precisely the same complex 
investigations that I have described above.   He must decide, first, which of the possible 
motivations the sponsor had in making statements in support of a Bill should count as the 
relevant motivation.   The hopes or moral convictions of the sponsor may have diverged 
significantly from her expectations.   She may have  hoped, in accordance with her 
conscience, that the Bill would produce one particular result; but she may have expected, 
given the way in which the Bill had been drafted, and the various pressures she felt from 
her party or Government (pressures which may pull in different directions), that it would 
produce another result.
32
                                                 
31 Law’s Empire, 322 
    If we take the facts of Pepper v Hart itself, it may well have 
been the case that the Financial Secretary to the Treasury (who was deemed to have 
sponsored the relevant taxation Bill) expected that the Bill would be interpreted in a way 
that favoured the Inland Revenue; but it may have been his hope or moral conviction that 
the Bill would be interpreted in a way that favoured the individual.   Secondly, having 
decided which type of motivation counts, the judge must also select a precise point in 
time at which that motivation should be recorded.  The sponsor of a Bill is liable to be 
strongly influenced by the views she considers between giving her own statements (if 
there is more than one), and by the Parliamentary debates that follow her statements.   
Her hopes may grow stronger, and her expectations weaker (or vice versa), as she listens 
to more and more arguments, and contemplates more and more amendments. We see then 
32 Ibid 321-324.   One topical example is the dilemma faced by Republican senators in late 2008, in 
deciding whether or not to vote for an enormous financial bailout to financial institutions.   Those who 
voted in favour may have done so a) for the reason that they saw some necessary limits to the free-market 
ideology; or b) because they wished to save their political career!   89 
that the ruling in Pepper v Hart replicates rather than provides a solution to the difficult 
questions posed by Dworkin above.  
Can it be argued that the difficulties I have described above in relation to the 
intentions theory are illusory?   Goldsworthy suggests two different ways in which this 
may be so.   First, he contends that it will often be possible to identify behind the text of a 
statute some underlying collective Parliamentary intention.  As he puts it: 
 
‘Despite occasional suggestions that collective intentions are mythical entities that cannot exist, it is 
obvious that they can.  We see them in action when we watch team sports, and hear them when we listen to 
orchestras.’
33
 
  
We can quickly see that this takes us nowhere. In so far as the members of an orchestra or 
sports team possess a collective intention – an intention which is shared by all or most of 
its members – that intention would have to be so abstract as to be practically useless to 
anybody  attempting to understand these practices.  At most, we could say that the 
orchestral players or sportsman collectively intend ‘to play well’, or, in the case of 
orchestral players, that they collectively intend ‘to follow the conductor and/or the Leader 
(of the orchestra)’.   The equivalent intention amongst legislators could only be 
something as abstract as an intention ‘to vote’ or ‘not to vote’ which, taken by itself, 
provides no guidance at all to a judge attempting to interpret the text of a statute.  As 
soon as a judge attempts to discover some more concrete intentions, he will find that he 
faces all of the questions, and others, that I have explored above.
34
  The second way in which Goldsworthy seeks to salvage the intentions theory runs as 
follows:  
    
 
‘It must be admitted that in many cases, what the judges describe as Parliament’s implicit intention is a 
counter-factual rather than an actual intention, a matter of what Parliament would have intended if it had 
anticipated the problem.’
 35
 
  
We are now asked to imagine a judge pondering what a particular legislator or group of 
legislators would have thought had they put their mind to a particular issue, or how they 
                                                 
33 J Goldsworthy, The Sovereignty of Parliament: History and Philosophy (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1999) 
251. 
34 For further discussion on the notion of an ‘abstract’ intention, see part C (below). 
35 Goldsworthy op. cit.at 252.   90 
would have voted had they been given the opportunity to vote on a particular amendment.   
Far from providing a way out of the difficulties with actual legislative intent though, the 
counter-factual argument arguably compounds those difficulties.     The judge is  now 
required to speculate on which (notional) motivations of which (notional) legislators at 
which (notional) point in time should count.  Given the infinite number of reasons that a 
legislator may have either for supporting or rejecting an amendment, the task envisaged 
for judges by the counter-factual argument is again wholly unrealistic.  
 
The intentions theory, I suggested towards the start of this chapter, is inspired by the ideal 
that the democratic will of the legislature should prevail over the will of unelected judges, 
and that the rights, duties and powers of individuals and officials should not be 
determined according to the moral and political philosophies of individual judges.    I 
have attempted to show that the intentions theory does not fit the way in which judges 
decided administrative law cases: this is to say that we cannot count the intentions theory 
as a plausible account of how judges in fact decide cases.    
If, for the sake of argument, we put to one side the arguments against the intentions 
theory based on ‘fit’, can the intentions theory justify the practice of administrative law 
adjudication?  In so far as the best justification for the intentions theory is one based on 
the principle of democracy, we might pause to consider whether the best understanding of 
democracy entails that the will of the legislature should, in all cases, prevail over other 
principles.   I propose only to adumbrate an argument now which will be central to the 
next chapter.
36
 
   While a straightforward majoritarian conception of democracy would 
seem to be supportive of the intentions theory, a rights-based conception of democracy 
would count against the idea that judges should give effect to the will of the legislature 
when that will runs contrary to fundamental human rights.   If it turns out that the rights-
based conception of democracy is a better account of that concept, then the intentions 
theory would fail both for reasons of fit and justification.   
B. The Inadequacy of the Common Law Critique of the Intentions Theory 
 
Before moving forward with our argument in part C (below), it will be instructive briefly 
to outline the way in which the so-called ‘common law’ theory of judicial review (or at 
                                                 
36 See (below) chapter 4, part 1.   91 
least one of the major elements of that theory) fails, in my view, adequately to confront 
the intentions theory (and  therefore  fails  to confront the ultra vires theory of judicial 
review).   The  relevant  element  of  the  common law theory  may be expressed  quite 
simply:  since judges often review the exercise of non-statutory  powers (such as 
prerogative powers), the intentions theory cannot account for all of the decisions that 
judges make in their supervisory jurisdiction.
37
The over-inclusiveness argument claims  too much  in so far as it assumes that 
intentions theorists (in the guise of ultra vires theorists of judicial review) necessarily aim 
to explain every proposition of law in terms of the intentions of Parliament.     This may 
be so, but it will ultimately depend on the background theory of legality in play.  If, as I 
have suggested elsewhere,
  Call this the ‘over-inclusiveness 
argument’. This argument, it is submitted, claims too much in one respect, and too little 
in another. 
38 ultra vires theorists of judicial review are committed to an 
Austinian-style ‘command’ theory of legality, then the argument of common law theorists 
would have some force; for, on this Austinian theory, the truth  or validity of every 
proposition of law will depend on the express or implied intention of the sovereign.
39  If, 
on the other hand, ultra vires theorists are committed to a rule-based conception of 
legality,  then the common law argument stated above can no  longer embarrass the 
intentions theory.  On this rule-based account of legality, it is entirely open to the ultra 
vires theorist to argue that there exist settled rules of the following description: a) that 
when judges interpret statutes, they should give effect to the will of Parliament; and b) 
that when judges review, say, the exercise of prerogative powers, they give effect to the 
rights, duties and powers clearly established in past judicial decisions; and c) that if there 
is a conflict between the intentions of Parliament and the past decisions of courts, the 
conflict should be resolved in favour of the former.
40    In other words, a rule-based 
theory of legality can plausibly accommodate multiple sources of law without tracing 
each and every law back to the single source of the intentions of Parliament.
41
                                                 
37 For the original statement if this type of objection, see D Oliver, Is the Ultra Vires rule the basis of 
judicial review?’ [1987] PL 543, 546 et seq. 
 
38 See (above) chapter 1, part 1 
39 Ibid. 
40 See further (below) part 2, part A.  
41 This rule-based defence of the ultra vires theory perhaps helps us to understand the contention by 
Forsyth that there can be a different justification (i.e. a justification which does not depend on Parliament’s 
express or implied intention) for the review of non-statutory powers (based, Forsyth suggests, on the need 
to control monopoly powers.  See C Forsyth, ‘Of Fig Leaves’ above (n 2).   92 
  The over-inclusiveness argument says too little in so far as it is based on the generality 
of the intentions theory rather than the quality of that theory.    Rather than attack the 
very concept of a Parliamentary intention, the argument merely questions whether 
Parliament can have intended the very many things that judges do in their supervisory 
jurisdiction.
42
 
  To put this differently, the objection does nothing more than point out the 
logical limits of the ultra vires theory taken on its own terms.   For a good illustration of 
this point, we need look no further than the acceptance by common law theorists – in 
common with ultra vires theorists – of the so-called ‘principle of legality’ articulated by 
Lord Hoffmann in the case of Simms: 
‘That, in the absence of clear words to the contrary, Parliament is presumed not to have intended to 
legislate contrary to fundamental rights.’
 43
 
   
Given that common law theorists accept this presumption, the difference between the 
common law theory and the ultra vires is almost negligible: for common law theorists, 
Parliamentary intentions apply in only a negative way, and only where fundamental 
rights are engaged; whereas for ultra vires theorists, Parliamentary intentions apply in 
more  positive way to the general  principles of judicial review.
44   As Allan rightly 
implies, this would seem to be more a difference in emphasis than a fundamental 
difference of conviction.
45
In placing an emphasis on what I have called the over-inclusiveness argument, 
common law theorists of judicial review have, in my view, misdirected their challenge to 
the intentions theory (or the ultra vires theory of judicial review).   An effective challenge 
must be directed, first, towards the background theory of legality against which the 
intentions theory is advanced and, secondly, towards the very concept of a Parliamentary 
intention.  If, as I have argued above,  it turns out that the very idea of a collective 
   
                                                 
42 This point is made in two different ways by common law theorists.  First, it is said that, given the abstract 
text of a statute, it is not plausible to suppose that Parliament intended the many principles that judges 
apply.  Secondly, a theory based solely on Parliamentary intention cannot explain cases in which courts 
have reviewed the exercise of non-statutory powers. See, generally, P Craig, ‘Ultra Vires and the 
Foundations of Judicial Review’ [1998] CLJ 63. 
43 Above (n 11) at 131 per Lord Hoffmann.    
44 For a similar point, see C Forsyth and M Elliott, ‘The Legitimacy of Judicial Review’ above (n 14) at fnt 
14.  This commonality of views can be explained by the commitment by both ultra vires theorists and 
common law theorists to the view that Parliament is sovereign.   See, for example, P Craig, ‘Competing 
Models of Judicial Review’ above (n 3) 390. 
45 See T.R.S. Allan, ‘The Constitutional Foundations of Judicial Review: Conceptual Conundrum or 
Interpretative Inquiry? [2002] CLJ 87-125, 91 et seq.      93 
Parliamentary intention is misconceived, then arguments about the generality of its 
application are beside the point.    
 
C. Legislative Intent  
 
Before our brief digression into the ultra vires debate, I concluded in part A (above) that 
the intentions theory neither fits nor justifies administrative law adjudication.  We now 
need to confront the following type of objection to that conclusion.  If, when faced with a 
statutory text, judges do not give effect to Parliament’s intentions, then, the objection 
runs, they must instead be giving effect to their own intentions, or to the meaning that 
they think a statute should have.
46
  The problem with this objection, it is suggested, is that it assumes the truth of the very 
theory which we have shown above to be false: the intentions theory.   The objection 
falsely assumes, that is, that the only way in which judges can give effect to Parliament’s 
will is by giving effect to Parliament’s intentions; and that where judges impose some 
meaning on a statute other than that intended by Parliament, they necessarily disregard 
the will of Parliament.
  In this case, we have moved away from a system 
based on Parliament democracy towards one of judicial supremacy or juristocracy.    
47
 
     I now want to square this apparent circle, and explain the 
sense in which judges can respect the will of Parliament without embarking on the 
hopeless task of identifying  the intentions of individual legislators, or the collective 
intentions of the legislature.   The key to this task can be found in the following oft-cited 
passage of Lord Reid: 
 ‘We often say that we are looking for the intention of Parliament, but that is not quite accurate.  We are 
seeking the meaning of the words that Parliament used.  We are seeking not what Parliament meant but the 
true meaning of what they said’.
 48
 
 
Building on this dictum, we can usefully distinguish between the intention of Parliament, 
and the intent of a statute.    The former concept, we have seen, refers to the mental states 
                                                 
46 See, for instance, J Goldsworthy, ‘Legislative Intentions, Legislative Supremacy, and Legal Positivism’ 
in J Goldsworthy and T Campbell (eds), Legal Interpretation in Democratic States (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2002), 66. 
47 See, Allan ‘Constitutional Dialogue’ op.cit. 571. 
48 Black-Clawson International Ltd v. Papierwerke Waldhof Aschaffenburg AG [1995] AC 591, 613. See 
T.R.S. Allan, ‘Legislative Supremacy and Legislative Intention: Interpretation, Meaning and Authority’ 
(2004) 63 CLJ 685, 689.   94 
of individual legislators: it takes the meaning of a statute to depend on the author’s 
intentions.  The latter concept, by contrast, refers to the general background theory of 
legality which a judge employs in identifying the meaning of words in a statutory text: it 
takes the meaning of a statute to be that which is imposed on the words of a statute by the 
interpreter of the statute.
49
  What does it mean to say that judges impose meaning on a statute according to some 
background theory of legality?    We have already seen an example of this practice in our 
consideration of the intentions theory above.   When judges claim to be giving effect to 
the intentions of Parliament, they must be taken to have made a choice about which 
theory of legality makes best sense of the text of a statute; to use our abstract formulation 
from chapter 2, they have made a choice about which standard, established in which way, 
count as legal standards.
   Given the impossibility of ascertaining the mental states of 
legislators, it is only this latter concept, I think, which can enable us to understand the 
special interpretive technique by which judges respect the will of Parliament.    
50  That choice, I explained above and in chapter 2, is based on 
the value or principle – perhaps the principles of ‘democracy’ or ‘fairness’ – which a 
judge takes to justify the very fact that statutes count towards (or perhaps determine) the 
content of the law.
51
Crucially, it is in this attempt by judges  (or interpreters of the practice of 
administrative law adjudication) to find some value  in the fact that Parliament enacts 
statutes, that we find the answer to the ‘judicial supremacy’ objection above.    Judges 
give effect to the will of Parliament in the sense that they locate the text of a statute 
within a broader theory of legality, one which settles on a particular justification for the 
force of Parliamentary legislation.   
   In part 3 (below), I will consider two further background theories 
of legality – and two different sets of value or principles – which a judge might employ in 
the task of interpreting the text of a statute.    
 
There are two important clarificatory points to make about the idea of legislative intent 
before we can progress to part 3 of this chapter.        
 
First, we need to guard against treating the notion of ‘legislative intent’ as a species of 
legislative intention.   This danger is manifest, I think, in attempts to present the true 
                                                 
49 Law’s Empire, ch 2. 
50 See chapter 2, part 1. 
51 Ibid.    95 
meaning of a statute as reflecting such things as the ‘abstract’
52 or ‘constructive’
53 intent 
of Parliament, or the ‘general intention’
54 of Parliament, or the ‘reasonable’,
55 ‘shared’
56 
or ‘implicit’
57  assumptions or presumptions that form the backdrop of statutory 
interpretation.  Given that theorists of administrative law disagree  about which 
background theory of legality provides the best justification for the practice of statutory 
interpretation, it cannot lend any weight to a particular conception of the rule of law, in 
my view, to present that conception as the one that Parliament would surely accept, or 
which we can reasonably assume that Parliament would accept.
58
 
     
Secondly, the meaning of a statute – or the background theory of legality which provides 
the best justification for statutory interpretation – cannot depend on the language used by 
judges in their decisions.   It may well be that judges regularly claim to be giving effect to 
the  intentions of Parliament; but this  is not decisive of whether the intentions theory 
provides the best justification for their decisions.   As I explained towards the beginning 
of this chapter, the true meaning of a statute will depend on the background theory of 
legality and adjudication which best  fits  and  justifies  the practice of administrative 
statutory interpretation.
59    In other words, the meaning will depend on a ‘constructive’ 
rather than a ‘conversational’ interpretation of the practice.
60
                                                 
52 The so-called ‘modified’ ultra vires theory seeks to preserve this basic intuition albeit that Parliament is 
said to have an abstract intention that judges give effect to the rule of law rather than concrete intentions as 
to particular principles of judicial review.  See C Forsyth and M Elliott, ‘The Legitimacy of Judicial 
Review’ above (n 14).   
   Crucially, a successful 
theory of the practice – one that fits and justifies the practice – must be able to explain 
and justify the fact judges do treat the text of a statute as being relevant to the content of 
the law.   A theory which envisages that judges reach decisions without any regard for the 
53  Allan ‘Constitutional Dialogue’ above (n 5) 565. As Allan puts it: ‘there is a perfectly cogent, if 
‘constructive’ sense in which we may attribute to members of Parliament a general intention to preserve the 
essentials of the rule of law.’      
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid at 566. 
58 Craig ‘The Common Law, Shared Power and Judicial Review’ above (n 9) 242. 
59 See part 1 above. Goldsworthy seems to confuse the notion of ‘constructive’ and ‘conversational’ 
interpretation when, having apparently accepted the former he defends the intentions theory (and the ultra 
vires theory of judicial review) on the basis that judges often say that they are giving effect to the intentions 
of Parliament.  See above (n 33) 250-1. For a further example of this confusion, see C Forsyth and M 
Elliott, ‘The Legitimacy of Judicial Review’ above (n 14) 287 and n 8.   
60 Law’s Empire, ch. 2.   96 
text of a statute would have failed to account for this key feature of administrative law 
adjudication.
61
 
 
 
2. Two Alternative Models of (Administrative Law) Adjudication  
 
The meaning of the words used by Parliament in any particular statute, I have argued 
above, must depend on the general background theory of the principle of legality – the 
principle that officials must exercise power in accordance with standards established in 
the correct way  before that exercise  –  which provides the best justification for the 
practice of statutory interpretation   In chapter 2, I outlined two contrasting abstract 
theories of legality, one based on values and principles such as certainty and 
predictability, and the other based on the value of integrity or equality before the law.
62
 
  I 
now want to demonstrate how these different conceptions of legality translate into two 
different theories of administrative law adjudication; or, to restate our original question in 
this chapter, I want to offer two further responses to the question: which standards, 
established in which way, provide the best justification for administrative law decisions?   
In order to bring out the differences in these responses, I will take as a focus for analysis 
two different judicial decisions, the first of which involves statutory interpretation, the 
second of which involves common law reasoning.   It will be helpful to provide a brief 
description of these decisions at the outset. 
Simms
63
 
 
The House of Lords had to decide whether it was lawful for the governors of prisons 
(applying a policy of the Home Secretary) to restrict the access of journalists to prisoners 
for the purpose of giving oral interviews. The relevant legislative provision was section 
                                                 
61 We might argue that the theory of legality as justice espoused by Guest should fail for this reason (see 
chapter 2 (above) part 3B.  Guest implies that judge should sometimes ignore the text of statutes where 
justice so requires.   See S Guest, ‘Integrity, Equality and Justice’ in Allard, Frydman (eds.) Dworkin with 
his replies.  Revue Internationale de Philosophie series (Bruxelles: Diffusion: Presses Universitaires de 
France) 335-362.  Similarly, Dworkin rejects the theory which he describes as legal ‘pragmatism’ (a theory 
which seems to represent an amalgam of legal realism, critical legal theory, and legality as justice) for the 
reason that such a theory cannot account for the fact that judges (at least seem to) have regard to the past 
enactments of Parliament and the past decisions of courts.  See Law’s Empire, ch.5.  For the importance of 
facts for a normative theory of legality, see chapter 2 (above) part 1.   
62 See chapter 2, part 3. 
63 Above (n 11).   97 
47(1) of the Prison Act 1952 which enabled the Home Secretary to make rules for ‘the 
regulation and management of prisons…and for the …treatment, employment, discipline 
and control of persons required to be detained therein’.   Although there were rules 
allowing prisoners to correspond with journalists and their legal adviser, paragraphs 37 
and 37A of the relevant prison rules provided that journalists were only permitted to give 
oral interviews upon signing a disclaimer that they would not use information obtained in 
their professional capacity.    
It was the avowed policy of the Secretary of State that there should be a blanket ban 
on oral interviews with journalists on the grounds that such interviews would ‘undermine 
the discipline and control which are unquestionably essential conditions in a prison 
environment’.
64
  Each of their Lordships emphasised the right of freedom of expression, drawing on 
English decisions such as Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2) [1990] 
1 A.C. 109 and Derbyshire County Council v. Times Newspapers Ltd. [1993] A.C. 534 
and the decisions of the European Court on Human Rights and the US Supreme Court.
   The claimant prisoners argued that paragraphs 37 and 37A, the policy 
of the Home Secretary to impose a blanket ban, and the decision of the governors of 
prisoners made pursuant to the Home Secretary’s policy, were ultra vires and irrational in 
so far as they interfered with the prisoners’ right of freedom of expression, and, more 
specifically, their right to have the safety of their convictions further investigated and 
tested with the potential for reconsideration of their convictions.    
65   
Lord Steyn remarked that, together with the intrinsic value of the right of freedom of 
expression, this right had an  instrumental importance as (inter alia) a means of 
‘facilitat[ing] the exposure of errors in the governance and administration of justice of the 
country.’
66 On the question of the meaning of paragraphs 37 and 37A, after invoking the 
‘principle of legality’ viz. ‘that, in the absence of clear words to the contrary, Parliament 
is presumed not to have intended to legislate contrary to fundamental rights’
67
 
,   Lord 
Steyn concluded that, even in the absence of an ambiguity in the language of paragraphs 
37 and 37A, these provisions  had  left untouched the right  to  freedom of expression.   
Similarly, Lord Hoffmann said  
                                                 
64 Ibid 120, per Lord Steyn 
65 Ibid 125-127, 130 131 per Lord Hoffmann 
66 Ibid 126 
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‘Prison regulations expressed in general language are also presumed to be subject to fundamental human 
rights. The presumption enables them to be valid. But, it also means that properly construed, they do not 
authorise a blanket restriction which would curtail not merely the prisoner's right of free expression, but its 
use in a way which could provide him with access to justice.’
68
 
 
Lord Hobhouse said 
 
‘Nor is it fully clear what are the parameters of the policy. The Prison Rules and the Standing Orders 
certainly do not necessitate the conclusion that a total ban is being imposed; in part the evidence leads to 
the same conclusion. This illustrates that it is the policy of the department rather than the Standing Orders 
themselves that are under attack’.
69
 
   
He concluded (citing the case of Raymond v. Honey
70) that the policy of the Secretary of 
State to impose blanket exclusion of journalists was ‘both unreasonable and 
disproportionate and cannot be justified as a permissible restraint upon the rights of the 
prisoner’.
71
 
 
Coughlan
72
 
 
The applicant was seriously disabled lady who, with seven comparably disabled patients 
had been moved with her agreement to Mardon House, a National Health Service facility 
for the long-term disabled, which the health authority assured them would be their home 
for life.    The health authority subsequently decided to close Mardon House and to 
transfer the long-term general nursing care  of the applicant to the local authority, 
although no alternative placement for her was identified.   The applicant applied for 
judicial review of this decision.  The ground of challenge on which I will focus is 
whether the decision frustrated an  substantive legitimate expectation held by the 
applicant.    
  In the Court of Appeal, Lord Woolf said that it was common ground between the 
parties that ‘in public law the health authority could break its promise to Miss Coughlan 
that Mardon House would be her home  for life if, and only if, an overriding public 
                                                 
68 Ibid 132  
69 Ibid 132 and 141 
70 [1983] A.C. 1 
71 Simms above (n 11) at 142 per Lord Hobhouse 
72 Regina v North and East Devon Health Authority ex p Coughlan [2000] 2 W.L.R. 622   99 
interest required it.’
73
 
   His Lordship then outlined three different categories of 
expectation, and the role for the court that each category implied.    It will be necessary to 
quote this and subsequent passages in full: 
57. …(a) The court may decide that the public authority is only required to bear in mind its previous policy 
or other representation, giving it the weight it thinks right, but no more, before deciding whether to change 
course. Here the court  is confined to reviewing the decision on Wednesbury grounds ( Associated 
Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corpn [1948] 1 KB 223 ). This has been held to be the effect 
of changes of policy in cases involving the early release of prisoners: see In re Findlay [1985] AC 318 ; R v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex p Hargreaves [1997] 1 WLR 906 (b) On the other hand the 
court may decide that the promise or practice induces a legitimate expectation of, for example, being 
consulted before a particular decision is taken. Here it is uncontentious that the court itself will require the 
opportunity for consultation to be given unless there is an overriding reason to resile from it (see Attorney 
General of Hong Kong v Ng Yuen Shiu [1983] 2 AC 629 ) in which case the court will itself judge the 
adequacy of the reason advanced for the change of policy, taking into account what fairness requires. (c) 
Where the court considers that a lawful promise or practice has induced a legitimate expectation of a 
benefit which is substantive , not simply procedural, authority now establishes that here too the court will in 
a proper case decide whether to frustrate the expectation is so unfair that to take a new and different course 
will amount to an abuse of power. Here, once the legitimacy of the expectation is established, the court will 
have the task of weighing the requirements of fairness against any overriding interest relied upon for the 
change of policy.
74
 
 
In terms of how a judge should decide which, if any, of these categories a given case 
belongs within, his Lordship said: 
 
In many cases the difficult task will be to decide into which category the decision should be allotted. In 
what is still a developing field of law, attention will have to be given to what it is in the first category of 
case which limits the applicant's legitimate expectation (in Lord Scarman's words in In re Findlay [1985] 
AC 318 ) to an expectation that whatever policy is in force at the time will be applied to him. As to the 
second and third categories, the difficulty of segregating the procedural from the substantive is illustrated 
by the line of cases arising out of decisions of justices not to commit a defendant to the Crown Court for 
sentence, or assurances given to a defendant by the court: here to resile from such a decision or assurance 
may involve the breach of legitimate expectation: see R v Grice (1977) 66 Cr App R 167 ; cf R v Reilly 
[1982] QB 1208 , R v Dover Magistrates' Court, Ex p Pamment (1994) 15 Cr App R(S) 778 , 782. No 
attempt is made in those cases, rightly in our view, to draw the distinction. Nevertheless, most cases of an 
enforceable expectation of a substantive benefit (the third category) are likely in the nature of things to be 
cases where the expectation is confined to one person or a few people, giving the promise or representation 
                                                 
73 Ibid 52   
74 Ibid 57   100 
the character of a contract. We recognise that the courts' role in relation to the third category is still 
controversial; but, as we hope to show, it is now clarified by authority.
75
 
  
In the event, Lord Woolf placed the facts the Coughlan case itself in the third category 
(expectation of a substantive benefit), and he concluded that the Health Authority had 
acted so unfairly as to have abused its power.   This, he said, was for the following 
reasons: 
 
First, the importance of what was promised to Miss Coughlan…; second, the fact that promise was limited 
to a few individuals, and the fact that the consequences to the health authority of requiring it to honour its 
promise are likely to be financial only.
76
 
 
After a detailed survey of the caselaw on the many different types of official conduct that 
may amount to an ‘abuse of power’, Lord Woolf said the following of the general 
doctrinal area of legitimate expectations: 
 
Legitimate expectation may play different parts in different aspects of public law. The limits to its role have 
yet to be finally determined by the courts. Its application is still being developed on a case by case basis. 
Even where it reflects procedural expectations, for example concerning consultation, it may be affected by 
an overriding public interest. It may operate as an aspect of good administration, qualifying the intrinsic 
rationality of policy choices. And without injury to the Wednesbury doctrine it may furnish a proper basis 
for the application of the now established concept of abuse of power.
77
 
 
 
A.  A Rule-Based Model of Administrative Law Adjudication 
 
This first model of administrative law adjudication, which derives from the ‘rule-based’ 
theory of legality described in chapter 2, will perhaps seem the most plausible and 
intuitively attractive to English public lawyers, and so this  model  will occupy us for 
several pages.  The principal role of judges on the rule-based model, it will be recalled, is 
to give effect to settled rules about the legal powers, rights and duties of individuals and 
officials; and in ‘hard cases’ – cases in which there is no such settled rule – judges must 
modify existing rules or create new legal rules which will then be applied retroactively to 
                                                 
75 Ibid 59 
76 Ibid 60 
77 Ibid 71   101 
the case.  The  value  in administrative law  and administrative law adjudication, so 
conceived, is one of legal certainty or protected expectations: an individual can plan and 
lead their life certain in their knowledge of the rights that they enjoy against the state; and 
officials can exercise power certain  in  their knowledge of  the scope of that power.
78
Beginning with decision in Coughlan, the question (within the framework of the rule-
based theory of legality)  is as follows: which rule or  rules  governed the question of 
whether, and when, an individual enjoys a substantive legitimate expectation (or when an 
official has a duty to respect such an expectation)?      The ‘parent’ rule guiding the 
court’s decision might be expressed as follows (modifying the relevant dictum of Lord 
Woolf): ‘that in public law a public authority can break its promise to an individual if, 
and only if, an overriding public interest requires it’.
    
Does this conception of legality fit and justify the decisions in Simms and Coughlan?     
79
  It will be recalled from chapters 1 and 2 that the very concept of a rule, according to 
theorists such as Hart and Raz, is such that we must be able to ascertain its content and 
meaning  empirically, that is,  without recourse to morality or other extraneous 
considerations; disagreement can only be about such things as how to modify or improve 
an existing rule, or about the form that a new rule should take.    These are the ways in 
which the rule-based theory seeks to promote such values as certainty and predictability.   
It is immediately difficult to see how any of the ‘rules’, ‘sub-rules’ or ‘supplementary 
rules’ that I have proposed above could be taken to represent such a settled, ascertainable, 
rule about the respective legal rights and duties of individuals and officials.     Each of 
these ‘rules’ is replete with abstract terms such as ‘promise’, ‘fairness’, ‘an overriding 
    It might then be said that each 
category of expectation identified by Lord Woolf represents a sub-rule, for instance, the 
third category might be expressed as follows (again to modify the dictum of Lord Woolf): 
‘that, where a lawful promise induces a legitimate expectation of a substantive benefit, 
the court will give effect to that expectation if taking a new and different course would be 
so unfair as to amount to an abuse of power’.   A supplementary rule (or set of rules) 
might then be added to this: ‘that a promise will so unfair as to amount to an abuse of 
power ‘where a promise is confined to one person or a few people, giving the promise or 
representation the character of a contract, and where the requirements of fairness to the 
individual are not outweighed by any overriding interest relied upon for the change of 
policy’.    
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public interest’, ‘substantive’, ‘procedural’ and ‘abuse of power’, terms about whose 
meaning and application judges will inevitably disagree.   So much is apparent from Lord 
Woolf’s repeated references to the difficulties in placing any given set of facts within one 
category of expectation or another, and to the fact, noted by many other judges and legal 
commentators, that this is a ‘developing field of law’.
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If, as I have suggested, there were no settled rules about the basis for a substantive 
legitimate expectation at the time that the Coughlan case came to court then, according to 
the rule-based model, the decision in favour of Mrs Coughlan could not have reflected 
the enforcement of existing  legal rights and duties.    Can it  instead be said that the 
decision in the Coughlan case represented the retroactive application of a rule created by 
judges to capture her case (and other similar cases)?   There are at least three difficulties 
with such an account.   In the first place, it is hard to imagine what the new rule might be.    
Lord Woolf singles out three factors  which are apparently decisive in the case: the 
importance of the promise to Mrs Coughlan, the fact that the promise was limited to a 
few individuals, and the financial consequences to the health authority.   But these factors 
can hardly be said to reflect a settled understanding about the grounds on which a 
substantive legitimate expectation  will arise.   Judges will inevitably disagree on the 
questions of whether a particular promise is sufficiently ‘important’, and whether it was 
limited to a ‘few’ individuals; and it  can  always  be said that there are financial 
consequences involved in holding a public authority to a particular decision or promise.    
    
  The second difficulty goes to the question of whether the Court of Appeal in Coughlan 
was legislating (as the rule-based account would suppose) or giving effect to an existing 
legal right (or rule).    The judgment in Coughlan reveals a distinctive aspect of common 
law reasoning: it  reveals the way in which judges make extensive references to past 
decided cases (whether in the same doctrinal area law or in an analogous area).    If the 
court in Coughlan was creating a new rule to capture her case, then it would seem to 
have been unnecessary and even misleading for judges to refer to the many past decided 
cases that figure in Lord Woolf’s judgment.    It would have been unnecessary in so far as 
Lord Woolf was free to apply such moral, political and other standards as he thought 
appropriate, irrespective of what other judges had said in the past; it would have been 
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misleading in so far as his Lordship may have given the false impression that he was 
giving effect to an existing legal right (rather than creating such a right).
81
  The third difficulty with the rule-based model of administrative adjudication takes us 
back to the arguments of chapter 2.   Given that there will often be uncertainty (of the sort 
seen in Coughlan itself) about whether there is an existing rule on some point of law, it 
must be the case (within the rule-based model) that the majority of cases are not decided 
according to existing rules.   This has two significant implications.   In the first place, it 
implies that the rule-based model falls foul of the central ideal of the principle of legality: 
that officials exercise power according to standards established before  that exercise.  
Moreover, as we saw in chapter 2, the rule-based model fails to promote the very values 
and principles on which it is founded, namely certainty and predictability.   Secondly, the 
rule-based model would  seem to subvert the central  ideal of administrative  law:  that 
judges decide cases according to the legality of the decision rather than the merits.  What 
is surely an anathema to  administrative lawyers, a  judge  creating  a  legal  rule will 
inevitably  be forced to consider the moral and political wisdom of any  particular 
executive decision (or category of executive decisions).
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If we turn now to the Simms decision, we will see precisely the same difficulties with 
the rule-based account of administrative law adjudication.  The rule-based theorist might 
argue that the decision in Simms represented the application of the following types of 
rules (on matters of both substantive doctrine and interpretation): first, that ‘words should 
generally be given the meaning which the normal speaker of the English language would 
understand them to bear in the context in which they are used’;
       
83  secondly, that, if the 
ordinary meaning of a statute leads to a result which is contrary to the ‘purpose’ of the 
statute, a judge should look for some other possible meaning of the words which could 
avoid this result;
84
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 thirdly, that ‘in the absence of clear words to the contrary, Parliament 
is presumed not to have intended to legislated contrary to fundamental rights’; and, 
fourthly, that freedom of expression is a fundamental right.     
82 See, for example, Lord Irvine, ‘Judges and Decision Makers: The Theory and Practice of Wednesbury 
Review’ [1996]     
83 See Cross above (n 13) 1, 22; see also Z. Bankowski & N. MacCormick, ‘Statutory Interpretation in the 
United Kingdom’ in N. MacCormick & R. Summers (eds) Interpreting Statutes (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 
1991) 382. 
84 A Kavanagh, ‘The Role of Parliamentary Intention in Adjudication under the HRA 1998’ (2006) 26 
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Of course, if there are multiple rules in play of the sort listed above, then there must be 
‘meta’ rules about the order of priority of these rules.  Kavanagh suggests, for instance, 
that judges should prioritise ‘enacted’ intentions (‘those which are expressed in the words 
of a statute itself’) from ‘unenacted intentions’ (broadly, the variety of different 
motivations that legislators may have in enacting a statute’)
85
 
 or ‘presumed intentions’ 
(such as the so-called ‘principle of legality’).   Thus, as a possibility which I anticipated 
towards the beginning of this chapter, Kavanagh defends the intentions theory (as I 
described it above), by means of a rule-based conception of legality.  As she puts it:   
 [Enacted] intentions are not fictional; they are determined by a set of rules or conventions, such that the 
intentions which are expressed in the statutory text (having gone through all the requirements of the 
legislative process) are the intentions of Parliament.
86
 
 
If the Simms case is best explained by reference to a set of rules, then there must be a 
settled understanding of what counts as the ‘ordinary’ or ‘express’ or ‘enacted’ meaning 
of words. Yet we see that Lords Steyn, Hoffmann and Hobhouse disagree on whether the 
words of paragraphs 37 and 37A are clear and unambiguous, in which case, they disagree 
about the existence or meaning of ‘express’ words.  Lord Steyn finds that there is no 
ambiguity  and that, ‘literally construed’  there  is  force in the submission that the 
paragraphs effect a blanket ban on oral interviews with prisoners;
87
  Similarly, on the question of the meaning of ‘freedom of expression’, it is clear that 
there was no existing settled rule about whether the right of expression encompassed the 
right of a prisoner to have oral interviews with journalists.     As a consequence, the 
decision to rule in Mr Simms favour would have to be understood, on the rule-based 
model, as the creation and retroactive application of a new rule affording him this right.    
But this conclusion carries each of the difficulties identified above.  First, it is difficult to 
 Lord Hoffmann finds 
the  language  to be ‘general’, and Lord Hobhouse finds  that the language does not 
necessitate the conclusion that there was a blanket ban.    Given these different opinions 
on the language of paragraphs 37 and 37A, the decision by each of their Lordships to 
interpret the paragraphs in the light of the right to freedom of expression can hardly be 
said to derive from a settled rule of statutory interpretation about when that right is 
triggered.     
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imagine what the new rule could be.   Their Lordships rule against the imposition of a 
blanket ban, but they seem to leave open the question of whether there could be particular 
circumstances in which such a ban would be permissible.   Given the scope for 
disagreement on this question, we can again dismiss the notion that their Lordships’ 
ruling establishes any rule about the meaning and application of the right of freedom of 
expression to prisoners.    Secondly, we see in the Simms decision extensive references to 
past decided cases on freedom of expression, particularly in relation to cases involving 
prisoners.
88
 
    Enough has been said to show how these references cast doubt on the 
explanatory potential of the rule-based model.   Finally, the rule-based model flouts the 
cardinal features of legality and the separation of powers identified above.    
The difficulties in applying the rule-based model to the decision in Coughlan and Simms 
can be extended more generally, I think, to the practice of judicial review as a whole.   
The leading textbooks on administrative law each devote different chapters to the three 
general ‘grounds’ or ‘heads’ of judicial review, ‘illegality’, ‘procedural impropriety’ and 
‘irrationality’.   And administrative lawyers invariably frame their legal submissions by 
reference to one or more of these heads.     The implication of this approach, we might 
say, is that each of the different heads of review represents a settled rule about when an 
official will have acted unlawfully, or when an individual has a legal right against a 
particular person or entity.    Of course, any administrative law theorist will be quick to 
point out that the courts appeal to a great many other standards when arguing or deciding 
administrative law cases.
89    A finding of illegality, for instance, might flow from a 
finding that a decision-maker  fettered his discretion,  or reached a decision for an 
improper purpose; and a finding of procedural impropriety might flow from a finding that 
a decision-maker failed to afford an individual a hearing, or failed to observe some other 
aspect of natural justice.    But, again, the rule-based theorist might contend that each of 
the discrete bases of unlawful official conduct constitutes a sub-rule which gives content 
to the general rules or heads of review.
90
The difficulty with this  rule-based account of judicial review is that none of the 
purported ‘rules’ or ‘sub-rules’ described above reflect some clear, ascertainable standard 
in the way that Hart, Raz and others stipulate.   On the contrary, judges, lawyers and 
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academics, characteristically disagree about  the nature and extent of the controls that 
should be placed on executive action; and – in so far as this is of interest to anybody but 
textbook writers – they disagree about which controls properly fall under which head of 
review (whether, for instance, a breach of a substantive legitimate expectation belongs 
within the ‘illegality’ rule, the ‘Wednesbury unreasonableness’ rule or neither).   These 
disagreements cannot go to the content of the rule, for this would mean that there is no 
rule.   But nor does it make any sense to think of these disagreements as modifications or 
refinements to the rules.
91   In so far as the rules are thought to be the general heads of 
review, it is clear that these heads of review have no determinate content – or, to use 
Herbert Hart’s language, no ‘core of certainty’ – which can be modified or refined.
92   As 
Allan puts it, the heads of review are  merely  ‘empty-vessels’ or ‘conclusions’ which, 
taken alone, reveal nothing about the grounds on which courts should impugn official 
action.
93   Similarly, it is unhelpful, I think, to distinguish between the general grounds 
(or heads) of judicial review – and the concrete application of those grounds.
94     Such a 
distinction once again incorrectly assumes that there is some determinate core of meaning 
within  each of the grounds of review which can be applied  differently in different 
contexts.
95
 
     
B. Administrative Law as Integrity 
 
We have seen  that  the rule-based  model neither fits nor justifies administrative law 
adjudication.   We are in need of an account of adjudication which can adequately explain 
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and justify the place of disagreement in adjudication; an account which can explain and 
justify the special ‘gravitational pull’
96
Here is a familiar – and, in my view, better – alternative to the two accounts of legality 
that we have examined above. The only standards that  can properly make sense of 
administrative law decisions, it is suggested,  are the different principles  and  (where 
statutes are concerned) policies  which can be summoned to justify the meaning of a 
statutory text or a common law doctrine, and which will inform the proper role of judges 
vis-à-vis political decision-makers.
 of past decided cases; and an account which can 
accommodate the ideal that judges give effect to existing legal rights, duties and powers.   
The first point  to appreciate is the types  of standards which judges  apply  in their 
adjudicative role.   We have seen that a judge faced with the question, say, of whether a 
particular applicant was treated ‘fairly’, or whether a Minister acted ‘rationally’ will not 
find the answer in Parliament’s intentions; nor will he find the answer in a set of rules.    
To return to the question driving this inquiry – viz. which standards, established in which 
way,  provide the best justification for  administrative law  decisions?  –  we can now 
eliminate ‘rules’ as the relevant ‘standards’, just as we eliminated ‘parliamentary 
intentions’ as the relevant standards in part 1 (above).    
97    Of course, to say that judges apply principles and 
policies in their adjudicative function may seem to imply, at first blush, that judges have 
carte blanche to impose whichever scheme of principle or policy reflects  their  own 
individual  moral and political preferences.
98    Indeed, the intentions theory and rule-
based theories considered above both may be seen as attempts – albeit unsuccessful – to 
avoid  this  conclusion.
99
In order to understand this constraint, we need to return to the conception of legality as 
integrity (and the programme of adjudication that it recommends) outlined in chapter 2.    
If we understand the principle of legality – the principle that officials exercise power in 
accordance with standards established before that exercise – as embodying the value of 
integrity or equality before the law, then the standards which figure in judicial reasoning 
   But if we examine the character of judicial reasoning  in 
Coughlan  and  Simms,  it will soon become apparent that judges observe a special 
constraint in terms of the particular principles and policies which figure in their decision-
making.    
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are only those principles  of justice, fairness and procedural due process  which are 
presupposed or entailed by the past decisions of Parliament and courts.
100   This is to say 
that judges must subordinate their own moral and political convictions to the scheme of 
principle which underpins the collective institutional decisions in a particular political 
community.    This scheme of adjudication differs from both the conception of legality as 
justice described in chapter 2, according to which, judges must decide cases according to 
the demands of (ideal) justice;
101
How  then  does  the conception of administrative law as integrity translate into 
administrative law adjudication?   I  noted above that the judgments  in Coughlan and 
Simms both illustrate the way in which judges refer to past decided cases in support of 
their decision in the instant case.   It is trite British constitutional theory that judges 
practice the doctrine of precedent or stare decisis in their decision-making, but we can 
now make sense of this practice by reference to the value of integrity.
 and it differs from the rule-based account of legality 
described above, according to which judges will normally bring  their own moral and 
political convictions to their frequent quasi-legislative task.    
102   In Simms, their 
Lordships located the principle of freedom of expression in past decided cases such as 
Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2)  [1990] 1 A.C.  109  and 
Derbyshire County Council v. Times Newspapers Ltd. [1993] A.C. 534 and the decisions 
of the European Court on Human Rights.
103   To this, we might add that the principle of 
freedom of expression is presupposed or entailed by the very fact that legislation is 
passed by Parliament: if the powers of Parliament are justified by the principle of 
democracy,  then the principle of democracy must figure amongst the legal principles 
which will help us to determine the proper powers of Parliament, and which will help us 
to make sense of any statute.
104  Democracy, properly understood, we might argue, 
implies that each member of a political community should enjoy the right to express their 
views on how their community should be governed.
105
The task of judges, according to a model of administrative law as integrity, is, as 
Dworkin puts it, ‘relentlessly interpretive’:
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‘constructive interpretation’ of the different principles and policies that underlie a given 
doctrinal area, and which  make best sense of the past decisions in English law as a 
whole.
107   The court in Simms  was therefore required to interpret the principles of 
freedom of expression and judicial independence, along with the policy of maintaining 
good order in prisons, in a way that best fits and justifies English legal practice as a 
whole.
108    It will be the task of chapter 4 to  explore fully the type of  theory of 
democracy, human rights and judicial review that could justify the decision in Simms and 
other cases involving human rights.    Suffice it to say in anticipation of that discussion 
that the Simms decision may be justified according to the view that the principle of 
freedom of expression trumps the (utilitarian) policy of maintaining prison security; or, to 
put this  differently, the Home Secretary offered an impermissible reason for his 
decision.
109
  Turning now to the Coughlan decision, rather than treat the different categories of 
expectation – and the different factors that might place a given case in one category or 
another – as hermetically sealed rules, the integrity-based  model  treats these different 
categories as a set  of principles which form the object of judges’  constructive 
interpretation.  The contrast between a rule-based and principle-based analysis of the 
legitimate expectation jurisprudence comes out nicely in the following dictum of Lord 
Justice Laws in Nadarajah:
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I think it superficial to hold that for a legitimate expectation to bite there must be something more than 
failure to honour the promise in question, and then to list a range of possible additional factors which might 
make the difference. It is superficial because in truth it reveals no principle. Principle is not in my judgment 
supplied by the call to arms of abuse of power. Abuse of power is a name for any act of a public authority 
that is not legally justified. It is a useful name, for it catches the moral impetus of the rule of law. It may be, 
as I ventured to put it in Begbie, ‘the root concept which governs and conditions our general principles of 
public law’. But it goes no distance to tell you, case by case, what is lawful and what is not. I accept, of 
course, that there is no formula which tells you that; if there were, the law would be nothing but a checklist. 
Legal principle lies between the overarching rubric of abuse of power and the concrete imperatives of a 
rule-book.
111
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Whether we accept  the  subsequent  conclusion of Laws LJ in Nadarajah  that the 
organising principle in the legitimate expectations jurisprudence (or in administrative law 
as a whole) is ‘fairness’ or ‘good administration’, the fact remains that the decision in 
Coughlin could only be based on the principle or set of principles which provided the 
best justification for the past decisions of courts in this doctrinal area of law.  The 
decision could plausibly be justified, for instance, on the basis that a public decision-
maker has a duty to demonstrate a heightened degree of trustworthiness when an 
ascertainable group of particularly vulnerable individuals are in question.      
 
I said above that a theory of administrative law adjudication must be able to explain and 
justify the place of disagreement in adjudication; it must be able to explain and justify the 
special ‘gravitational force’ of past decided cases; and it must be able to accommodate 
the ideal that judges give effect to existing  legal rights, duties and powers.     The 
integrity-based model, it is submitted, satisfies each of these desiderata.
112
 
   If the role of 
judges is to give effect to the principles of justice, fairness and procedural due process 
which best justify any given doctrinal area, then disagreement can only be understood as 
a disagreement of political morality about  the nature of  these principles, and as a 
disagreement on the question of how such principles should determine the outcome of a 
particular case.     Furthermore,  the integrity-based model provides  a compelling 
justification for the abstract ideal of legality and the separation of powers outlined in 
chapter 2.     If the legal rights, duties and powers of individuals and officials flow from 
the past decisions of Parliament and courts, then the role of judges is always to give 
effect to existing  legal rights.   At the same time, the judicial role is always one of 
interpretation, and never one of legislation.      
C. Administrative Law as Integrity and the ultra vires debate 
 
How, if at all, does the model of administrative law as integrity just described differ from 
the common law theory of judicial review (or indeed the modified ultra vires theory of 
review)?    According to common law theorists, judges apply common law principles 
when they interpret  statutes; or, where appropriate, judges apply  both  common law 
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principles and principles which can be inferred from the statutory context.   Craig has 
suggested further that the relevant common law principles are those principles which are 
‘sensible, warranted and justified in the light of the aims of the particular doctrinal area in 
question’.
113  According to modified ultra vires theorists of judicial review, judges should 
draw only upon principles which appear on the face of a statute, or which can be inferred 
from a statute, or which belong within the rule of law.
114   It would ‘subjugate the will of 
Parliament’
115
  The crucial difference between the model of administrative law as integrity and the 
different justifications for judicial review put forward within the ultra vires debate, I 
think, is the way in which the latter types of justification each focus on the source of the 
principles of judicial review rather than the justification for those principles.   This is to 
say that the ultra vires debate takes place within a legal positivist framework: common 
law theorists seem determined to demonstrate that it is judges  who authorise (and 
fashion) the principles of review, while ultra vires theorists seem determined to 
demonstrate that it is Parliament which authorises  judges to fashion the principles of 
review.    I have tried to show in this chapter and in chapter 2 that theories about the 
sources of law – whether cast in terms of sovereign commands, or Hartian rules – cannot 
be sustained.   The law is neither what Parliament says or intends, nor what judges say or 
intend; rather, the truth or validity of any proposition of law, I have argued, depends on 
our understanding of the very principles which justify  the powers of Parliament and 
courts, and on our understanding of the different principles and policies that underpin 
different doctrinal areas of law.
 say modified ultra vires theorists if it were left to judges to decide (via 
their common law jurisdiction) which ‘fundamental values’ condition the exercise of 
Parliament’s powers.   
116
 
   To repeat the mantra of the past three chapters, it is 
the principle of legality which determines the power of institutions and, more broadly, 
which shapes or controls our understanding of the separation of powers.    
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Chapter 4:  Democracy, Human Rights and the Proper Role of Judges 
 
 
‘In a society based upon the rule of law and the separation of powers, it is necessary to decide which branch 
of government has in any particular instance the decision-making power and what the legal limits of that 
power are. That is a question of law and must therefore be decided by the courts.’     
 
Lord Hoffmann R  (on  the application  of  ProLife  Alliance) v.  British  Broadcasting  Corporation  [2003] 
UKHL 23, [2004] 1 A.C. 185, at [75] 
 
 
In the first three chapters of this thesis, I have challenged two ideas which have for long 
been dominant in orthodox British constitutional theory.   These are the twin ideas that 
Parliament is sovereign and that, as such, the law of the constitution ultimately depends 
on Parliamentary intentions.   The most sophisticated philosophical defence of these two 
ideas, we have seen, involves the contention  that the powers of the different political 
institutions, and the grounds on which any proposition of law is true or valid, depend on 
the existence of settled rules about those things.   There is a settled rule, it is said, to the 
effect that ‘what the Queen in Parliament enacts is law’, and there are a range of settled 
rules about the different assumptions, presumptions and other canons of statutory 
interpretation that enable us to identify Parliament’s intentions.
1
The first stage in my  argument  against this rule-based account of the British 
constitution has been to establish that the idea of Parliamentary sovereignty is a red-
herring.   Disagreements about the powers of institutions and about the grounds of legal 
validity  in the British constitution, I suggested in chapter 1, revolve, not around the 
concept of sovereignty, but around different conceptions of the principle of legality – the 
principle that officials (or institutions) may only exercise power in accordance with 
standards established before that exercise.  The best conception of this principle, I then 
    These rules depend for 
their existence and validity on what officials or judges say or think, and so the task of the 
constitutional theorist is simply to record empirically what it is that officials and judges 
have in fact said or thought.   
                                                 
1 See chapter 2, part 1.   113 
argued in chapters 2 and 3, is not a rule-based conception, but a conception based on the 
value of integrity or equality before the law.   This is to say that the ‘standards’ in 
accordance with which officials must exercise power are the principles of justice, fairness 
and procedural due process to which a  community is committed through the past 
decisions of its political and legal institutions.   The value of integrity demands that these 
principles should be extended equally to each member of that community.    It is in this 
sense that the principle of legality – and, more specifically, the value of integrity – shapes 
or controls the many other principles which underpin the British constitution.  
What do these conclusions tell us about the nature of the  British constitution and 
British constitutional theory?     They tell us, it is suggested, that we can only reach an 
understanding of the British constitution by engaging directly in arguments of political 
morality about which principles do justify the powers of the political and legal branches 
of government, and which principles do make best sense of the past decisions of those 
institutions.   British constitutional theory is, in this sense, quintessentially an exercise in 
moral argumentation about how best to understand the facts of British constitutional 
history and practice.  On the other hand, the above conclusions tells us that British 
constitutional theorists should abandon philosophically ill-conceived debates about 
sovereignty, Parliamentary intent, and the existence and content of rules, which debates 
have served only to obscure the important questions of political morality just described.    
Against the background of these conclusions, we are now in a position to launch 
directly into a set of questions which, it is suggested, must lie at the heart of any theory of 
the British constitution.   These questions concern the proper constitutional relationship 
between government (which throughout this chapter I will take to mean the legislature 
and executive) courts and citizens.   The key question is one concerning the extent of the 
legislative powers that Parliament possesses.
2
                                                 
2 It should be said that Parliament does not have a monopoly on legislative power in the British 
constitution.   For instance, the executive legislates by Orders in Council, and by a producing a vast amount 
of secondary legislation.  In my view, the same principle of democracy justifies the legislative powers of 
Parliament and the executive, and so any reference to Parliament in this chapter should be taken to 
encompass the legislative powers of both the legislature and executive.   For an interesting judicial account 
of the relative weight to be paid to legislative and executive decisions, see International Transport Roth 
GmbH v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] EWCA Civ 158, paras 83 to 87 per Lord 
Justice Laws. 
   Can Parliament ‘make or unmake any 
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law’ in the way that Dicey suggested, or are there certain things that Parliament cannot 
do?     It will by now be apparent that this question does not depend on the concept of 
sovereignty.   It depends rather on the principle or principles of law which justify the fact 
that it is a Parliament  (as opposed to some other person or  body)  which exercises 
legislative  power in the British constitution.    The second question is inextricably 
connected to the first, although the precise nature of that relationship will require careful 
accounting.  The question is this: in what senses, if any, can it be said that individuals 
possess  moral  rights  against  the government?    While many theorists agree that 
individuals do possess such rights, there is considerable disagreement about the nature of 
such rights.   The final question is an institutional question.  If individuals possess moral 
rights against the government, then what role, if any, should courts have in giving effect 
to those rights?     To put this differently, how might a background theory of the moral 
rights of individuals inform the existence and content of legal rights and duties? 
 
1. Justifying the Powers of Parliament 
 
I have suggested in previous chapters that it is the principle of democracy which justifies 
the fact that Parliament (as opposed to some other person or body) exercises legislative 
power in the British constitution.  To put this differently, the principle of democracy 
figures amongst the legal principles which will help us to determine the proper powers of 
Parliament, and which will help us to make sense of any statute.
3 It is in this vein that 
Lord Steyn has said that: ‘Parliament does not legislate in a vacuum; it legislates for a 
modern European liberal democracy’;
4  and that:  ‘[i]n the context of a Parliamentary 
democracy the language of section 2(1) and section 7 [entails that an indirect route to 
amending the Parliament Act 1911 is not available]’.
5
                                                 
3 See chapter 3, part 3. 
   The principle of democracy is 
also now formally recognised in an English statute as a result of the incorporation of 
certain parts of the ECHR by the HRA 1998.    Articles 8 to 12 of the Convention include 
the following words: ‘There shall be no inference with the right except as is necessary in 
a democratic society’ (my italics).   Of course, if it is accepted that Parliament possesses 
4 R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p. Pierson [1998] A.C. 539, 575.  
5 Jackson v Her Majesty’s Attorney-General [2005] UKHL 56, 79. Similarly see Lord Roger at 139.   115 
only such  powers  as  are justified by the principle of democracy, then this  formal 
reference to democracy in the  ECHR is otiose; for we would then be saying that 
Parliament in virtue of being a Parliament is only empowered to act in a way that serves 
the principle of democracy.
6
The principle of democracy is firmly embedded then in British constitutional practice, 
but what does this principle mean?    Some have defined democracy in grand terms as 
government ‘of the people, by the people, for the people’, but this type of definition does 
not take us very far.   First, we need to hear some theory of who counts as ‘the people’, a 
question which historically has been highly controversial and remains so.
 
7   Secondly, in 
a large, populous and complex modern state, it is surely impracticable to allow all or even 
most individuals to be involved in the task of government.   Government ‘by the people’ 
is really only intelligible therefore if we think of ‘the people’ as popular representatives.
8
Others have (no doubt unconsciously) treated the concept of democracy as a concept 
of a natural kind: the very DNA of democracy, they suggest, is the idea of majoritarian 
rule; and the very DNA of human rights  is the idea of  limits on majority rule.
     
Finally, we need to hear some story about what government for the people means.  Does 
this mean that government should be directed towards giving people what they want, or 
giving  most  people what they want; or does government for the people mean that 
government should be directed towards ensuring that each members of a political 
community is treated in a particular way? 
9    
Democracy and human  rights, on this approach,  are therefore in an inescapably 
antagonistic, conflictual  relationship  with  each other  such that when the will of the 
majority gives way to judicially enforced human rights this must be deemed ‘morally 
regrettable’ as a matter of fairness.
10
                                                 
6 See (below) p 15 et seq. 
    I argued in chapter 1 that we have no reason to 
7 There is much contemporary debate, for instance, about whether and to what extent asylum seekers should 
enjoy the protection of the British government.  See, for instance, the decision in R v Secretary of State for 
the Home Department ex parte Limbuela [2005] UKHL 66.    
8 In this sense, the etymology of the word democracy (demos (the people) + crato (rule)) can be misleading 
in a modern state.   The need for representatives has long been an issue for political philosophers in terms 
of reconciling the natural right to freedom with the need for government or authority.   See, for instance, J 
Locke, Peter Laslett (ed.), Two Treatises of Government (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2003)m 
Second Treatise, chapter VIII, para. 154. 
9 See chapter 1, part 1. 
10 See R Dworkin, Freedom’s Law, (Oxford University Press, Oxford 1996) 16-17.   116 
think that political concepts such as democracy or human rights can be analysed and 
identified in the way that we analyse and identify an animal or a plant; on the contrary, 
our  day-to-day  disagreements about such concepts are characteristically based on 
competing  arguments of political morality, arguments which are not amenable  to 
scientific analysis. 
A better starting point in trying to understand the principle of democracy, it is 
suggested, is to try to identify the point, purpose or value of this principle.
11    This takes 
us back to the argumentative framework proposed in chapter 2 for an understanding of 
the principle of legality.    We must suppose, I suggested in that chapter, that people who 
theorise  and disagree about the meaning of political  concepts  such as legality or 
democracy share the same concept: they must all be in the same ‘ball park’ when they 
disagree  about  those concepts  (otherwise, we could not intelligibly describe their 
exchanges as disagreements).
12   We need to begin therefore by attempting to identify the 
basic plateau of agreement which enables theorists to disagree about the concept.     Here 
is a working  suggestion: most people agree, it  may  be  supposed, that the value in 
democracy is to enable each member of a political community to have an equal stake in 
the way that their community is governed.
13
I now want to outline three theories or conceptions of an equal stake, each of which 
rests on a particular conception of the abstract concept of equality.     The first two 
conceptions both place majoritarian decision-making at their heart, but they do so for 
very different reasons.   The last conception rejects majoritarian decision-making in 
   If this is the shared concept of democracy, 
then a proper understanding of the concept will ultimately depend on how we understand 
the  notion of an ‘equal  stake’ or, more broadly, how we understand  the value of 
‘equality’.    
                                                 
11 Ibid at 15. 
12 See chapter 2, part 1. 
13 For the concept of an ‘equal stake’, see R Dworkin, ‘Equality, Democracy, and Constitution: We the 
People in Court’, Alberta Law Review 28 (1990): 324-346.  There is clearly a connection between the 
principle of democracy and the value of integrity described in earlier chapters.  In each case, the emphasis 
is on ensuring that each member of a political community is treated as an equal.  See T R S Allan, 
Constitutional Justice: A Liberal Theory of the Rule of Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2003) 29 and 
chapter 2 (above) part 3B.   Importantly though, the value of integrity would remain a guiding value in a 
political community even if that community could not plausibly be described as a democracy.  In other 
words, the principle of democracy is a legal principle in the British constitution because the value of 
integrity picks out this principle from facts about British constitutional practice.      117 
favour of the idea that rights exist against the majority.  As I have indicated above, the 
view that one takes on which of these three (or some other) conceptions of an equal stake 
best explains and justifies the  concept  of democracy is of the utmost constitutional 
importance: if the principle of democracy figures amongst the principles which justify the 
powers of Parliament, then that same principle (properly understood) will inform the true 
extent of Parliament’s legislative powers (and the powers of the executive) in the British 
constitution.     
 
A. The Majoritarian Conception 
 
For proponents of the majoritarian conception, the principle of democracy is embodied in 
the ideal of representative  government and the untrammelled power of a legislature.
14  
Since Parliament derives its power from ‘the people’  –  an idea which is sometimes 
expressed  in terms of ‘popular sovereignty’
15 – it  is right, as a matter of democratic 
principle, that Parliament should be free to act in any way it pleases, and that it should 
not be thwarted by the  unelected judiciary.
16   The majoritarian conception further 
implies that every member of a community should have an equal input into their political 
system, typically in the form of casting a vote for a political representative, but perhaps in 
terms of more developed modes of popular participation.
17    To make some use of the 
grand definition of democracy mentioned above, rule ‘by the people’, on the majoritarian 
account, relates to the involvement of each person in the process by which decisions are 
made.     Rule is then said to be ‘for the people’ in so far as the outcome of that process 
should be for the benefit of everybody (given their equal input).
18
On the face of things, the majoritarian conception of democracy just described seems 
to fit British constitutional practice squarely.   The view widely held among judges and 
   
                                                 
14 See, for instance, C Gearty, Principles of Human Rights Adjudication (Oxford University Press, 2004) 
ch. 2. 
15 See, for instance, J Waldron ‘Judicial Power and Popular Sovereignty’ published in Mark Graber and 
Michael Perhac (eds) Marbury versus Madison: Documents and Commentary (CQ Press, 2002), 181-122; 
K Ewing ‘The Human Rights Act and Parliamentary Democracy’ (1999) 62 M.L.R. 79, 98-99. 
16 Many theorists locate this view within theories of civil republicanism.  See, most recently, R Bellamy, 
Political Constitutionalism A Republican Defence of the Constitutionality of Democracy (Cambridge 
University Press, 2007); A Tomkins, Our Republican Constitution, (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2005).   
17 Bellamy, op.cit. ch. 5. 
18 See R Dworkin above (n 10) 16.    118 
academics that Parliament can ‘make or unmake any law’, while usually (but mistakenly) 
expressed in terms of a theory of sovereignty, is perhaps best understood as a statement in 
support of the majoritarian conception of democracy.
19     The same can be said of so-
called ‘principle of legality’ viz. that, in the absence of express, unambiguous, words to 
the contrary, the courts will presume that Parliament did not intend to interfere with 
fundamental human rights.
20  This interpretive presumption reflects the view that 
Parliament (or the majority) should have the last word on matters of human rights and 
other fundamental principles.  Similarly, the courts have developed a principle of – what 
may be called – ‘democratic deference’ towards the executive branch of government in 
cases decided under the HRA 1998.   This is the idea that the balance between liberty and 
security should be made by elected officials and not by unelected judges.
21
 
   As Lord 
Hoffmann puts it in Rehman: 
‘…it is not only that the executive has access to special information and expertise in these matters. It is also 
that such decisions, with serious potential results for the community, require a legitimacy which can be 
conferred only by entrusting them to persons responsible to the community through the democratic process. 
If the people are to accept the consequences of such decisions, they must be made by persons whom the 
people have elected and whom they can remove.’
 22
 
 
We need to be cautious  though  about how we treat these  and other (ostensible) 
expressions of support for the majoritarian conception.   In the first place, the meaning of 
democracy does not depend on what most people (or indeed what most judges or 
officials) think it means; rather it depends, I have argued above, on the meaning which, as 
a matter of political morality, best captures the idea that people should have an equal 
stake in the way that their community is governed.   If we find that democracy, properly 
                                                 
19 Arguments by public lawyers against the majoritarian conception of democracy have also been expressed 
(mistakenly) in terms of sovereignty.  Jowell has argued, for instance, that ‘…some of those conditions [i.e. 
of a constitutional democracy], such as free and regular elections, underlie the legitimacy of the principle of 
parliamentary sovereignty itself’.  See J Jowell, ‘Parliamentary Sovereignty under the New Constitutional 
Hypothesis’, [2006] PL 562-580, 579. 
20 R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte, Simms and Another [2000] 2 AC 115, 131 per 
Lord Hoffmann 
21 For a robust argument against the idea that judges should defer to Parliament on democratic grounds, see 
Jowell, ‘Of Vires and Vacuums: The Constitutional Context of Judicial Review’ [1999] PL 448-460; 
‘Judicial Deference: Servility, Civility to Institutional Capacity’ [2003] PL 592, 597; Woolf, Jowell and Le 
Sueur, De Smith’s Judicial Review (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2007) 18. 
22 Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Rehman [2001] UKHL 47, 62.     119 
understood, implies certain limits to the things that a majority can do, then the question of 
whether the principle of democracy is instantiated in British constitutional practice will 
depend on the extent to which those limits are  in fact  reflected in the past political 
decisions of Parliament and courts.   If they are not, then we may be forced to conclude 
that it would be inaccurate to describe Britain as a democracy (or, at least, to conclude 
that certain aspects of British constitutional practice are undemocratic). 
Secondly, it remains to be seen what would happen if Parliament (or ‘the majority’) 
did attempt to suspend or abrogate well-established rights. There are no clear precedents 
for such action in recent times.
23 Orthodox constitutional theory tells us that provided 
Parliament uses clear, unequivocal words, judges would give effect to such a decision.    
But we have seen in our analysis of Jackson in chapter 1 and Simms in the last chapter, 
that this orthodox theory is empty.   Judges characteristically disagree about the meaning 
of words and phrases  in a statutory text depending on how  they justify the force of 
statutes in general, and on how they interpret the background scheme of principle in any 
particular doctrinal area of law.
24   In this way, the question of whether Parliament has 
the legislative power to enact some illiberal measure will depend on judgments of 
political morality rather than on semantics.
25   Should Parliament ever attempt to enact 
some egregiously oppressive measure – the Blue Eyed Babies Act or the Abolition of 
Democracy Act – it may well be that judges would invoke such principles as democracy 
and human rights to justify striking down such purported Acts (or at least to interpret 
such Acts in a way that would negate their otherwise oppressive effects).  Britain may yet 
have its own Marbury v Madison.
26
The majoritarian conception of democracy, I have said, takes the concept of an equal 
stake – or the concept of ‘equality’ – to mean that each member of a community should 
   
                                                 
23 Dicey sought to demonstrate Parliamentary omnipotence by reference to the enactment of the Septennial 
Act (extending the life of Parliament from three years to seven years).  See AV Dicey, Introduction to the 
Study of the Law of the Constitution (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1982 [reprint of 8th ed., 1915] chapter 1, 
part 1.   Recent judicial decisions would suggest that a similar attempt to extend the life of Parliament today 
might be ruled invalid.  See Jackson above (n 5) discussed in chapter 1 (above), parts 2 and 3.  See also R. 
(on the application of Bancoult) v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2007] 
EWCA Civ 498 at 46 per Sedley LJ discussed in chapter 5 (below), part 3. 
24 See chapter 3, part 2A. 
25 See chapter 1, part 2.   
26 5 US (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).  The possibility that the House of Lords might ‘strike down’ a statute is far 
more real following the decision in Jackson.  See my discussion (above) in chapter 1, part 2.  See also 
chapter 6 (above).   120 
have an equal input into the decision-making processes (whether in the form of votes for 
local and national representatives, or in the form of some deeper form of participation or 
popular deliberation).  I  now  want  to  draw a contrast between two very different 
justifications for this process-based account of majoritarian decision-making.    The first 
justification treats the input of each member of a community as a preference to be fed 
into an overall utilitarian calculation about the maximisation of welfare or happiness in 
that community.
27   We might express this conception of equality as the ideal of treating 
people equally  in the sense that everybody is afforded the same minimal entitlement, 
namely the casting of a preference or a vote.
28    This (utilitarian) justification is sceptical 
of the existence of natural or moral rights in the sense that it rejects any determinant of 
justice and rights other than the (consequentialist) test of maximising utility.
29   This is to 
say that this justification rejects any  prior rights-based  or  deontological  grounds for 
limiting  the powers of the government;  the ‘rightness’ of any political decision is 
determined solely on the basis of the consequences of that decision.
30
I do not propose to deal at any length with this first justification for majoritarian 
decision-making, although I will offer some arguments against it below in the course of 
defending a ‘reason blocking’ theory of human rights and adjudication.
   
31
                                                 
27 For an excellent overview of different theories of utilitarianism, see N Simmonds, Central Issues in 
Jurisprudence (3
rd edn, Sweet and Maxwell, 2008); J.J.C. Smart & Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism For 
and Against, (Cambridge University Press, 1973); Jeremy Waldron (ed.) Nonsense on Stilts: Bentham, 
Burke and Marx on the Rights of Man (London: Methuen, 1987). 
   Suffice it to 
say for now that the utilitarian justification for majoritarian decision-making can neither 
fulfil its liberal egalitarian ambitions as a general theory of morality (for the reason that a 
28 This conception of equality is also sometimes described as formal equality.   For an excellent discussion 
of whether Dicey’s conception of the rule of law supports a formal or substantive conception of equality, 
see Craig, ‘Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law’ (1997) P.L 467-87, 472 et seq.  See 
also J Jowell, ‘Is Equality a Constitutional Principle?’ (1994) 47 Current Legal Problems, (Part 2); J Jowell, 
‘The Rule of Law and its Underlying Values’ in J Jowell and D Oliver (eds), The Changing Constitution 
(6th edn, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007), 23. 
29 This is not to say that individuals cannot be granted ‘rights’ in some sense.   One form of utilitarianism – 
indirect utilitarianism – holds that the greatest happiness for the greatest number may be best achieved if a 
government does give protection to individual rights.  Of course, the ‘rights’ in this situation are 
instrumental to the utilitarian goal rather than intrinsically valuable.  For a helpful discussion on this point, 
see W Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction   (Clarendon Press, Oxford 2002) ch 
2. 
30 For a detailed discussion of deontological and consequentialist ethics, see Larry Alexander and Michael 
Moore ‘Deontological Ethics’ available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-deontological/   For an 
interesting discussion of how these competing philosophies manifest themselves in judicial judgments, see 
D Vick, ‘Deontological dicta’ (2002) 65 MLR 279-289.  
31 See below at 14-18.   121 
majority of people may express a preference that some other person or group should be 
treated as an inferior);
32 nor can it fulfil its goals of certainty and rationality as a theory of 
political decision-making (for the reason that there is no universally accepted way either 
of expressing or measuring the aim of utilitarianism).
33
 
    To the extent that a utilitarian 
justification lies behind the view that Parliament (or ‘the majority’) can legitimately make 
or unmake any law’ or abolish any extant individual rights, we should reject this view of 
Parliament’s legislative powers.  It may be though that there is a  second, and  very 
different  rights-based  justification for majoritarian decision-making, and it is this 
alternative justification to which I will now turn. 
B. A Rights-Based Conception of Majoritarian Decision-Making 
 
Jeremy Waldron has argued that there are rights-based reasons for leaving decisions 
about the rights of individuals to a majority of legislators (and for not leaving such 
decisions to unelected judges).
34   If we accept that individual members of a political 
community  enjoy  certain  moral and legal rights against the government,  it does not 
follow, Waldron argues, that decisions about the nature and content of these rights should 
be removed from the majority  (in practice Parliament or Congress)  and assigned  to 
courts.     Judges possess no special powers of moral reasoning over and above that of 
legislators or ordinary citizens.
35   And since we disagree on questions of rights, and can 
never know the true rights of individuals, we should favour entrusting decisions about 
rights to a political assembly where the full range of moral and ethical  issues can be 
debated fully.
36
                                                 
32 See R Dworkin, Rights as Trumps in Waldron (ed.) Theories of Rights. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1984), 153. 
     There  are  rights-based  reasons (as opposed, say, to reasons of 
33 See N Simmonds, Central Issues in Jurisprudence above (n 28) 25-26; B Williams above (n 27) passim; 
J Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights  (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1980) 111-118. 
34 This is a theory that Waldron has developed over many years.  See, for instance, J Waldron ‘A Rights-
Based Critique of Constitutional Rights’ (1993)13 OJLS 18-51; Law and Disagreement (Oxford University 
Press, 1999), 239-243 (hereafter Law and Disagreement);  ‘The Core Case Against Judicial Review’ 115 
Yale Law Journal (2006); J Waldron, ‘Some Models of Dialogue Between Judges and Legislators’, 23 
SUP. CT. L. REV. 2d 7, 9-21 (2004); ‘Do Judges Reason Morally’, delivered in the Oxford/UCL 
Colloquium 2009, available at http://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/jurisprudence/docs/08_waldron.pdf 
35 J Waldron, Law and Disagreement, op. cit. 184  
36 Ibid at 232.    122 
institutional competence) for leaving decisions about rights to a majority in the sense that 
the ultimate ‘right of rights’ is the right to participate.
37
 
   As Waldron puts it: 
‘Some of us think that people have a right to participate in the democratic governance of their community, 
and that this right is quite deeply connected to the values of autonomy and responsibility that are celebrated 
in our commitment to other basic liberties. We think moreover that the right to democracy is a right to 
participate on equal terms in social decisions on issues of high principle and that it is not to be confined to 
interstitial matters of social and economic policy’
38
 
 
Like the utilitarian process-based theory described above, Waldron’s theory is a 
procedurally egalitarian
39
Much has been said and written about Waldron’s theory and this is not the place to 
attempt a point-by-point critique.
    conception of an equal stake  which  may  similarly  be 
expressed in terms of treating people equally.  Unlike the utilitarian theory  though, 
Waldron’s theory is not sceptical of rights; rather it connects the right to participate with 
the values of individual autonomy and responsibility – the very values which underpin 
our ‘other basic liberties’.   
40
                                                 
37 Ibid. 
    Instead, I want to pursue a specific question within 
the framework of our inquiry into the meaning of democracy, namely whether the idea of 
treating people equally – the  input or process-based conception of equality –  within 
Waldron’s theory provides the best understanding of the concept of an equal stake or 
equality.    We can usefully put the question in the following way: is the fact of an 
individual having had an equal input into the system in  the form of participation 
sufficient to give that individual a sufficient stake in any governmental decision, and 
sufficient to legitimise any decision that may run contrary to their own interests or 
preferences?    In order to respond to this question, we need to consider carefully the 
38 J Waldron, ‘A Rights-Based Critique’ above (n 35), 20. 
39 For this terminology, see A Kavanagh ‘Participation and judicial review: a reply to Jeremy Waldron’ 
Law and Philosophy 22, 451-486, 453.   
40 For a sample of the extensive literature responding to Waldron’s work, see A Kavanagh op. cit.; C Fabre, 
‘The Dignity of Rights’ (2000) 20 OJLS 271-282 (a review of Law and Disagreement); D Kyritsis, 
‘Representation and Waldron’s Objection to Judicial Review’ (2006) OJLS 26 733-751; Adrienne Stone 
‘Judicial Review Without Rights; Some Problems for the Democratic Legitimacy of Structural Review 
(2008) OJLS 28 1-32.     123 
conditions under which an individual will be sufficiently tied to a political community to 
accept a decision made in his name.   As Dworkin puts it:  
 
We must describe some connection between an individual and a group that makes it fair to treat him – and 
sensible that he treat himself – as responsible for what it does.
41
 
 
For Waldron, we have seen that this connection is on the face of things limited to the fact 
that each member of the group has an equal right to participate  in  debates and 
deliberations on all questions of government (both on matters of ‘high principle’ and on 
‘interstitial matters of social and economic policy’).     I have italicized the words ‘on the 
face of things’ for the reason that Waldron makes a number of background assumptions 
about the circumstances  in which majoritarian decision-making and the right to 
participate can flourish (or the circumstances in which judicially enforced rights against 
the majority will not be necessary).    In order for these circumstances to obtain, there 
must be the following ‘institutional and political features of modern liberal democracies’:   
 
‘(1) democratic institutions in reasonably good working order, including a representative legislature elected 
on the basis of universal adult suffrage; (2) a set of judicial institutions, again in reasonably good order, set 
up on a nonrepresentative basis to hear individual lawsuits, settle disputes, and uphold the rule of law; (3) a 
commitment on the part of most members of the society and most of its officials to the idea of individual 
and minority rights; and (4) persisting, substantial, and good faith disagreement about rights (i.e., about 
what the commitment to rights actually amounts to and what its implications are) among the members of 
the society who are committed to the idea of rights.’
42
   
 
The need for these circumstances reveals several difficulties, I think,  with Waldron’s 
account.   First, it is doubtful whether these circumstances exist in any developed nation.   
To say that majoritarianism would be the best mode of decision-making in a Utopia may 
be interesting as a matter of abstract political philosophy, but it hardly advances the case 
for dispensing with (judicially enforced)  rights against a majority  in contemporary 
political communities.     But there is a second  and  greater difficulty for Waldron’s 
procedural account: if majoritarian decision-making and the right to participate can only 
                                                 
41 R Dworkin, Freedom’s Law above (n 10) 23. 
42 J Waldron, ‘The Core Case Against Judicial Review’ above (n 35) 1360.   124 
be justified under conditions of a modern liberal democracy, then the right to participate 
is less the foundational ‘right of rights’ and more the fruits of a set of prior rights and 
principles which enable participation.   In order for democratic institutions and a healthy 
culture of disagreement about rights to exist, every individual must already have freedom 
of speech, assembly and association; every individual must be free from torture or 
arbitrary arrest; and so on.
43     It is one thing to argue – as many civic republican 
theorists do – that individual rights exist to ‘ensure the realization of the conditions for an 
authentic deliberative democracy’;
44 it is quite another thing to assume the existence of a 
deliberative democracy (in the form of a general right to participate), and then to argue 
that individual rights emerge out of the processes of deliberative democracy.
45
 
    
C. Rights against the Majority 
 
I have suggested that Waldron’s rights-based defence of majoritarian decision-making 
gets things the wrong way round. It treats popular participation in government as the 
foundation of rights and democracy without recognizing that this process or input based 
right presupposes a richer set of substantive rights and values.   We are in need of a more 
developed theory of these background substantive rights and values, and a better account 
of what it means for individuals to have an equal stake in the way in which they are 
governed.    I said above that the key to understanding the concept of an equal stake is to 
appreciate the type of connection that an individual must have with other members of a 
political community.   Dworkin finds this  connection in the idea of ‘moral 
                                                 
43 A similar objection may be made against John Rawls’ theory of ‘justice as fairness’.  See Rawls, A 
Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980). In order to achieve the circumstances of the 
Original Position and the Veil of Ignorance, we must already assume the existence of certain rights and 
principles.  To put this differently, there must be certain principles of justice which are logically prior to the 
principle of fairness.   See R Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press, 1977) 181; T R 
S Allan, ‘Constitutional Dialogue and the Justification of Judicial Review’ (2003) 23 OJLS 563, 571 (n 30). 
44 See M Loughlin ‘Rights, Democracy and Law’ in Gearty and Tomkins (eds) Sceptical Essays on Human 
Rights 44; cf. C Gearty ‘Democracy and Civil Liberties: a Reappraisal’ talk given at Centre for Human 
Rights, LSE, 27 January 2004, at 3.   
45 Kavanagh makes the different objection (following Joseph Raz) that, even if the full conditions of 
participation are met, the decisions that emerge may fall foul of the ‘Instrumentalist conditions of good 
government’.   This is to say that, even if the procedures are just there may still be injustice if the results are 
‘wrong, unfair or unjust’.  See Kavanagh above (n 39) 460-464; J Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays 
in the Morality of Law and Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 117.   125 
membership’,
46
 
 and the conditions of such membership in the idea that the government 
should treat everyone as equals. Chief amongst these conditions, Dworkin suggests, is 
the idea of ‘moral independence’.  This is the idea that members of a political community 
regard themselves as ‘partners in a joint venture’: 
A genuine political community must...not dictate what its citizens think about matters of political or moral 
or ethical judgment, but must, on the contrary, provide circumstances that encourage them to arrive at 
beliefs on these matters through their own reflective and finally individual conviction.
47
 
 
We see then that being treated as an equal, on Dworkin’s account, entails the positive 
idea of allowing people to make choices for themselves about the good life, and the 
negative idea of not interfering with someone’s choices on the basis of one’s own 
preferences.
48
 
  Importantly, these conditions of equal treatment are democratic conditions 
in the sense that they are necessary in order to satisfy the very point of democracy: 
namely, that each individual has an equal stake in the way in which they are governed.    
We are now in a position to return to the question motivating this part of the chapter. 
What are the implications of the argument that a political community should treat all 
individuals as equals (as opposed to treating all individuals equally)
49
                                                 
46 See R Dworkin, Freedom’s Law above (n 10) 17.  
 for the powers of 
Parliament in the British constitution?    Here is the striking answer to that question.  If 
the powers of Parliament are justified by the principle of democracy, and the principle of 
democracy means that the political institutions in a community may only act in a way that 
respects the conditions of equal treatment, then, quite simply, Parliament may only act in 
accordance with these conditions.    To put this differently, individuals have an abstract 
moral right against Parliament (or ‘the majority’) to be treated as an equal. Far from 
being antithetical to democracy, this abstract right (and the concrete rights that flow from 
47 Ibid at 26. 
48 More recently, Dworkin has expressed these two ideas in terms of two connected principles, the principle 
of ‘intrinsic value’, and the principle of ‘personal responsibility’. See R Dworkin, Is Democracy Possible 
Here? (Princeton University Press, 2006) 9-10 and passim. 
49 For a clear account of the difference between these two conceptions of equality, see Charles Beitz, 
‘Procedural Equality in Democratic Theory: A Preliminary Examination’, in Roland Pennock and John 
Chapman (eds.), Nomos XXV: Liberal Democracy (New York: New York University Press, 1983) 71.   126 
it) is a necessary corollary of democracy.
50
 
     Of course, this egalitarian conception of 
democracy takes us some way from the orthodoxy in British constitutional theory, that 
Parliament can ‘make or unmake any law’, or that Parliament can suspend or abrogate 
fundamental rights by the use of express language.   In fact,  it takes us towards the 
system of government that we tend to associate with most other liberal democracies, a 
system in which the powers of the legislature are limited by a written constitution or Bill 
of Rights.   This a point to which I will return in the final chapter of the thesis.  
Rights as ‘Trumps’ 
 
What does it mean to say that individuals have an abstract moral right against 
government to be treated as an equal; and how do we determine which concrete rights 
flow from this abstract right?   The right to be treated as an equal, Dworkin suggests, 
blocks  or ‘trumps’  certain types of reasons for governmental action,    namely those 
reasons  which  fail to recognize the dignity  of individual members of a political 
community, or reasons which otherwise  treat particular individuals or groups as 
inferiors.
51     According to this reason-blocking model of rights, the concrete rights o f 
individuals are those that reflect the grounds on which government is most likely to treat 
individuals or particular groups as inferiors, for instance, on the grounds of their gender, 
race or their religious or sexual beliefs and practices.
52
                                                 
50 R Dworkin, Freedom’s Law above (n 10) ch 1 passim.   See also John Hart Ely, Democracy and 
Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review, (Harvard University Press, 1980).  Ely was one of the first writers to 
recognize that some constitutional constraints facilitate democracy.  
    
51 R Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously above (n 43) 198-9. 
52 Ibid. The reason-blocking account of rights may be contrasted with an ‘interests-based’ account whereby 
rights are treated as a set of interests which are deemed to be sufficiently important to warrant their 
protection by a right. See, for example, Waldron J (ed.) Theories of Rights above (n 32) 6; J Waldron ‘A 
Rights Based Critique’ above (n 35) 30;  J The Morality of Freedom.   Space does not permit any detailed 
consideration of the relative merits of interested-based and reason-blocking theories of rights.   Letsas 
defends the reason-blocking theory, first, for the reason that it makes better sense of the idea of rights as 
being absolute (rather than subject to balancing); secondly, that it implies a less burdensome role for judges 
who are ‘not asked to establish what interests human rights should serve, in what ways and to what extent’ 
and, thirdly, on the basis that an interests based theory reflects a perfectionist theory (which is arguably less 
desirable than a liberal theory).  See G Letsas, A Theory of Interpretation of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2007), ch 5.  For an interesting exchange on the question of 
whether Dworkin’s theory of rights as trumps is best understood as a ‘reason blocking’ or ‘interests based’ 
theory, see R Pildes,  (1998) ‘Why Rights are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and 
Constitutionalism’ 27 J. Legal Stud. 725; J Waldron (2000) ‘Pildes on Dworkin’s Theory of Rights’, 29 J.   127 
The particular type of impermissible reason envisaged by the reason blocking theory is 
one based on utilitarian reasoning (government may wish to improve overall efficiency or 
the general welfare by pursuing some collective goal at the expense of some individual 
interest).
53  But the reason-blocking theory of rights can be understood as also blocking 
certain non-utilitarian reasons.
54  By way of illustration, suppose that Parliament 
legislates to permit the detention of foreign nationals suspected of committing terrorist 
activities without first charging them with an offence, and without allowing them the 
opportunity to contest their detention in a court of law.
55
 
   Let us suppose further that the 
reason offered by the Government for making use of this legislative provision is the need 
to protect national security and to safeguard the rights of others.   Now, there are at least 
three  different bases on  which the Government’s decision  (and/or  Parliament’s 
legislation) might be deemed impermissible within the reason blocking theory:    
1.  First, it may be that, given the absence of any compelling evidence to show that 
foreign  nationals pose a threat to national security or the rights of others, the 
governmental action is clearly not directed towards these purposes.   We might 
infer that the true reason for the action or decision was, say, the utilitarian reason 
of making most people feel more secure.   
 
2.  Secondly,  given the absence of any compelling evidence to show that foreign 
nationals pose a particular threat to national security or the rights of others, we 
might infer that  the  governmental action betrays a prejudice towards  non-
                                                                                                                                                 
Legal Stud. 301; R Pildes (2000) ‘Dworkin’s Two Conceptions of Rights’ 29 J. Legal Stud. 209; P Yowell 
(2007) ‘A Critical Examination of Dworkin’s Theory of Rights’ 52 Am. J. Juris. 93.   
53 Dworkin’s builds his theory around the idea that rights should trump the external preferences of 
individuals in a utilitarian calculation.   This is to say that no individual should ‘suffer disadvantage in the 
distribution of goods or opportunities on the ground that others think he should have less because of who he 
is or is not or that others care less for him than they do for other people’.   See R Dworkin, ‘Rights as 
Trumps’ above (n 32).    
54 See Hart, H.L.A. (1980) ‘Between Utility and Rights’ Col. L. Rev. 79; (1983) Essays in Jurisprudence 
and Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993) 217.  See also Raz, J. (1978) ‘Professor 
Dworkin’s Theory of Rights’ 26 Pol. Stud. 123, 131.   
55 This example is based loosely on the facts of the ‘Belmarsh’ case.  See A v. Secretary of State for the 
Home Department; X v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] UKHL 56.   128 
nationals in general, or against particular targeted groups, most obviously, on the 
grounds of their race or religion.
56
 
  
3.  Thirdly, we might conclude that the government action reflects some attempt to 
balance the right not to be detained without trial with the right of others, say, to 
safety or security, but that the resulting burden on non-nationals offers only the 
most marginal or speculative improvement to the safety or security of others.  In 
this situation, we would say that government  action was  disproportionate 
(although it might alternatively be argued that the reasoning in this third example 
necessarily conceals the type of reasoning to be found in one or other of the first 
two examples).
57
 
  
In each of these examples, we would say that the governmental had failed to treat non-
national detainees as equals for different substantive moral reasons which may be, but 
need not be, utilitarian in character.    
If we approach things from the other direction, what type of reason would count as a 
legitimate or permissible reason for detaining certain individuals or groups without trial?    
Or, to put this differently, how could government satisfy the democratic requirement of 
treating  people as equals?    Two types  of  permissible  reasons are  available, it is 
suggested.  The first reason involves a genuine attempt by government to make some 
judgment about the strength or nature of competing rights or principles.   Government 
does not treat an individual as an inferior if its reasons for action are based precisely on 
the protection of individual rights.  And since citizens, lawyers, judges and officials 
disagree about the nature and strength of competing rights, and we cannot know with any 
certainty which rights individual have,  the most that we can ask of government in this 
case is that is makes a bona fide attempt at this judgment.
58
                                                 
56 This reason arguably lay behind their Lordships decision to find a breach of Art 14 (in conjunction with 
art 5) in Belmarsh.   See also R (European Roma Rights Centre) v. Immigration Officer, Prague Airport 
[2003] EWCA Civ 666 [2003] 4 All ER 247 criticized in R Singh, ‘Equality: the Neglected Virtue’ LSE 
Working Paper, available at 
    Secondly, if it can be 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/LSEPublicLecturesAndEvents/pdf/20031126Singh.pdf  
57 See R Dworkin, ‘What are Human Rights’, unpublished article, available at: 
http://www.law.nyu.edu/clppt/program2003/readings/dworkin.pdf.  
58 Ibid.       129 
clearly demonstrated that there is an exceptional emergency ‘threatening the life of the 
nation’,
59 or representing what Oliver Wendell Holmes described as a ‘clear and present 
danger’,
60  this may arguably justify the decision to restrict some fundamental right or 
liberty.    It might be said though that this second reason is really a restatement of the first 
in so far as the derogation from one right is really the recognition of the exceptional 
strength of some other right or rights.
61
 
   
 2. The Proper Role of Judges (in the British constitution) 
 
I have argued above that individuals enjoy an abstract moral right to be treated as equals 
in the British constitution (and that Parliament may only legislate in a way that respects 
individuals in this way).   This right is derived, in part, from the principle of democracy – 
the principle which justifies the fact that Parliament exercises legislative power – but it is 
derived also from the free-standing, anti-consequentialist, principle of human dignity: the 
Kantian notion that individuals should not be treated as a means to an end, but as an end 
in themselves.   Now, if we can agree that individuals enjoy this background moral right, 
this still leaves open the question of which people  or which  institution  should have 
responsibility for determining which concrete, legal rights flow from that abstract moral 
right.  Call this the ‘institutional question’.  As Vile puts it: 
 
‘The history of Western political thought portrays the development and elaboration of a set of values – 
justice, liberty, equality, and the sanctity of property – the implications of which have been examined and 
debated down through the centuries; but just as important is the history of the debates about the institutional 
structures and procedures which are necessary if these values are to be realized in practice’.
62
 
 
                                                 
59 This is the test by which a government can derogate from certain rights under ECHR article 15.   
60 See Schenck v United States 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
61 Whether this second reason amounts to a restriction of a right or a recognition of a right will depend on 
whether one support an interests-based theory of rights or a reason-blocking theory of rights.   See above (n 
52).     
62 M.J.C. Vile Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (2
nd edn) (Liberty Fund, 1998) 1.   130 
In particular, there is an age-old debate about whether it should be unelected judges or 
elected legislators who decide controversial questions of political morality such as the 
meaning of free-speech, or the right to life.    
The first important point to make is that the principle of democracy does not dictate an 
answer either way to the institutional question.
63   While it would make sense to say that 
elected legislators should have the final say on questions of rights if democracy meant 
‘majoritarian rule’, we have seen that this conception of democracy is deficient; the 
principle of democracy is best understood as embodying the requirement that every 
member of a political community should be treated as an equal.
64   On the other hand, 
there is no default position in favour of it being unelected judges who should have the 
final say on questions of rights.   It might be argued, for instance, that a majority of 
elected  legislators are equally well, or even better equipped than  unelected judges to 
make judgments about the requirements of treating people as equals.  In short, the 
institutional question requires arguments from some reason or principle other than the 
principle of democracy (although I will suggest below that democracy is improved when 
unelected judges exercise the judicial function).
65
There are two further important preliminary points to make.   First, as Locke
       
66 and 
Montesquieu
67 have taught us, there is (and should be) a division of functions or powers 
in the processes  of government.  In modern constitutional thinking, we  distinguish 
between the legislative, executive and judicial  functions.
68
                                                 
63 R Dworkin,Taking Rights Seriously above (n 43) 142.   
   Where there is a ‘pure’ 
separation of functions, these functions are carried out by different categories of people 
belonging to distinctive institutions whose name corresponds to these functions; but in 
other systems, including the British system, it may be that the same person or set of 
64 See section 1 (above). 
65 See p 29 (below). 
66 J Locke, Peter Laslett (ed.), Two Treatises of Government (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
2003), chapter VII, para. 87. 
67 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, (trans. Thomas Nugent) (New York: MacMillan, 1949). 
68 Interestingly, Locke did not talk explicitly about a judiciary although he refers to ‘magistrates who 
execute the law’.   Instead, he divides the functions of government into the legislative, executive and 
federative.   See above (n 66).   131 
people performs more than one of these functions.
69     Given that each system of 
government  must instantiate these functions in one or other of these ways, our 
institutional question, it is submitted, is not whether judges should have the final word on 
questions of rights, but who should be the judges.  If it is thought that elected officials 
should perform both the  legislative and judicial functions then  we need to hear some 
story about how the judicial and legislative functions can be carried out by the same set 
of people.  And if it is thought that unelected individuals sitting in courts of law should 
exercise the judicial function, then we similarly need to justify this claim by reference to 
some principle or principles.
70
There is a sense in which my second preliminary point answers the first.   I have tried 
to emphasise in previous chapters that my aim in this thesis is not to reinvent the British 
constitution, but to try to make  best  sense of facts about contemporary British 
constitutional practice.   It is a fact about British constitutional practice that the judges of 
the system are unelected, apolitical individuals, with security of tenure, who exercise the 
judicial function alone or with others in an institution that is separate from the legislature 
(in future, when I use the term ‘judges’ or ‘judiciary’ I will be referring to this category 
of person).  In this respect, the institutional question cannot be approached as a matter of 
pure abstract political philosophy in the manner of my first preliminary point; and there is 
little value in making the argument that judges should have no role in determining the 
rights of individuals. Nonetheless, the fact that we can agree that judges do, in some way, 
engage in rights adjudication is not to say that we will all agree about how best to 
understand this practice.   As I have emphasised in earlier chapters, our disagreements 
about law and adjudication will  inescapably  involve competing arguments of political 
morality about which particular conception best fits and justifies the facts of the practice.    
   
In chapters 2 and 3, I suggested that a conception of legality as integrity (which I 
defended as the best understanding of the concept of legality) recommends a general 
model of adjudication or judicial decision-making.   The judicial role, I said, should be to 
                                                 
69 The overlapping model is sometimes described as a ‘fusion of powers model or a ‘checks and balances’ 
model.  For an insightful discussion of these different models, see E Barendt, ‘Separation of Powers and 
Constitutional Government’ (1995) P.L. 599.   
70 For recognition of the fact that there is nothing axiomatic about which group of people exercise which 
function, see V Sadursky, ‘Judicial Review and the Protection of Constitutional Rights’ (2002) 22 OJLS 
275-299.    132 
engage in an interpretive process whereby judges settle on the best interpretation of the 
principles of justice, fairness and procedural due process which are presupposed or 
entailed by  the past decisions of Parliament and courts.  I  offered  two particular 
arguments in favour of that model of adjudication.
71
These arguments, I think,  go only  so far in helping with the institutional question.     
They give us some idea of what judges should and should not do, but we are still in need 
of a positive justification for the fact that it is judges who give effect to legal rights and 
duties (by way of the interpretive process described above). We are also in need of a 
clearer idea of how the judicial function differs from the legislative function  –  for 
instance, the sense in which the judicial function is backward-looking, and the legislative 
function is forward-looking  –  and  why it should be elected politicians (if indeed it 
should) who carry out the governmental functions.
    First,  if judges give effect to 
principles which are embedded in the past decisions of Parliament and courts, they are 
not engaging in the forward-looking process of legislating.    Secondly, if – as the theory 
supposes – there is always an objectively correct answer to a legal dispute (based on the 
best interpretation of existing principles), then there is no sense in which a ruling in a 
‘hard case’ –  a case in which legal rights and duties are uncertain  –  involves  the 
retroactive imposition of a newly created legal right or duty.     
72
We can sharpen our understanding of the proper division between the judicial and 
governmental  functions, it is suggested, by reference to Ronald Dworkin’s celebrated 
distinction between matters of policy and principle:
    
73
 
      
‘Arguments of policy justify a political decision by showing that the decision advances or protects some 
collective goal of the community as a whole.  The argument in favour of a subsidy for aircraft 
manufacturers, that the subsidy will protect national defence, is an argument of policy.  Arguments of 
                                                 
71 See, generally, chapters 2 and 3 (above).  
72 Again, I use the term ‘governmental’ to denote both legislative and executive action. 
73 This is a distinction which Dworkin has developed throughout his work on legal theory. See R Dworkin 
Taking Rights Seriously above (n 43) chs 2 and 4; A Matter of Principle (Harvard University Press, 1985), 
33-71;  Law’s Empire (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1986) 87-113.  In his later 
work, Dworkin adopts a parallel distinction to the policy/principle distinction between choice-sensitive 
matters on the one hand, and choice-insensitive  matters on the other. See Sovereign Virtue ((Harvard 
University Press, 2000) 208-9.   133 
principle justify a political decision by showing that the decision respects or secures some individual or 
group right.’
74
 
 
The central case or paradigm of the governmental (which, again, I will take to mean 
legislative and executive) functions, it is suggested, is to formulate, enact and implement 
policies (in the above sense of ‘collective goals’).
75  While the political branches of 
government do not have the power to pursue goals which treat particular individuals or 
groups as inferiors  (a point to which I will return below),  they are  otherwise 
unconstrained in the policies that they  may pursue. Thus,  to use Dworkin’s example 
(above), a government is free (subject, perhaps, to the principle of rationality) to choose 
to subsidise aircraft manufactures rather than ship manufacturers, or to choose to build a 
sports stadium in Wembley rather than Birmingham.
76   It is uncontroversial, I think, that 
policy decisions should be made  by elected officials, and not by unelected judges.   
Judges possess neither the electoral mandate, nor the institutional capacity (in terms of 
adequate time, procedures, expertise and so on) to make difficult choices about which 
collective goals a community should pursue.
77
Before we can answer these questions directly, we need to emphasise the special sense 
in which the term ‘principle’ is here being used.   In one respect, the political branches of 
government necessarily make decisions based on principle.  The collective goals or aims 
they pursue will (one hopes) reflect some coherent background theory of distributive and 
    The more difficult questions are these.  
First, in what sense is the judicial function defined by the task of deciding matters of 
principle, and, secondly, why should it be judges (as defined above) who give effect to 
matters of principle?  
                                                 
74 Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously above (n 43) 82-3. 
75 The term ‘legislative’ should be understood to include the creation of subordinate or secondary 
legislation which, in practice, is the context in which specific goals are formulated by the government 
pursuant to powers conferred by a primary Act of Parliament.  The legislative function should also be taken 
to include the exercise of prerogative powers in so far as the exercise of such a power involves the pursuit 
of some collective goal.    
76 This example is admittedly rather out of date.  A governmental subsidy to a given industry would 
doubtless fall foul of the EC law on state aid.  The reader is asked to put this complication to one side when 
considering the example! 
77 R Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously above (n 43) 85.  This is a point that has been developed by a 
number of constitutional lawyers in Britain and the US.  See, for example, L Fuller, ‘The Forms and Limits 
of Adjudication’, 92 Harvard Law Review 353 (1978); A Chayes, ‘The role of the judge in public law 
litigation’, (1976) 89 Harvard Law Review 1281; J Jowell, ‘Of Vires and Vacuums’ above (n 21) at 451; C 
Harlow, ‘Public Law and Popular Justice’ (2002) 65 MLR 1-18.   134 
corrective justice, a theory which will ordinarily reflect the political ideology of the 
governing party.    For present purposes though, a decision of principle does not relate to 
a political choice about which theory of justice, fairness and procedural process to pursue 
in relation to some collective goal; it relates rather to the question of which rights, duties 
and powers  flow from the scheme of justice, fairness and procedural due process 
embedded in past legislative decisions in relation to some individuated claim.
78    It is this 
latter question, I think, which defines the judicial role.    To put this differently, the role 
of the political branches of government concerns the forward-looking question of which 
policies  and principles to pursue;
79  the judicial role concerns the backward-looking 
question of which policies and principles a legislature has pursued in its past decisions, 
and which legal rights, duties and powers flow from those principles and policies for the 
purposes of resolving a litigant’s claim.   In this way, the judicial role tracks the value of 
integrity or equality before the law, while the political role involves broader questions 
about which decision would be the most just, efficient, effective, and so on.
80
 
    This 
distinction, I think,  helps us to understand the following celebrated dictum of Lord 
Diplock in the IRC case: 
It is not . . . a sufficient answer to say that judicial review of the actions of officers or departments of 
central government is unnecessary because they are accountable to Parliament for the way in which they 
carry out their functions. They are accountable to Parliament for what they do so far as regards efficiency 
and policy, and of that Parliament  is the only judge; they are responsible to a court of justice for the 
lawfulness of what they do, and of that the court is the only judge.
81
 
 
We can now usefully link this discussion of policy and principle, I think, to our earlier 
discussion on the nature of rights.   I suggested above (after Ronald Dworkin) that rights 
are best understood as blocks on, or trumps over,  particular types of reasons for 
                                                 
78 Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously above (n 43) 90. 
79 Dworkin has argued though that a legislature has a duty to observe the principle of legislative integrity 
such that the laws it enacts reflect a coherent scheme of principle.  See R Dworkin, Law’s Empire above (n 
73) ch 6. 
80  See chs 2 and 3 (above).  
81 IRC v National Federation of Self Employed and Small Businesses Ltd [1982] AC 617 at 644.   Of 
course, many commentators have doubted a) whether a distinction between matters of policy and principle 
is sustainable; and b) whether judges do in fact respect such a distinction.  See, for example, J Griffith, The 
Politics of the Judiciary (London, Fontana, 1997, 5
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governmental action, namely those reasons which treat individuals as inferiors.   We can 
translate this theory of rights into the language of the policy/principle distinction in the 
following way: principles (or rights) will trump policies or policy decisions which are 
premised on impermissible reasons.  This is to say that a  legislative or governmental 
choice which engages some legal principle or right (which choice cannot therefore be 
described as a ‘pure’ policy choice), for this reason engages the judicial function. In this 
situation, a political decision-maker has a duty and not merely a choice to act in a way 
that respects the relevant right or principle; and a judge has a duty to give effect to the 
principle or right which trumps the policy.     
By way of illustration, consider the example given above.   The decision as to whether 
to build a sports stadium in Wembley rather than Birmingham, I suggested, is a pure 
question of policy (subject, perhaps, to the principle of rationality): this is to say that 
there is no right or principle which constrains or limits the choices available to the 
decision-maker.  But the decisions as to whether or not to consult interested parties in 
making that decision, or whether to give reasons for the decision, or whether to honour 
some sort of legitimate expectation, are questions of principle.    It may be that it would 
more just, efficient and so on to grant a subsidy without consulting anybody, or without 
giving reasons; but if certain individuals have a right to consultation or the provision of 
reasons (according to  the best understanding of the principles embedded in the past 
decisions of Parliament and courts), then a decision-maker may only act in a way that 
these rights and principles permit; and these rights and principles will trump any 
purported decision that ignores such rights and principles.    
 
Having improved our sense in which the political and judicial functions differ, we are 
now in a better position to tackle the institutional question posed at the outset of this 
section.   The question can be put thus: what reasons can we give in support of assigning 
the judicial  function of blocking impermissible reasons (or giving effect to rights or 
principles)  to  judges  (unelected, apolitical individuals, with security of tenure, who 
exercise the judicial function alone or with others in an institution that is separate from 
the legislature); and are there negative arguments against assigning this role to legislators 
(elected, party political individuals who sit in a Parliamentary chamber and exercise the   136 
legislative function)?     I want to consider two different criteria  for assessing these 
questions. The first criterion is the soundness of decisions.   In other words, is one set of 
actors more  likely to generate accurate decisions than the other, in the sense that the 
decisions come closer to reflecting the true  legal rights of individuals?  The second 
criterion is the fairness of the decision.
82
 
    
(i) Soundness 
 
Do we have any reason to think that judges  have a superior (or inferior) ability over 
legislators to decide, say, whether freedom of speech includes the right to burn a national 
flag, or to decapitate a wax-work of a former Prime Minister?    Or, to frame this in terms 
of a theory of rights as trumps, are  judges  better able than legislators to  determine 
whether the reasons offered by officials for prohibiting such practices  is based on a 
permissible or impermissible reason?   There are three important points to make before 
we can attempt to embark on this type of comparison.   
 
First, an inter-institutional comparison based on the criterion of soundness can only work 
on an all-other-things-being-equal basis.   We must assume, that is, that judges and 
legislators will make bona fide (non-prejudiced, non-biased, non-partisan etc) judgments 
about the rights of individuals.    I will consider below under the heading of ‘fairness’, 
whether this is a plausible assumption.    
 
Secondly, we need  to be absolutely clear on what we mean by the ability to decide 
matters of principle.    The question is not whether judges or legislators have a superior 
ability to engage in general moral reasoning, but whether one or other type of 
institutional actor possesses superior abilities in the specific judicial function outlined 
above, namely the ability to make a judgment about the principles which best justify the 
past decisions of Parliament and courts  in relation to some individuated claim.  To 
illustrate this point,  the question a)  of whether euthanasia is a morally acceptable 
practice, or a practice which a political community would prefer not to permit, is different 
                                                 
82 I have borrowed these two criteria from Dworkin.  See Taking Rights Seriously above (n 43) 141-147.   137 
from the question b) of whether Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
permits a doctor or spouse to carry out euthanasia.
83
 
    If it is thought that a legislature 
possesses a superior ability to engage in general moral reasoning of type a), it may not 
follow that it possesses a superior ability in the special type of moral reasoning involved 
in the judicial task involving the reasoning in type a).  
Thirdly, as Waldron has argued persistently, legislators, judges, lawyers and citizens 
disagree  about the nature and content of rights; and  we have no ‘epistemology’ for 
knowing which view is correct (always assuming that there are ‘correct’ answers to 
questions of law and other dimensions of morality).
84
 
     In this sense the question of 
moral objectivity is irrelevant to the soundness comparison. 
In the light of the three points just made, and our earlier discussion, it will be apparent 
that there is a conceptual problem with this first criterion of comparison.   In short, there 
is nothing to compare.    If the same people who exercise the legislative function also 
exercise the judicial function, then, on the occasions that those people exercise the 
judicial function, they act not as legislators but as judges: the judicial function remains 
the judicial function irrespective of which group of people or institution performs that 
function.   In response to this argument, it might be argued that the people exercising the 
legislative function are more in number, have greater time, great resources, greater access 
to experts and so forth than unelected (etc…) judges.   But even if we suppose (somewhat 
controversially) that these types of factors would improve judicial decision-making, this 
would simply be an argument for reforming  existing judicial procedures rather than 
entrusting the judicial function to the same people who exercise the legislative function.
85
                                                 
83 R (on the application of Pretty) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] UKHL 61. 
    
To summarise this last point, there is no sense in which there is a competition between 
the legislative and judicial functions: each function forms an independent part of British 
constitutional practice.  The important question is who should exercise each function and, 
84 J Waldron, Law and Disagreement above (n 34) ch 8.  See also chapter 2 (above) part 2B.  
85 On the other hand, it might be argued that (unelected) judges have more experience, and are better 
trained to engage in judicial reasoning.   But this would again be an argument in support of offering similar 
training and opportunities to gain experience for elected legislators.      138 
as I will now consider, whether it is objectionable for the same  group of people or 
institution to exercise both the judicial and political functions. 
 
(ii) Fairness 
 
If the criterion of soundness is unhelpful, can it be said that it is fairer to allow the same 
people who exercise the legislative function also to exercise the judicial function? Jeremy 
Waldron has offered two connected arguments in support of this view.  First, since we 
disagree  about rights, it should be a majority who decides  which rights we have.  
Secondly, ‘decisions about rights are best taken by those who have a sufficient stake in 
the matter to decide responsibly’,
86  and by those on whom rights impact the most.
87   In 
relation to the first of these arguments, a growing number of theorists have raised the 
following  compelling  objection: that there can be no default  position in favour of 
participatory majoritarianism  simply in virtue  of the fact that we disagree; for  we 
disagree just as much about procedures as we do about results.
88
Does Waldron’s second argument supply such a moral argument?  In so far as Waldron 
envisages that it is individual citizens  who should directly determine the nature and 
content of rights, Kavanagh makes the following observation: 
   The question of 
whether a particular procedure for decision-making is fair – like the question of whether a 
particular outcome is just – can only be supported by substantive arguments of political 
morality.     
 
‘[I]t is not immediately obvious why being affected by a decision creates an entitlement in the person so 
affected that he or she should make the decision. There are many situations where the opposite is the case. 
In the case of medical decisions which clearly affect us in significant ways, we often think it is better to 
leave them to doctors. Similarly, we often leave legal  decisions to our lawyers, financial decisions to 
accountants/financial advisers etc.’
89
   
 
                                                 
86 Waldron, Law and Disagreement above (n 34) 253 
87 Ibid at 238 
88 See A Kavanagh above (n 39) 467; J Raz, ‘Disagreement in Politics’, American Journal of Jurisprudence 
43 (1998) 47; C Fabre, ‘The Dignity of Rights’ above (n 40) at 275.   See generally chapter 2 (below) part 
2B. 
89 Kavanagh op. cit. 470   139 
There is of course nothing alien about allowing some person or body to take decisions on 
our behalf.  As Kavanagh observes, we customarily entrust decisions about the public 
interest to elected representatives.
90   This is no doubt partly for practical reasons, but 
also for the reason that individuals are likely to be biased and self-interested in their 
decision-making, something that would run entirely contrary to the democratic ideal of 
treating people as equals.
91
Why then should elected representatives not perform the judicial function of 
determining matters of principle or rights in relation to individuated claims?    The reason 
is not difficult to find.   Just as there would be a risk that individuals would make biased 
and self-interested decisions on matters of principle if entrusted with such decisions, so 
there is a risk that elected representatives would do the same.   Given that the political 
branches of government are in the business of pursuing collective goals (or ‘policies’) in 
as efficient, effective and economical way as possible, it would almost seem a logical 
impossibility for these same branches of government to identify  and observe the 
situations in which individual rights should trump those collective goals.  More cynically, 
we might say that individual legislators are motivated primarily by the wish to be re-
elected, in which case the will of the majority is bound to be their primary concern.  The 
principle here, of course, is that no man (or majority) should be a judge in his (or its) own 
cause (‘nemo iudex in sua causa’).
    In any case, the real question, and the question with which 
we have been concerned in this section, is whether elected representatives should make 
judicial decisions about matters of rights or principle.    
92   In other words, as a matter of fairness, it must be 
an independent branch of government (or group of people) which should adjudicate on 
the question of whether governmental action that interferes with a right is taken for a 
permissible reason, a branch of government that has ‘no mail bag or lobbyists or pressure 
groups, to compromise competing interests in their chambers’.
93
                                                 
90 Ibid 471. See also D Kyritsis, ‘Representation and Waldron’s Objection to Judicial Review’ (2006) 26 
733-751 
    To connect the idea of 
91 Kavanagh op. cit. 472. 
92 See R Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously above (n 43)142-143; Dworkin, A Matter of Principle above (n 
73) 24.   Cf. Lawrence Sager, ‘The Incorrigible Constitution’ New York University Law Review 65 (1990) 
956.  
93 See R Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously above (n 43) 85; Kavanagh above (n 39) 476-7 who argues that 
the risk of self-interested decision-making is sufficient to warrant judicial review; John Hart Ely, 
Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980) 
passim.  Cf. J Waldron, who finds that this view incorrectly dismisses the fact that ‘voters and legislators   140 
judicial independence  to our earlier conclusions in relation to Waldron’s theory of 
participatory majoritarianism, it is judges who are uniquely well placed to give effect to 
the very rights which enable  equal participation, rights such as freedom of speech, 
association and assembly.
94   It is in this sense, it is suggested, that the judicial protection 
of  principle or rights is complementary  rather than antagonistic to the principle of 
democracy.
95
 
      
3. Human Rights Adjudication under the HRA 1998 
 
In the previous sections of this chapter, I have explored the sense in which individuals 
enjoy certain moral and legal rights against government, and I have offered arguments to 
justify the role of judges  in giving effect to those rights.  These arguments, while of 
interest in their own right as questions of abstract political philosophy, have been directed 
towards improving our understanding of the particular constitutional arrangements and 
practices in the British constitution.    With this in mind, I now want to offer a sketch of 
how these moral justifications for the powers of Parliament and courts, and the rights of 
individuals  can help us to understand  concrete questions about British constitutional 
practice.
96
 
    The HRA 1998 will serve as a suitable focus for discussion.    
A. The Nature of Rights Under the ECHR  
 
Members of the Council of Europe have a legal obligation not to act contrary to the rights 
enshrined in the ECHR.
97   As Letsas puts it: ‘the ECHR is part of the normative 
materials that make each and every proposition of domestic law true’.
98
                                                                                                                                                 
are capable of focusing their deliberations on the general good and on some sense of the proper balance that 
should be held among individual interests in society’.  See J Waldron, Law and Disagreement above (n 34) 
417.  And see Waldron, ‘Rights and Majorities: Rousseau Revisited’, in LiberalRights: Collected Papers 
1981–1991 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).   
   The immediate 
94 See section 1B and C (above).   
95 See R Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue above (n 73) 208-9.  Similarly, see Kavanagh above (n 39) 481 et seq. 
96 For a detailed analysis of the best interpretation of adjudication under the European Convention on 
Human Rights, see G Letsas, A Theory of Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights 
above (n 52).  Letsas explicitly defends a Dworkinian reason-blocking theory of right.    
97 See ECHR arts 32, 34 and 46.    
98 Letsas op. cit. at 35.  Waldron J (ed.) Theories of Rights above (n 32) at 15.     141 
question  for our purposes is how best to understand these rights.   Like other human 
rights documents found around the world, the rights and freedoms contained in the ECHR 
are drafted in highly abstract terms.  There is ample room then for disagreement about 
how to interpret these rights and freedoms.     It might be argued, for instance, that a rule-
utilitarian model of rights fits the language of the ECHR most closely, in so far as a 
government can supposedly justify interfering with the rights contained in arts 8-12 of the 
Convention on certain ‘public interest’ grounds such as ‘the economic well being of the 
country’ or ‘the protection of health and morals’.
99    I suggested above  though that 
utilitarianism cannot provide an adequate justification for democracy and – in so far as 
any utilitarian political theory can accommodate them – individual rights.
100     Instead, I 
defended a reason-blocking model of rights (a theory which operates, at least in part, as a 
corrective to utilitarianism).
101
 
   How then can this account of moral rights help us to 
understand the legal rights contained in the ECHR?    I will offer just a few suggestions 
before considering at greater length the way in which the HRA 1998 shapes the role of 
institutions: 
First,  if the rights contained in the ECHR are understood as trumps, then each of the 
rights enumerated in the Convention should be taken to represent the types of general 
grounds on which the government is most likely to treat certain individuals or groups as 
inferiors.    This is to say that the Convention represents an attempt to capture the moral 
right to be treated as an equal.
102
 
   
Secondly, if the rights contained in the ECHR are understood as trumps, then each of 
these rights is absolute  in the following two senses: first,  they cannot be ‘balanced’ 
against other interests;
103
                                                 
99 See Letsas op. cit. at 100.   
    secondly,  the rights  are only engaged or  activated when 
impermissible reasons are in play, whereupon  they function to trump or block these 
reasons.   This second point has a striking effect on the way that we understand the so-
100 See (above) section 1A. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Within an interests-based theory of rights, the rights would represent particular interests grounded in a 
person’s well-being.  See Letsas op. cit. 103. 
103 Again, contrast this point with the balancing of interests that takes place within the framework of an 
interest-based theory of rights.  Ibid. 104 and 117.     142 
called ‘qualified’ rights of the ECHR (Arts 8-12).   The structure and language of these 
articles would suggest that the first part of these articles contains the right, while the 
second part of the article contains different grounds on which the government  might 
legitimately interfere with the right.  This would make perfect sense within an ‘interests-
based’ theory of rights.
104
 
   But within a reason-blocking model of rights the right can 
only be seen as the product of arguments about when the government can legitimately 
act.   To put this differently, we can only define the right after factoring in the types of 
grounds listed in the second part of the Convention articles.  
Finally, as we will see below, if the rights contained in the ECHR are understood as 
trumps, then the judicial role is a minimal one: it is to screen governmental decisions for 
impermissible reasons.   Significantly, this judicial  role has no obvious  place for a 
principle of proportionality  (beyond treating this principle as a diagnostic test for 
identifying impermissible reasons for governmental action).
105
 
   Nor is there a place for a 
concept of deference  (beyond treating this term as the expression of a principled 
conclusion about the proper role of courts vis-à-vis the political branches of government).   
 
B. The Proper Role of judges under the HRA 1998 
 
The HRA 1998, I have suggested, does not alter the nature of the rights protected by the 
ECHR (rights which, I have argued, are best understood as trumps over impermissible 
reasons for governmental action):  individuals enjoy these legal rights independently of 
the provisions of the HRA 1998 (and, it should be said, they enjoy the moral rights to be 
treated as an equal independently of the provisions of the ECHR).
106
                                                 
104 See above (n 52). 
   The importance of 
the HRA 1998, in my view, is the way that it conditions the role of domestic institutions 
in giving effect to ECHR rights at the behest of individual applicants or ‘victims’.    The 
105 For one possible way in which the idea of proportionality remains relevant within a model of rights as 
trumps see (above) p 128. 
106 For an excellent discussion of the relationship between moral and legal rights, see Dworkin, Taking 
Rights Seriously above (n 43) ch. 7.   143 
key question under the Act is how best to understand the judicial role in relation to 
sections 3 and 4, and it is these sections on which I will concentrate.  
The first important point to make is a general one about statutory interpretation.   The 
jurisprudence and academic literature on the proper interpretation of sections 3 and 4 of 
the HRA 1998 is replete with references to the ‘intention of Parliament’ – either  in 
respect of the 1998 Act itself, or in  respect of  the Act whose compatibility with the 
ECHR is challenged.   And recourse is often had to Hansard,
107 and to the government 
White Paper preceding the Act  in an attempt to divine  one  or  other  Parliamentary 
intention.
108    I argued in the chapter 3 that the notion that courts identify the meaning of 
an Act of Parliament by looking to Parliamentary intentions (or indeed, to the intentions 
of one or more ministers or other sponsors of a bill) is fallacious.   This can be no more 
clearly seen in relation to the language of the HRA 1998 where argument has revolved to 
a large degree around the outstandingly opaque phrase ‘so far as it is possible to do 
so’.
109
The meaning of an Act of Parliament, I suggested, instead depends on the intent of the 
statute: that is, the meaning imposed on the statute by the interpreter of the statute 
(typically a judge).   This interpretation is best understood in terms of the conception of 
legality as integrity which I defended in chapter 2 and 3.  According to this conception, it 
will be recalled, the meaning of a statute must depend on the best interpretation of the 
principles of justice, fairness and procedural due process which are presupposed or 
entailed by that particular statute, by the principles that best justify that general doctrinal 
area of law, and by the principles which best justify the role of the different branches of 
government.  Our task in trying to make sense of the HRA 1998 is therefore to try to 
make sense of the scheme of principle that underpins this Act.   In order to bring out 
    
                                                 
107 For instance, Lord Steyn notes in R v A (No 2) [2002] l AC 45 at 44, that ‘In the progress of the Bill 
through Parliament the Lord Chancellor observed that "in 99% of the cases that will arise, there will be no 
need for judicial declarations of incompatibility" and the Home Secretary said "We expect that, in almost 
all cases, the courts will be able to interpret the legislation compatibility with the Convention": Hansard 
(HL Debates), 5 February 1998, col 840 (3rd Reading) and Hansard (HC Debates), 16 February 1998, col 
778 (2nd Reading)’.   
108 Rights Brought Home: The Human Rights Bill (CM.3782, 1997) 
109 HRA 1998, s 3.  There is a vast body of literature on the meaning of this provision.  See, for example, C 
Gearty ‘Reconciling Parliamentary Democracy and Human Rights’ (2002) 118 L.Q.R. 248; G Phillipson, 
‘(Mis)Reading Section 3 of the Human Rights Act’ (2003) 119 L.Q.R. 183; ‘The Elusive Divide between 
Interpretation and Legislation under the Human Rights Act 1998’, (2004) 24 OJLS 259-285.   144 
some of the implications of this approach, I will briefly discuss one of the leading cases 
on the interpretation of sections 3 or 4 of the Act.    
 
Ghaidan
110
 
  
The facts of Ghaidan are very well known.   The question for the court was whether the 
survivorship provisions of the Rent Act 1977  –  which  clearly applied at least to  a 
surviving spouse occupying a dwelling-house as his or her residence
111
 
 – also applied to 
unmarried same-sex couples.   The arguments revolved around the meaning of paragraph 
2 of schedule 1 to the 1977 Act  (for convenience, I  will refer to this provision as 
‘paragraph 2’): 
‘(2) For the purposes of this paragraph, a person who was living with the original tenant as his or her wife 
or husband shall be treated as the spouse of the original tenant.’ 
 
The House of Lords had decided in Fitzpatrick,
112
  The first important point to make in the light of the arguments of this chapter and 
previous chapters is as follows.     If, as Letsas suggests, ‘the ECHR is part of the 
normative materials that make each and every proposition of domestic law true’,
 prior to the coming into force of the 
HRA 1998, that the 1977 Act applied only to persons in an opposite-sex relationship.   
The task for their Lordships in Ghaidan was therefore to determine how the HRA 1998 
impacted on the meaning of paragraph 2.   The applicant, Mr Godin-Mendoza, contended 
that  paragraph  2, as interpreted in  Fitzpatrick,  infringed his right against non-
discrimination in the exercise of his article 8 right to private and family life, in so far as it 
drew an impermissible distinction between homosexual and heterosexual individuals on 
the grounds of sexual orientation.   The House of Lords accepted that argument and, 
using section 3 of the 1998 Act, read into paragraph 2 the words ‘as if’ to achieve the 
effect of extending that provision to same-sex couples. 
113
                                                 
110 Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2004] 2 A.C. 557 
 then 
111 Paragraph 2(1) of Schedule 1. 
112 Fitzpatrick v Sterling Housing Association Ltd [2001] 1 AC 27. 
113 Above p 140.   145 
it is the law that Parliament (and government) has no power to act contrary to the rights 
of the ECHR.   To put this differently, the principles and rights enshrined in the ECHR 
figure amongst the legal principles which will help us to determine the proper powers of 
Parliament, and which will help us to make sense of any statute.
114    In order to 
appreciate the significance of this point, we need to consider the types of interpretive 
tests adopted by the court in Ghaidan.  These tests can be reduced to the following two 
propositions:
115
 
 
First, Section 3 of the HRA 1998 can be used to change the unambiguous meaning of a 
statutory provision provided that  this usage does  not run contrary to ‘a fundamental 
feature of the legislation’ or ‘the underlying thrust of the legislation being construed’, or 
‘the grain of the legislation’.
116
 
   
Secondly, to quote Lord Nicholls, the courts should not ‘make decisions for which they 
are not equipped.  There may be several ways of making a provision Convention-
compliant, and the choice may involve issues calling for legislative deliberation’.
117
 
 
The first of these propositions reveals a characteristic but, in my view, mistaken feature 
of the standard approach taken by judges to statutory interpretation under the 1998 Act.    
To suggest, as Lord Nicholls does, that judges should not use section 3 to depart from the 
underlying thrust of a statute implies that statutes have a meaning which is independent 
of the principles of the ECHR, and which can be ascertained prior to any consideration of 
those principles.  Thus, adjudication under s.3, on the standard approach, takes place in 
two stages.   At the first stage, judges effectively close their eyes to the principles and 
rights of the ECHR and identify the ‘human rights free’ meaning of any given statute 
applying ‘the legislation in its natural and ordinary meaning’.
118
                                                 
114 I have made a more radical claim still than this above: namely, that the truth conditions of any 
proposition of law include the principle of democracy and the rights that flow from this principle.  This is 
to say that the ECHR and HRA 1998 arguably replicate principles that already belong to the British 
constitution, and which would survive the repeal of the HRA 1998.  See above section 1C. 
  Only then do judges 
115 For a helpful analysis, see Craig, Administrative Law (5
th edn) (Sweet & Maxwell, 2008) 559-560. 
116 Ghaidan above (n 110) at 33 per Lord Nicholls. 
117 Ibid. 
118 Ibid at 60 per Lord Steyn.   146 
consider the effect that the ECHR rights have on the meaning of the statute.
119     This 
approach is seen most clearly in the dissenting judgment of Lord Millet, who found that 
the  meaning of paragraph 2 depended on the ‘words that Parliament has chosen to 
use’,
120 and on the pre-HRA 1998 legislative history.
121
  The mistake in this approach, it is submitted, is that the meaning of a statute must 
depend on the best interpretation of all of the principles and policies that are presupposed 
or entailed by the statute.
 
122   This is to say that, the ‘fundamental feature’ or ‘underlying 
thrust’ of any Act of Parliament must include the principles and rights of the ECHR.
123    
For this reason, the judgment of the majority in Ghaidan is best understood, I think, as 
involving one stage and not two: the true meaning of paragraph 2 depended on the best 
understanding of ECHR arts 8 and 14 in conjunction with the policy of allowing two 
cohabiting individuals to enjoy security of tenure.
124
What do these conclusions tell us about the  nature of adjudication under the HRA 
1998?   Crucially,  if we assume that judges have correctly interpreted the different 
principles and rights under the ECHR, and the relationship of these principles and rights 
to the policies implicit in a given Act of Parliament, then the question of whether to use 
section  3 or 4  cannot  hang on the distinction between judicial interpretation  and 
legislation in the way that is commonly suggested: for any action taken by judges under 
s. 3 which is directed towards giving effect to ECHR rights would be directed toward 
giving effect to the existing  legal  rights of individuals under the ECHR  (it would be 
different if judges ignored or misapplied Convention rights, for instance, by engaging in 
so-called ‘rights inflation’ in which case, we would say that they were legislating).
    
125
How then can we justify the use of section 3 or 4?   The most obvious justification for 
the use of section  3, it is suggested, is that judges have a duty to remedy  rights 
     
                                                 
119 For a clear academic statement of this approach, see C Gearty above (n 109). 
120 Ghaidan at 70 per Lord Hope 
121 Ibid at 83 et seq. 
122 See chapter 3 (above) part 2B. 
123 A number of judges and commentators have made a similar (albeit using the unhelpful phenomenology 
of ‘Parliament’s intention’) but narrower point.  The argument runs as follows: that the meaning of any Act 
of Parliament must depend primarily on Parliament’s intention in relation to the HRA 1998 (rather than in 
relation to the Act whose compatibility with the ECHR is under challenge) that all primary and secondary 
legislation should be read compatibly with Convention rights.  See G Phillipson above (n 109). 
124 Ghaidan above (n 110) at 17 per Lord Nicholls 
125 See Letsas above (n 52) at 126 et seq.     147 
infringements  (in the sense that judges are under a duty to give  effect to  rights and 
principles by blocking impermissible reasons for legislative and governmental action).  It 
is only by the use of s. 3, we might say, that judges can properly achieve this end.    One 
further justification might be added.   Although I have argued that the true meaning of 
paragraph 2 extended to heterosexuals and homosexuals even before judges made use of 
s. 3, we might say that the insertion of the words ‘as if’  into paragraph 2 achieves a 
textual form that better captures the true substantive rights of individuals, and which 
achieves greater clarity for those looking to the statute for guidance.    
Can there ever be a justification for the use of s. 4?    The strongest potential 
justification lies, I think, in the second proposition stated above viz. that courts should not 
‘make decisions for which they are not equipped [since]  [t]here may be several ways of 
making a provision Convention-compliant, and the choice may involve issues calling for 
legislative deliberation’.
126  This is to say that there may be cases in which a change to a 
statutory provision might have far-reaching ramifications for different areas of law and 
social life, ramifications which Parliament (or the government) could more easily 
assess.
127
 
   Thus, in Bellinger v Bellinger, we might justify the decision of the House of 
Lords to make a declaration of incompatibility on the basis that Parliament (or the 
government) is better placed to assess the implications of a change to gender-recognition 
for such things as tax law, inheritance law, criminal records and insurance.    
                                                 
126 Ghaidan above (n 110) at 33 per Lord Nicholls. 
127 [2003] 2 A.C. 467.      148 
Chapter 5: Law, Constitutional Conventions and Political Principles 
 
It might be objected that this  thesis has so far has been dominated by questions of 
legality, legal principles, and courts at the expense of the non-legal aspects of the British 
constitution.   The greater part of British constitutional practice, it is often said, is played 
out in the corridors of political power rather than in the courtroom.  Indeed this is said to 
be one of the principal virtues of the ‘unwritten’ British constitution as compared to the 
‘written’ constitutions of, say, the United States or Germany.    The different political 
institutions operate, not within the straightjacket of written laws, but under a regime of 
shifting and adaptable constitutional conventions or unwritten rules.    In so far as these 
conventions  are enforced, their enforcement depends on mechanisms of political 
accountability and the force of tradition rather than on courts.   The British constitution 
is, in these different senses, a ‘political’ rather than a ‘legal’ constitution.
1
  In this chapter and the next, I intend to challenge each of these types of objections, 
objections which, collectively, we might call the ‘political’ objection.  In the present 
chapter, I will concentrate on a number of  philosophical objections to a distinction 
between law and convention.  Contrary to the political objection, I will maintain that the 
principle of legality is central to each and every aspect of British constitutional practice.    
In the next chapter, I will attempt to explain – by way of a conclusion to the thesis – the 
sense in which it is unhelpful and misleading to characterise the British constitution as 
either a ‘legal’ or ‘political’ constitution, or as a ‘written’ or ‘unwritten’ constitution.      
        
 
1. Why Distinguish Between Law and Convention? 
 
It is well-established orthodoxy that the British constitution comprises constitutional law 
on the one hand, and constitutional conventions on the other.
2
                                                 
1 .See, for instance, Griffith, ‘The Political Constitution’ (1979) 42 MLR 1; A Tomkins, ‘In Defence of the 
Political Constitution’ (2002) 22 OJLS 157-175.  For more detailed consideration of the type of claim made 
by these theorists, and two different senses in which such theorists employ the phrase ‘political 
constitution’, see chapter 6 (above). 
   Most commentators 
would doubtless agree, for instance, that the requirement that a minister belongs to one or 
2 See, for instance, Hood Phillips and Jackson, Constitutional and Administrative Law (8
th edn, Sweet & 
Maxwell) ch 7.   149 
other House of Parliament, and the requirement that the Queen gives the Royal Assent on 
the advice of her Ministers, are conventional in character,
3 while the duty of a minister to 
act fairly in making a decision about an individual, or the duty of a minister not to make a 
decision for improper purposes, are legal in character.   Yet if we are able to point to 
paradigms or central cases of the legal and the conventional, it is a daunting task to derive 
from those central cases a comprehensive test for distinguishing the one type of 
constitutional practice from the other. Constitutional theorists across the ages have 
struggled to identify any such tests.
4  Some have doubted whether there is any 
meaningful distinction;
5  and one leading theorist has recently argued that there is a 
‘softness [in the]…line between informal social rules [or conventions] and a legal 
system’
6 such that any difference between them is ‘a matter of degree’.
7
Why should we be interested in distinguishing constitutional laws from constitutional 
conventions?    Perhaps a useful starting point in answering that question is to recast the 
law/convention dichotomy in terms of different types of rights, duties and powers.  When 
a Government minister (or some other official) makes a decision, for example, about 
whether an asylum seeker should be deported, or whether permission should be granted 
for the construction of a new airport terminal, we tend to think of the minister as having 
various legal duties and powers (if not rights), for instance, to take into account relevant 
considerations, and to employ fair decision-making procedures.   On the other hand, we 
tend to think of the minister as having a political or constitutional duty
 
8 to appear before 
Parliament to report on the actions (or inactions) or their department, or to adhere to the 
Ministerial Code.
9
                                                 
3 Examples of other constitutional conventions are: the Queen will never refuse royal assent once the Bill 
has passed through the necessary Parliamentary process; Royal assent is granted by the Queen on the 
advice of her ministers; High Court judges hold their offices during good behaviour, and are disqualified 
from membership of the Commons; Westminster will not legislate for the devolved bodies (the Sewel 
Convention) or for former Colonies.     
    It makes sense to think of judges too as having certain duties.   
Judges are  under a duty, I have argued in previous chapters, to  give effect to  the 
4 The classic ‘enforcement’ test is that of A V Dicey.  See A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Law of the 
Constitution, 10th edn (1962), a 417. See part 2A (below). 
5 See T.R.S. Allan, Law, Liberty and Justice: The Legal Foundations of British Constitutionalism (Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1993) ch 10.   
6 See N Barber, 'Laws and Constitutional Conventions' (2009) 125 LQR 294-309, 307. 
7 Ibid at 308. 
8 I treat the terms ‘constitutional’ and ‘political’ duty as being synonymous but I will mainly use the latter 
term during the course of this paper.   
9 Ministerial Code (2007).       150 
principles of justice, fairness and procedural due process which provide the best 
justification for the past decisions of Parliament and courts.
10
In each of these examples, it would seem too weak to say that the minister or judge 
merely ‘chooses’ to act in these different ways, or has a ‘habit’ of acting in these ways, or 
acts because they feel that they ‘ought’ to act in these ways, or because they ‘make it a 
rule’ to act in these ways.
  
11   Nor would it be adequate to say that we can ‘predict’ that 
the minister or judge will act in particular ways.  Each of these weaker statements of the 
position of minister or judge, it is suggested, fails to capture the normative or binding 
force of the different requirements facing these actors in the situations described.
12   It 
hardly seems intelligible to treat the decision of a minister or judge not to perform any of 
these different requirements as carrying no greater significance than the decision, say, to 
break their habit of taking coffee at 9 am, or a decision (by the Prime Minister) not to 
holiday in Chequers at Christmas time.
13
 To return to the original question then, we might want to distinguish between law and 
convention for the reason that we want to distinguish the legal duties of constitutional 
actors from their political or constitutional duties.    Law (or legal practice), it might be 
argued, is a distinctive and particularly important political concept (or practice), such that 
we should attempt to  isolate  it  from the broader domain of political or constitutional 
morality.
   
14
                                                 
10 Some positivist theorists have interpreted Hart as arguing that judges are under no such duty.  See, for 
instance, Julie Dickson, ‘Is the Rule of Recognition Really a Conventional Rule’ (2007) 27 OJLS 373-402. 
    Dworkin, for example, has argued that law uniquely justifies the use of state 
coercion against members of a political community, and that a conception of law as 
integrity defines a political community in a way that rights and duties within the more 
general domain of constitutional morality (or from other branches of morality such as 
11 Mitchell makes a similar point in distinguishing between conventions and mere practices.  See J.D.B. 
Mitchell, Constitutional Law, 2
nd edn (Edinburgh, 1968) 39.  Dicey appears to make this mistake in that he 
groups together ‘conventions, understandings, habits, or practices’ (see Dicey, op.cit. 23-24).   
12 Hart famously objected to John Austin’s legal theory on the basis that, in his emphasis on the ‘habits of 
obedience’ of subjects (as a means of identifying the ‘sovereign’), Austin failed to provide any account of 
normative duties and obligations.  See H L A Hart, The Concept of Law (2nd edn, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 1994), especially chapters 2-4.  
13  See J Waldron, The Law (London, 1990) at 64. 
14 Cf. Raz, who suggests that law is an instrument for giving effect to reasons which individuals have 
independently of law.   See, generally, Joseph Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of 
Law and Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994).   151 
‘justice’) could not.
15    Finnis, by contrast, has argued that law and legal institutions are 
the only means of securing certain  core  human goods  in order that people can lead 
flourishing lives.
16  This argument rests on a developed theory of what  is distinctive 
about law – or, to use Finnis’ own language – what counts as a ‘central case’ of law (as 
opposed to some other social practice).
17
If all theorists can agree that constitutional actors have certain legal duties which are 
somehow distinct from their political or constitutional duties, there are two divergent 
responses to the question of how to distinguish between these different types of duties.  It 
is  this question  that will occupy us for much of this chapter.  One response  to  this 
question is to admit that there is no scientific way of drawing a sharp distinction between 
legal and constitutional or political rights, duties, and powers.    The most that we can do, 
it might be argued,  is to offer some abstract account of the value or values that 
distinctively justify legal practice, which value or values will then inform in a very 
general way the question of whether particular concrete decisions or actions are lawful or 
not.  A second and quite different response to the question is to insist that there must be 
some kind of ‘litmus test’ for identifying when a given right, duty or power is legal, and 
when it is merely constitutional or political.   This response is reflected in the legal 
positivist view that law is (or should be) readily distinguishable from morality.
    
18    
Indeed, it is no doubt in this positivist spirit that a number of constitutional theorists have 
historically equated constitutional conventions with constitutional morality  (the 
implication  being  that  constitutional law is conceptually  distinct  from constitutional 
morality).
19
In the remainder of this paper, I shall argue that the second (positivist) response to the 
question posed above is unsustainable.   To summarise, it will be contended, first, that the 
positivist (litmus test) response cannot withstand that fact that we disagree as a matter of 
     
                                                 
15 See R Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1986) ch 3.   
16 J Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1980) ch I. 
17 Ibid. 
18 For the classical statement of this position, see H.L.A. Hart, ‘Positivism and the Separation of Law and 
Morals’ (1958) 71 Harv. L. Rev. 593-629. 
19 Dicey described conventions as ‘the positive morality of the constitution’ (Dicey op. cit.); similarly, 
Austin described conventions as ‘a whole system of political morality, a whole code of precepts for the 
guidance of public men.’ See J Austin, Wilfred E Rumble (ed.) The Province of Jurisprudence Determined 
(1832) (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1995) 259.     152 
political principle about the particular rights, duties and powers of officials in different 
fact situations.    Crucially for the purposes of this chapter, such disagreements belie the 
existence of any conventions whose existence, by definition, depends upon some widely 
agreed standard of conduct.  Secondly, in so far as any proposed litmus test rests on some 
empirical fact about what particular people think or say, such a test cannot explain how 
the fact that people do behave in a particular way implies that they are under a duty to act 
in that way: in other words, an is cannot become an ought.
20
There are further difficulties, I will say, with any attempt to draw a bright line between 
law and convention, or between legal duties and constitutional or political duties.  First, 
whatever we have to say about the rights, duties and powers of constitutional actors 
reflects some proposition of law.  If the Monarch has a duty to dissolve Parliament when 
so advised, then it is the law that the Monarch has such a duty.
  Given the non-availability 
of a litmus test, the most that can be done in the way of distinguishing between legal 
practice and other social practices, I will say, is to offer some abstract account of the 
value of law in line with the first response described above.   But the question of whether, 
in a particular situation, an official has some particular legal right or duty must depend on 
a complex moral judgment, sensitive to the facts of that situation.  While this judgment 
takes place against the background of an abstract account of the value of legal practice, 
that abstract account cannot provide the categorical tests that legal positivists seek. 
21
                                                 
20 The illicit inference from an ‘is’ to an ‘ought’ is associated with the work of David Hume.  For a detailed 
discussion, see 
   And if it is the case 
that the Prime Minister has the power to dismiss a minister, or to force a Minister to 
resign for intentionally misleading Parliament, then it is the law that the Prime Minister 
possesses  such a power; and it  is the law that the Minister has no right not to be 
dismissed.    In other words, the law is not silent (to speak metaphorically) on any feature 
of constitutional practice (or any other social practice).   Here is a second difficulty: the 
same action or decision by a constitutional actor may engage legal rights, duties, or 
powers and other types of rights, duties and powers.   A minister may have the legal 
power to fund an overseas project and the minister may be under a constitutional duty to 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hume-moral/.  I will return to the significance of the 
is/ought distinction for the notion of constitutional conventions in part 3 9 (below).    
21 To take a non-constitutional example, we could say in relation to the duty to keep promises that it is the 
law that a person may break their promise to meet their partner at the coffee shop.   There may be some 
other type of moral duty to keep promises.     153 
justify this decision in Parliament.
22   For  this  additional  reason, any attempt to 
compartmentalize different areas  of constitutional practice into the legal and 
conventional I will argue is bound to fail.
23
   
 
2. Two Attempts to Distinguish Legal Duties from Political Duties 
 
I have set out above the general conclusions that I want to draw on the question of how to 
distinguish between constitutional laws and constitutional conventions.  I now want to 
show how I have reached those conclusions.   I will do so by examining two prominent 
ways in which different theorists have sought to distinguish between law and convention, 
or between legal duties and constitutional or political duties.   The first method is the 
classical test espoused by Dicey, which derives from the jurisprudence of the 19
th century 
jurist John Austin.
24   This test can be expressed quite simply: constitutional laws are 
enforced by  courts; constitutional conventions are not.   The second method, which 
derives from the legal theory of Herbert Hart,
25
 
  is a (necessarily) more sophisticated 
attempt to define different types of duties independently of their enforcement (or 
enforceability).  According to this account, non-legal duties arise out of ‘social rules’ 
which, in turn, emerge out of the attitude of acceptance by a particular group towards a 
particular standard of conduct or behaviour.   Legal rights, duties and powers are legally 
valid in virtue of the fact that they can be traced back to an ultimate rule of recognition.    
A. Enforcement/Enforceability 
 
The classical test for distinguishing between constitutional law and constitutional 
conventions is that offered by Dicey: 
                                                 
22 See R v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Ex p. World Development Movement 
Ltd [1995] 1 W.L.R. 386.   For an interesting discussion of the way in which legal and political duties 
coincided in relation to a decision to fund the Pergau Dam, see J Jaconelli, ‘Do Constitutional Conventions 
Bind?’ (2005) 64 CLJ149-176, fnt 25. 
23 A similar point could be made about the supposed distinction between law and morality.   There are laws 
against murder, but most people would say that we have an independent moral duty not kill: our legal and 
moral duties coincide.    
24 See Dicey, op. cit. 23-24; J Austin, above (n 19). 
25 Above (n 12).    154 
 
The one set of rules are in the strictest sense ‘laws,’ since they are rules  which… are enforced by the 
courts… The other set of rules consist of conventions, understandings, habits, or practices which, though 
they may regulate the conduct of the several members of the sovereign power… are not in reality laws at all 
since they are  not enforced by the courts.  This portion of constitutional law may… be termed the 
‘conventions of the constitution,’ or ‘constitutional morality’
26
 
 
At first blush, this test seems promising.   We do tend to think of courts (or tribunals, or 
other judicial bodies or bodies exercising quasi-judicial functions) as having a special 
responsibility to enforce laws.  They do so by imposing some sanction, or providing some 
remedy for a breach of a given law.   It might therefore seem entirely reasonable to 
conclude that laws are only those measures which courts do enforce, or in respect of 
which courts do impose some sanction, or grant some remedy.   The enforcement test 
would also provide a neat answer to the oft-debated questions of whether constitutional 
conventions can transmute or crystallise into law, and (what amounts to the same 
question) whether constitutional conventions can become legally binding.
27
Notwithstanding its superficial appeal, Dicey’s test, it is suggested, mistakenly 
conflates two separate questions: first, what makes it the case that a particular proposition 
of law is true or valid (the question of legality); and, secondly, which institution or 
institutions (if any) should enforce (or adjudicate upon) true or valid propositions of law 
(the question of enforcement)?   Here is the problem: a judge does not decide to enforce 
something in a vacuum. Before a judge can decide whether or not to enforce a given 
measure the judge must already have employed some theory about what makes it the case 
that there is a legal right, duty or power to enforce.   Within the context of the British 
constitution, the judge must already  have decided,  for instance,  why the decisions of 
Parliament and courts (in the form of statutes and common law precedents) are relevant 
to the question of what the law is; and the judge must already have decided how those 
    Quite 
simply, a convention can crystallise into law, we would say, when courts decide to 
enforce the convention.    
                                                 
26 Above (n 24).   For a recent adoption of Dicey’s definition, see Sir William Wade, First Report of 
Foreign Affairs Committee (Kershaw Report) vol 11 HC 42-11 of 1980-81 memorandum at 24.   
27 For an extremely interesting discussion of this possibility, see M Elliott, ‘Parliamentary sovereignty and 
the new constitutional order: legislative freedom, political reality and convention’ (2002) 22 Legal Studies 
340-376.   155 
decisions are relevant (whether, for instance, rights, duties and powers of individuals and 
officials are those that reflect the intentions of Parliament, or those which have been 
established by a clear rule in some past judicial decision).   We seen then that the first of 
the questions posed above (the  question of legality) must be settled prior  to, and 
independently of, the second question (the question of enforcement). 
The landmark decision of the House of Lords in GCHQ
28  will serve well to bring out 
this point.  As is very well known, their Lordships ruled, inter alia, that the question of 
whether power is susceptible to judicial review depended on the nature of the power, and 
not the source of that power.
29   In the light of this general principle, their Lordships ruled 
that  the exercise of prerogative powers would, in principle, be subject to judicial 
review.
30    Prior to the  GCHQ  decision, it was widely thought that the various 
prerogative powers, including the power of the Minister for the Civil Service (in practice 
the Prime Minister) to control the civil service, were not subject to review by courts.
31  At 
most, the courts would merely declare the existence of such powers without ruling on the 
manner in which the powers were exercised.
32   Let us assume for present purposes, in 
line with Dicey,  that  in the pre-GCHQ  period it was constitutional conventions  that 
‘determine[d] the mode and spirit in which the prerogative is to be exercised’.
33
Applying Dicey’s enforcement test, we might say that the GCHQ decision represented 
the enforcement of those conventions, thereby converting those conventions to law.    But 
this analysis, it is suggested, distorts the basis on which the House reached its decision.   
To begin with, we need to ask why the House of Lords decided that a minister could be 
under a duty to exercise prerogative powers in particular ways.  Dicey’s enforcement test 
has nothing to say on this question.   We are simply left to assume that judges decided in 
the abstract to enforce a particular measure (which measure was necessarily non-legal 
because not-as-yet-enforced).   But if we look closely at the reasoning in GCHQ, we see 
    The 
following question then arises: what effect did the decision in GCHQ have on those pre-
existing conventions?     
                                                 
28 Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service [1985] A.C. 374 (hereafter ‘GCHQ’). 
29 Ibid 417 per Lord Roskill.  
30 Ibid. 
31 This position reflected the historical view that the Monarch could do no wrong.    
32 Attorney-general v De Keyser's Royal Hotel Ltd. [1920] A.C. 508, 526 per Lord Dunedin. 
33 Dicey op.cit. at 426.     156 
that Dicey’s test gets things the wrong way round.   Central to the decision in GCHQ was 
the fact that there was no reason why a minister acting under prerogative powers should 
not be subject to the  same  principles of judicial review,  embedded  in past judicial 
decisions, which already  circumscribed  the exercise of statutory powers.
34
Can we iron out these difficulties with Dicey’s enforcement test by modifying that 
test?   One popular means of doing so has been to substitute for the ‘enforcement’ test, an 
‘enforceability’ test.
   In other 
words, the focus of their Lordships’ reasoning was on extending the reach of existing 
legal principles to a different types of executive power (in line with the theory of legality 
as integrity described in earlier chapters); there was no question of judges creating new 
legal rights and duties by the enforcement of certain constitutional conventions.  In short, 
while it may well be argued that judges enforce only legal rights and duties, it cannot be 
said that a norm is a legal right or duty because judges have enforced it.     
35   This modification amounts to the concession that a law can be a 
law even if no judge has enforced it in the past (or indeed if no judge ever enforces it in 
future).  But, in so far as the hallmark of a given measure’s ‘lawness’ is now said to be its 
enforceability, this modified test once again gets things the wrong way round.  We cannot 
say that something is legal because  it is enforceable, since the very notion of 
enforceability again implies some theory about what makes it the case that there is an 
enforceable legal right or duty.  At most we can say that something is enforceable 
because it is legal (according to some theory of legality).  But even this latter proposition 
represents a controversial position on the question of enforcement posed above.   We 
might plausibly argue that law has little or nothing to do with enforcement (or sanctions) 
in so far as the primary or purpose of law is to solve problems of coordination, or to 
guide people’s conduct.
36
I have noted elsewhere the curious time lag between debates in abstract legal theory, 
and debates in British constitutional theory.
 
37
                                                 
34 GCHQ, 407 per Lord Scarman. 
  While legal theorists have long since 
abandoned the Austinian jurisprudence on which Dicey relies, many British 
35 See, for example, J Goldsworthy, The Sovereignty of Parliament: History and Philosophy (Clarendon 
Press, Oxford 1999) at 11-12. 
36 This is a point that Hart makes persuasively against Austin.  See above (n 12).  See, more recently, J Raz, 
The Morality of Freedom (Oxford University Press, 1986), 154-62. 
37 See chapter 1(above).   157 
constitutional theorists still cling to this jurisprudence.
38     The continuing place of 
Dicey’s enforcement test in the modern law/convention debate is a testament to this 
tendency.
39    As the enforcement test has stretched to breaking point, rather than 
confront the test head on, contemporary constitutional theorists have instead adopted two 
different strategies in an attempt to rescue it.   The first strategy has emerged in response 
to the occasional judicial references, say, to the doctrine of ministerial responsibility or 
Cabinet responsibility
40 (doctrines which, according to traditional constitutional theory, 
are governed by constitutional convention).   Rather than automatically treat such judicial 
references as the enforcement of the doctrine of ministerial responsibility (which would 
bring about the supposedly undesirable consequence of converting this doctrine into a 
legal  doctrine), judges and theorists have instead distinguished between a measure’s 
enforcement and its mere ‘recognition’ (where only the former counts as a stamp of legal 
validity).
41    The decisive factor to bring a measure into the law bracket is invariably 
thought to be the presence or absence of a sanction for the breach of the measure.
42   But, 
for reasons that I hope are now apparent, the enforcement/recognition distinction cannot 
determine whether a given measure is legal or non-legal.   Assuming that judges enforce 
only legal rights, duties and powers, the question of whether a judicial decision counts as 
enforcement or recognition (in so far as such a distinction is intelligible) will  again 
depend entirely on some prior theory of the grounds on which a proposition of law is true 
or valid.
43
The second strategy has been to concede that the enforcement test may be uncertain 
and over-inclusive in so far as it has the potential to bring areas of British constitutional 
practice, traditionally thought to be governed by constitutional convention, within the 
category of constitutional law, but that the test is otherwise workable.  For instance, it 
     
                                                 
38 This is a point that Trevor Allan has made persistently in his writing.  See, for example, Allan, above (n 
5) 239.  Cf. D Dyzenhaus, who suggests that Dicey has certain anti-positivist tendencies.  The Constitution 
of Law, Legality in a Time of Emergency, (Cambridge University Press, 2006) at 71.   
39 See chapter 1 (above).    
40 Att.-Gen. v. Jonathan Cape Ltd. [1975] Q.B. 752, 767F per Lord Widgery CJ (hereafter ‘Crossman 
Diaries’). 
41 One can detect this type of distinction in Reference re Amendment of the Constitution of Canada (Nos 1, 
2 and 3) (1982) 125 DLR (3d) 1.  
42 Ibid. 
43 For an argument to similar effect in relation to the Crossman Diaries decision, see T. R. S. Allan above (n 
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might be argued that the doctrine of ministerial responsibility is enforced in the sense that 
the Prime Minister has a duty (analogous to that of a judge) to dismiss a minister or to 
require a minister’s resignation.
44
In my view, these two argumentative strategies each miss the deeper difficulty with 
the enforcement/enforceability test that I have attempted to identify above.   This 
difficulty bears repeating.   Before we can say anything about the enforcement  or 
enforceability of a legal right, duty or power (including the question of whether 
something is ‘recognised’ rather than ‘enforced’), we must first have addressed a prior 
question about why courts enforce some measures and not others.
    But if the enforcement test is uncertain and over-
inclusive, then this would seem to provide a strong reason to abandon that test – and, in 
the absence of some alternative test – to abandon the law/convention distinction that the 
test is supposed to prove: better to fit the shoe to the foot than the foot to the shoe. 
45
Toward the beginning of this paper, I identified an important additional reason as to 
why we should reject the enforcement/enforceability tests (along with any other tests) as 
a way of distinguishing  categorically  between  constitutional  law  and  constitutional 
convention, or between  legal rights, duties and powers and constitutional or political 
rights, duties and powers.  The reason is this: it is wrong to suppose that there are some 
parts of British constitutional practice in respect of which the law is silent (to speak 
metaphorically).    To put this differently, there is a sense in which every aspect of British 
constitutional practice is governed by law.   If the Prime Minister has the power to 
dismiss a minister, then it is the law that the Prime Minister possesses that power.   And 
  Judicial enforcement 
is not a latter day biblical parable in which judges touch some standard or norm and 
miraculously convert it into law.  If there is some way of distinguishing categorically 
between law and convention, or between legal rights duties and powers and constitutional 
or political rights, duties and powers, then the argument for that distinction has to appear 
in the form of a developed theory of legality at an analytically prior stage to questions of 
enforcement.     
                                                 
44 See Barber above (n 6) at 306-7.  It is questionable whether the Prime Minister has a duty to dismiss a 
minister in any circumstances.   It would be more accurate, it is suggested, to say that the Prime Minister 
has a power dismiss.   In this case, the analogy breaks down: we think of judges as having a duty and not a 
power to make decisions.    
45 This is arguably so even For Raz who argues that there are norms (legal norms) which authorize the 
courts to act.  See J Raz, The Authority of Law, Essays on Law and Morality (Clarendon Press, Oxford 
1979) 97-8; J Goldsworthy above (n 35) at 11.   159 
if the Prime Minister has a political or constitutional duty to consult Parliament before 
deploying the armed forces, it is the law that the Prime Minister possesses this type of 
duty.    Indeed, there is a sense in which every single aspect of daily life can be captured 
by some proposition of law.  For instance, it is the law that I have the power to brush my 
teeth in the morning, and it is the law that I have the power to jog in a public park.     
It will useful to return to the GCHQ case once again  in order to demonstrate the 
relevance of this last point.  It is sometimes argued that the House of Lords did not make 
any legal ruling on the prerogative power of the Minister for the Civil Service to prohibit 
civil servants at GCHQ from joining their Trade Union.  Instead, the argument runs, the 
House ruled that this power was non-justiciable or, to use the language of Dicey’s test, 
non-enforced (or non-enforceable).   As such,  we might say that the GCHQ decision 
established that the prerogative power of the Prime Minister to control the civil service is 
governed only by convention and not by law.   But, in line with what I have said above, 
there is a clear sense in which the decision in GCHQ can be expressed in the following 
proposition of law: namely, that it is the law that the Minister for the Civil Service had 
the power to remove the right of workers at GCHQ to belong to a trade union without 
first consulting those workers.  Once it is accepted that all  aspects of constitutional 
practice can be so expressed, it makes little sense to attempt to compartmentalize legal 
from non-legal parts of the constitution: for every part of the constitution is governed by 
law in the sense that I have described.
46
 
 
B. Legal and Constitutional Duties as Hartian ‘Social Rules’  
 
How might we distinguish between legal and constitutional duties before entering into 
questions of enforcement or enforceability?   In his monumental work The Concept of 
Law, Herbert Hart offers a celebrated answer to this type of question.   The existence of 
                                                 
46 It is important to distinguish this position needs from the position of legal pluralists.  It is not my claim 
that the ‘laws’ of, say, monopoly or football are no different to laws which emanate from a legislature.    
Law or legality, I have argued in previous chapter, is distinctively associated with the coercive force of past 
decisions by Parliament and courts (see, especially, chapter 2 (below)).   Law (properly understood) 
governs monopoly or football only in the sense that the state will ordinarily have no legal power to interfere 
with an individual’s enjoyment of these games (although the state may well have such a power if, for 
instance, the monopoly players substituted cannabis for monopoly money, or if footballers committed 
criminal assault).   160 
an obligation or duty depends, he says, not on the prediction that some (judicial) sanction 
might follow for breach of the relevant standard, but on some normative standard which 
exists independently of, and prior to, any sanction or other institutional intervention.
47   
Importantly, for the purposes of this chapter, Hart seeks, first, to explain the general basis 
of duties and obligations and, secondly, to explain how legal duties differ from other 
types of duties.    It is little surprise then that several British constitutional theorists have 
summoned the work of Herbert Hart in defence of the idea of a distinction between 
constitution law and constitutional convention.
48
In order to assess this theory as a candidate for explaining the traditional 
law/convention dichotomy, we first need  to look again  at the mechanics of Hart’s 
theory.
     
49
 
 Hart explains the existence of a duty or obligation by his ‘social rules’ theory 
(which is often referred to as his ‘practice theory’ of rules).   A duty or obligation exists, 
Hart tells us, when there is a social rule supporting such a duty.    And a social rule exists 
when people take the ‘internal point of view’ towards a particular pattern or standard of 
behaviour:   
‘What is necessary is that there should be a critical reflective attitude to certain patterns of behaviour as a 
common standard, and that this should display itself in criticism (including self-criticism, demands for 
conformity, and in acknowledgements that such criticism and demands are justified, all of which find the 
characteristic expression in the normative terminology of ‘ought’, ‘must’ and ‘should’, ‘right’ and 
‘wrong’.’
50
 
   
Against the background of this general theory of social-rules, 
 Hart introduces the key to 
distinguishing non-legal duties from legal duties.   He does so by use of a thought-
experiment.   In a primitive, ‘pre-legal’ community, the only means of social control 
would be the general attitude of acceptance by the group as a whole towards its own 
standards of behaviour – what we might call ‘customary’ law.   But such a system would 
suffer from a number of defects.  Chief amongst these defects would be the problem of 
                                                 
47 Above (n 12), chapters 2-4.  
48 See J Jaconelli, ‘the Nature of Constitutional Convention’ (1999) 19 LS 24, 28-29. Colin Munro, ‘Laws 
and Conventions Distinguished’, (1975) 91 Law Quarterly Review 218 
49 I discussed Hart’s rule of recognition in some detail in ch. 1 (above). 
50 Above (n 12) at 57.   161 
uncertainty, in that there would be no way to distinguish between valid legal rules and 
other types of rules, and there would be no way of identifying the precise legal powers, 
rights and duties of individuals and officials.   The remedy for this defect, Hart suggests, 
is a ‘Rule of Recognition’ which provides the criteria of legal validity in a community.   
Crucially, the rule of recognition is itself a social rule in that it depends for its existence 
and content on the acceptance by the officials of the system of particular standards of 
behaviour.   Thus we see that Hart ultimately grounds all duties and obligations – both 
moral and legal – in his theory of social rules.
51
How does Hart’s theory bear on the distinction between constitutional laws and 
constitutional conventions, or between legal duties and constitutional or political duties?   
If we take the duty of a Minister, say, to take into account relevant considerations when 
determining an asylum application, we might say that that this is a legal duty,  first, 
because most officials accept as a ‘standard of official public behaviour’ the judgments of 
courts; secondly, because a court has declared that such a duty exists; and finally, because 
no superior court or legislature has ruled that there is no such duty.   What about the duty 
of a minister to render an account to Parliament or to follow the Ministerial Code?       
Supposing that such duties cannot be traced back to the rule of recognition in the same 
way, we might say that these duties are constitutional or political duties.   They exist, not 
because they derive from a common public set of standards of behaviour accepted by 
officials, but because most constitutional actors (say, ministers, Parliamentarians and 
perhaps citizens)
 
52 practise these rules: that is, they accept the underlying standards that 
constitute the rule, criticize ministers for falling short of those standards, and demand 
compliance with those standards.
53
                                                 
51 Hart is careful to emphasise though that not all conventional practices generate duty imposing rules.  In 
addition to the requisite attitudes of acceptance, a convention must have three further characteristics.  In the 
first place, there must be serious social pressure to comply with the underlying standard; and the failure to 
comply with that standard must meet with serious criticism.   Secondly, the standard must relate to some 
prized feature of social life.   Finally, it must be possible that the standard may conflict with what a person 
who owes the duty may wish to do.   In this way, a duty imposing rule can be distinguished, say, from the 
rules of a game or some relatively unimportant aspect of social life.
 See Hart above (n 12) at 86. 
      
52 There is constant problem of identifying which actors must accept a given practice.  See N MacCormick, 
H L A  Hart (Stanford University Press, 1981). 
53 The precise nature of the different non-legal duties will therefore depend on the domain in which they are 
accepted.       162 
  It is worth emphasising the important difference within Hart’s scheme between legal 
duties and other types of duties.   The very point of the rule of recognition (viz. to cure 
the defect of uncertainty in a primitive legal community) is such that the existence of 
legal duties cannot depend on the fact that these duties are generally practised; their 
existence depends rather on the fact (which may be empirically determined) that these 
duties arise out of rules which can be traced back to the rule of recognition.
54
Hart’s theory is beautiful in its simplicity, and it would seem to provide a firm basis 
for a distinction between legal duties and constitutional or political duties (and a 
corresponding distinction between law and convention).
 
   To 
illustrate this point, if certain government ministers were to refuse to obey the judgments 
of courts, their refusal would not affect the legal validity of those judgments.  Such 
judgments are valid, on Hart’s account, because they can be traced back to the rule of 
recognition, and not because they are practised or generally accepted.   If, on the other 
hand, most ministers were to refuse  to render an account of the actions of their 
department of state to Parliament, this may well negate or modify any constitutional or 
political duty that may previously have existed on Hart’s account; for where non-legal 
duties are concerned, the existence of those duties is wholly determined by the attitudes 
of acceptance by particular groups of people.    
55
Does Hart’s theory support the view that conventions can transmute or crystallise into 
laws?    Arguably so.  If we define a constitutional convention as a (constitutional) norm 
or standard which is accepted by most constitutional actors, then a constitutional 
convention could transmute into a legal standard if most officials were to accept that ‘the 
standards which most constitutional actors accept’ constitutes a criterion of legal validity.    
This would present an obvious problem for Hart though.   If one of the criteria of legal 
     Crucially, the factor which 
drives Dicey’s theory on the distinction between law and convention is relegated to the 
margins of Hart’s theory, namely, whether judges enforce a given measure, or whether a 
given measure is enforceable.   For Hart, the primary question is one of how to account 
for, and how to distinguish between,  different types of duties; the question of 
enforceability is a separate, and secondary, question about adjudication.     
                                                 
54 See generally chapter 1 (above).  
55  Indeed, several eminent constitutional theorists (including Jacob Jaconelli and Nick Barber) have 
explicitly sought to explain the nature of constitutional conventions by reference to Hart’s legal theory.     163 
validity requires an examination of what most constitutional actors believe or practise, 
then the very point of the rule of recognition would be lost, namely to provide legal 
certainty.   This would be to turn Hart’s thought experiment (described above) on its 
head: the developed legal system would revert back to the primitive pre-legal system of 
social rules and nothing else.
  56    In the light of this difficulty, perhaps the perhaps the 
only way in which the doctrine of ministerial responsibility (for example) could become a 
legal doctrine would be for Parliament to enact a statute to that effect, or for courts to 
create a common law rule to that effect.
57
 
 
3. The Moral Foundations of Legal and Constitutional Duties 
 
While few would play down Hart’s influence on legal theory (and beyond), he has not, of 
course, been without his critics.   Within the Anglo-American tradition of legal theory, 
these criticisms have mainly come from two different directions, first, the anti-positivism 
or ‘interpretivism’ of Ronald Dworkin,
58  and secondly the ‘hard’ or ‘exclusive’ 
positivism of Joseph Raz.
59    It is Dworkin’s critique – and the account of rights and 
duties that he proposes – on which I want to focus.    It is not my intention to enter into 
the rich and voluminous debate about the force of Dworkin’s critique of Hart’s social 
rules theory.
60
The question that motivates Dworkin’s critique of Hart is this: when we say that a 
individual or official is under a duty to act in a particular way, or has some power to act, 
is it always the case that we appeal either to one or more rules of recognition (in order to 
identify his legal duties and powers), and to some other social rule in order to identify his 
  Rather, I will assume for the purposes of this chapter that his critique is 
effective, and concentrate on  how this critique impacts on the two corresponding 
distinctions with which we have been concerned in this chapter: namely, the distinction 
between law and convention, and the distinction between legal duties, and constitutional 
or political duties.     
                                                 
56 I have here adapted an argument by Ronald Dworkin in a slightly different context.  See R Dworkin, 
Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press, 1977), Model of rules I and II (hereafter ‘MoR’). 
57 Sir Richard Scott VC, ‘Ministerial Accountability’ [1996] PL 410, 426. 
58 It is Dworkin’s earliest critique in MoR I and II on which I will focus.    
59 Above (nts 14 and 45).    
60 For a particularly insightful set of essays on the Hart/Dworkin debate, see Coleman (ed.) Hart’s 
Postscript (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001).      164 
non-legal  duties and powers?     I argued in chapter 1 that the notion of a rule of 
recognition cannot explain the powers of Parliament and courts, or the grounds on which 
a proposition of law is true or valid.    It will be useful at this point to summarise the 
reasons offered by Dworkin for rejecting the social rules theory as a more general 
account of duty or obligation: 
 
(a) First, people commonly appeal to duties that have no grounding in any social rule i.e. 
duties which it could not be said are generally accepted in the way that the social rules 
theory requires.   For instance, a vegetarian plausibly appeals to a duty not to kill or 
animals notwithstanding that very few people hold such a view.
61
 
     
(b) Secondly, when a group of people do seem to agree about the existence of a right or 
duty, they will often not count the fact of that agreement as being relevant to its 
existence.    Everybody may think that there is a duty not to lie, or a duty to keep 
promises, but they hold this view, not because other people hold that view, but because 
they think that there are independent moral principles which justify the existence of such 
a duty.
62
 
  In this case, it is the background principles that are doing all the work. 
(c) Thirdly, even when people do count the fact that others hold the same view about 
rights and duties as being partly relevant to the existence of those rights and duties, they 
disagree, as a matter of principle, about the precise content of those rights and duties.   
All judges may agree that Acts of Parliament are relevant to the question of what rights 
and duties exist, but judges characteristically disagree about why an Act of Parliament is 
relevant, and they disagree about how an Act of Parliament is relevant (i.e. how best to 
interpret any given Act).
63
                                                 
61 MoR II at 52.  
   Similarly, we may all agree that a minister has a general duty 
62 Dworkin helpfully expresses these differences in reasoning in terms of ‘concurrent’ and ‘conventional’ 
morality.  As he says, ‘A community displays a concurrent morality when its members are agreed in 
asserting the same, or much the same, normative rule, but they do not count the fact of that agreement as an 
essential part of their grounds for asserting that rule.  It displays a conventional morality when they do’.  
Ibid at 53.  Hart concedes this point in the Postscript to the Concept of Law above (n 12) 256. 
63 See chapter 1 (above).   165 
to account to Parliament for the failings of her department; but we will often disagree 
about the precise nature and scope of that duty.
64
 
    
(d) Fourthly, it is not possible to separate  in some scientific way all those principles 
which justify legal  duties and power  (which principles belong within  the rule of 
recognition), from all those principles which justify non-legal  principles  (which 
principles belong outside of the rule of recognition).
65
 
           
(d) Fifthly, it may sometimes be the case that a group of people will accept a particular 
standard of conduct which is pointless or absurd.   In these circumstances, an individual 
will not say that there is a duty but it would be better if there were not; on the contrary, 
that individual will deny there to be any such duty.
66
 
   
The  central thrust of Dworkin’s critique  then  is that the existence and content of 
individual rights, duties and powers within some complex social practice cannot depend 
on an empirical description of the standards of conduct that are accepted  by any 
particular group.
67   Even if it were possible to identify some such commonly accepted 
standard, the  mere  fact that a group does  believe that it should follow a particular 
standard  does not entail that the group should  follow that standard: an  is  does not 
necessarily imply  an  ought.
68  Rather, Dworkin suggests,  the existence of particular 
rights, duties and powers must depend on a complex evaluative or ‘interpretive’ judgment 
about how best to justify the facts of a practice.
69
                                                 
64 One such memorable disagreement concerned Mr Derek Lewis.  There had been a series of escapes from 
prisons around the UK.  Mr Lewis was the head of the Prisons Agency, a so-called ‘Next Steps Agency’ set 
up by the Government to run the Prison Service. Michael Howard, the then Home Secretary, decided to 
dismiss Mr Lewis.   In an action for unfair dismissal, Mr Lewis contended that Mr Howard had constantly 
interfered with the operational running of the prison service.  A debate ensued about whether ministerial 
‘responsibility’ was different to ministerial ‘accountability’, and whether a minister had a duty to resign 
over ‘operational’ and/or ‘policy’ failures.   For a helpful discussion, see D Woodhouse, ‘Ministerial 
responsibility; something old, something new’ (1997) PL 262-282.   
    
65 MoR I passim. 
66 MoR II at 58. 
67 It may be that there are certain forms of social life which are governed by convention, for instance, the 
rules of a game or the rules of etiquette at a dinner party.   
68 See above (n 20).   
69 Dworkin uses the device of ‘constructive interpretation’ to explain the structure of the justificatory task.  
See LE, ch 2. Several British constitution theorists have displayed the intuition that a conventional practice   166 
It will now be useful to see these arguments at work.   I want to begin by focussing on the 
claim – central to traditional theories of the British constitution – that there are certain 
types of powers, or certain areas  of governance, in respect of which government 
ministers have only political or constitutional duties, and which raise no questions of law 
on which a court can adjudicate.  This type of claim is typically made in relation to 
particular prerogative powers.
70
 
   As Lord Roskill put it in the GCHQ case: 
‘Prerogative powers such as those relating to the making of treaties, the defence of the realm, the 
prerogative of mercy, the grant of honours, the dissolution of Parliament and the appointment of ministers 
as well as others are not, I think susceptible to judicial review because their nature and subject matter are 
such as not to be amenable to the judicial process. The courts are not the place wherein to determine 
whether a treaty should be concluded or the armed forces disposed in a particular manner or Parliament 
dissolved on one date rather than another.’
71
 
 
Before discussing this dictum, it will be helpful to quote Lord Scarman in the same case: 
 
‘[T]he law relating to judicial review has now reached the stage where it can be said with confidence that, 
if the subject matter in respect of which prerogative power is exercised is justiciable, that is to say if it is a 
matter upon which the court can adjudicate, the exercise of the power is subject to review in accordance 
with the principles developed in respect of the review of the exercise of statutory power.’
72
 
 
Each of their Lordships, it should be noted, begins with the question of justiciability: 
namely, is the subject matter or area in which a decision is taken suitable for adjudication 
by a court.   The approach taken by judges to this question is broadly as follows:  if the 
subject matter is one of ‘high policy’ then it will be non-justiciable; if the subject matter 
is one of ‘individual rights’, then it will be justiciable.
73
                                                                                                                                                 
must have some reason or justification behind it.  See, for example, Sir Ivor Jennings, The Law and the 
Constitution (5
th edn) 1959) 136; J D B Mitchell, Constitutional Law, 2
nd edn (Edinburgh, 1968) 68. 
   To convert this test into the 
language used throughout this chapter, matters of high policy give rise only to political or 
constitutional duties, whereas matters of individual rights give rise to legal duties. 
70 The claim I have described extends to areas of constitutional practice not normally associated with the 
royal prerogative, for instance, the doctrine of ministerial accountability.  See part 3 (below).  The exercise 
of prerogative powers, it has historically been argued, could only be policed by Parliament. See Blackstone 
W., Commentaries on the Laws of England, 15 edn, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977) vol. 1, 
252.    
71 GCHQ  417. 
72 Ibid 407. 
73 I have here adapted a dictum of Taylor LJ in R v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth 
Affairs Ex p. Everett [1989] Q.B. 811.    167 
It will be apparent that the approach just described is very much along the lines of the 
classical ‘enforcement’ test developed by Dicey for distinguishing law (or legal duties) 
from convention (or political or constitutional duties).
74   Lord Scarman tells us that the 
principles developed in respect of the review of the exercise of statutory power apply 
because a particular power is justiciable (or enforceable).     This is to say that legal 
rights, duties and powers exist because judges can (or do) enforce them.   Enough has 
been said in the first part of this chapter, I hope, to show that this test reverses the correct 
order of things.     It cannot be the case that a legal duty exists because a given power or 
duty is justiciable or enforceable by courts.  Judges do not decide to enforce something in 
the abstract; they enforce a legal right or duty because they believe that such a right or 
duty exists according to some prior background theory of the principle of legality.
75
  At the start of this section, I set out the objections made by Dworkin to Hart’s general 
‘social rules’ theory of duties and obligations.   Of course, it is on the back of these 
objections that Dworkin has advocated the conception of legality as integrity with which 
we have been concerned for much of this thesis.    This conception of legality, it will be 
recalled, entails that judges are under a duty to give effect to the principles of justice, 
fairness and procedural due process which best justify the past decisions of courts and 
Parliament.   It will now be seen that this conception of legality (which embodies each of 
Dworkin’s criticisms of Hart) has two significant and connected implications for the 
present discussion on the availability of judicial review of prerogative powers.   
    We 
must therefore turn our attention back to the question of how best to understand the 
principle of legality. 
 
First, there is no area or subject  matter which can be pre-emptively  ruled out as not 
engaging legal principles or legal rights and duties, and which can therefore be pre-
emptively excluded from the reach of judicial review.   To adapt  Dworkin’s helpful 
                                                 
74 See part 2A (above). 
75 The concept of justiciability, like the concept of deference discussed in chapter 4, is a conclusion to the 
question of how best to justify the role of courts in the British constitution.   In this sense, there is no scope 
for an independent theory of justiciability.  See T R S Allan, Constitutional Justice: A Liberal Theory of the 
Rule of Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2003) 10 and, generally, ch 6.   168 
metaphor, it will always be open for some (traditionally non-justiciable) matter of policy 
to enter the (judicial) ‘forum of legal principle’.
76
 
   
Secondly, given that it is not possible to anticipate which legal principles will be engaged 
in some novel fact situation, it is not possible to identify concrete rules ex ante – as the 
Hartian account discussed above envisages – about the precise circumstances in which an 
official will be under a legal duty as opposed to a political or constitutional duty, or both.   
As I have said, the nature of an official’s duty will always depend on a complex moral (or 
interpretive) judgment about how best to understand the relevant legal principles.  In this 
sense, it is unhelpful to talk in terms of the prerogative power of X,  Y, or Z, or the 
doctrine of ministerial responsibility, which mistakenly implies that there are discrete and 
ascertainable powers and duties that can be defined in advance of their exercise. 
 
These two points can be illustrated clearly, I think, from the decisions and dicta in cases 
decided since GCHQ (on the question of when the courts have been willing to review the 
exercise of prerogative powers  in particular areas of governance).    In  Bentley,
77
 
  for 
instance, the question was whether the minister had a legal duty to grant a posthumous 
pardon to Bentley (or a legal power to refuse to grant such a pardon).    If the court had 
adopted Lord Scarman’s approach (above), it would first have had to establish that the 
general area or subject matter of the granting of pardons was justiciable; only then could 
any consideration of legal rights and duties begin.  But, for the reasons that I have given 
above, the reasoning of the court is best understood as the reverse of Lord Scarman’s 
approach: the single question for the court was instead whether there were particular legal 
principles embedded in the past decisions of courts which, properly understood, justified 
the existence of such a duty.   It is in this sense that  Watkins L.J. considered the 
following hypothetical: 
                                                 
76 R Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Harvard University Press, 1985) ch 2. For a persuasive endorsement 
of this argument in the context of English administrative law, see T.R.S. Allan, ‘Dworkin and Dicey’ 275 et 
seq; Constitutional Justice op. cit. at 13 and, generally, ch 6;  
77 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex p. Bentley [1994] Q.B. 349.   169 
‘If…it was clear that the Home Secretary had refuse to pardon someone solely on the grounds of their sex, 
race or religion, the courts would be expected to interfere and, in our judgment, would be entitled to do 
so.’
78
 
 
In the event, the Court of Appeal applied a different well-established legal principle – a 
failure to take into account relevant considerations – and ordered the Secretary of State to 
retake the decision.   We can also see from Watkins L.J.’s hypothetical, and from the 
decision in the case just described, the difficulty in formulating in advance any rule about 
the nature and scope  of a  minister’s power in relation to the act of pardoning  an 
individual.   If it is thought that a minister’s powers in relation to the granting of pardons 
can be clearly divided, by means of one or more rules, into those aspects governed by law 
(or legal duties and powers), and those governed by convention (or  political or 
constitutional duties and powers), then such a rule would have to anticipate the existence 
and weight of each and every possible legal principle that might condition the minister’s 
power.  This would clearly be a hopeless task.  
  More recently, in the case of Abbasi,
79
Finally, in Bancoult,
  the Court of Appeal had to consider whether 
the  Foreign Secretary  had a duty to make representations to the United States 
Government on behalf of the applicant in relation to his detention in Guantanamo Bay.   
Where Lord Scarman’s test would surely have led to a pre-emptive finding that the 
subject matter of foreign diplomatic relations was non-justiciable, the Court of Appeal 
focussed on the question of legality or legal principle, and found that the promulgation of 
a policy by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office gave rise to a legitimate expectation 
for the applicant.    Again, any legal rule about the nature of the duties and powers of the 
Foreign Secretary would implausibly have had to encapsulate the plethora of principles 
relating to legitimate expectations, along with the existence and weight of any other legal 
principle which might in future be engaged in this area of government.   
80
                                                 
78 Ibid at 453.   
 the question was whether the Secretary of State for Foreign 
and Commonwealth Affairs had lawfully exercised a power under an Order in Council to 
79 R. (on the application of Abassi) v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2002] 
EWCA Civ 1470. 
80 R. (on the application of Bancoult) v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2007] 
EW CA Civ 498.   170 
act for the ‘peace, order and good government’ of an overseas territory.    In the Court of 
Appeal, Lord Justice Sedley hypothesised that each of the ‘excluded’ powers listed by 
Lord Roskill in GCHQ (quoted above), might conceivably engage some legal principle 
which would justify judicial review: 
 
‘It can be observed without disrespect, particularly since Lord Roskill was careful was careful to express 
himself tentatively, that a number of his examples could today be regarded as questionable: the grant of 
honours for reward, the waging of war of manifest aggression or a refusal to dissolve Parliament at all 
might well call in question an immunity based purely on subject-matter’
81
 
 
It is no surprise then that Sedley L.J. envisaged circumstances in which a minister could 
abuse the power to act for the ‘peace, order and good government’, for instance on the 
grounds of jurisdictional error or malpractice, or if the subject matter ‘is manifestly not 
the peace, order or good government of the colony’.
82
  If we move away from the issue of prerogative powers and consider other areas of 
British constitutional practice, it is apparent that there is similarly no scope for drawing a 
sharp distinction between areas of governance controlled by law and areas controlled by 
constitutional convention.   It is often said, for instance, that the Queen gives the Royal 
Assent on the advice of her ministers as a matter of constitutional convention (or that the 
Queen has only a constitutional or political duty, but no legal duty, to give the Royal 
     These dicta illustrate as clearly 
as could be the problems with both the enforcement/justiciability approach of the court in 
GCHQ, and the attempt to demarcate different types of duties by concrete Hartian rules.   
                                                 
81 Ibid at 46 
82  Ibid.  Of course, while my primary aim in this section is to show that judges do  not pre-emptively 
exclude any area of government from judicial scrutiny, we should recall the important reasons as to why 
judges should not approach their adjudicative task in this way.    The British constitution, I have argued in 
previous chapters, rests on the principle of legality.   This is to say that officials should exercise power only 
in accordance with the principles, embedded in the past decisions of courts and Parliament that licence the 
exercise of that power.    Judges are under a duty, I have argued, to give effect to these principles (or rights) 
which operate as trumps over the inegalitarian decisions of government.    Now, if judges demonstrate a 
willingness to exclude certain areas of government from judicial, the principle of legality, and the value of 
integrity, is lost.    Thus, we might criticize the House of Lords in Bancoult (op. cit.) in so far as their 
Lordships seemingly refused to accept that the relevant power could ever be judicially reviewed.  Similarly, 
in the recent case of R (on the application of Corner House Research) v Director of Serious Fraud Office 
[2008] UKHL 60; [2008] 3 W.L.R. 568 (HL) the House of Lords seemed pre-emptively to exclude the 
subject matter of diplomatic relations (with Saudi Arabia) from the principle of legality.    For a powerful 
recent argument against the insulation of particular areas of government from judicial review, see T R S 
Allan, ‘Human Rights and Judicial Review: a critique of “due deference” (2006) CLJ 65, 671-695.   171 
Assent (when so advised by her ministers).  But, for the reasons that I have given above, 
it makes no sense to designate the giving or withholding of the Royal Assent as a non-
justiciable area or subject matter  which, for that reason,  is  necessarily devoid of any 
implications for legal rights, duties and powers.  One can imagine any number of 
situations in which the Queen might be under a legal duty not to grant the Royal 
Assent.
83    The starting point must be to consider how best to justify the fact that the 
Royal Assent forms a necessary element of the legislative process.   It might plausibly be 
argued that the power of the Queen to give (or refuse) the Royal Assent is justified by the 
principle, say,  that  the  Monarchy  is  the  final barrier  against  legislative  tyranny, 
oppression and corruption.  In this case, if legislature were to act in these ways, it would 
be entirely plausible to say that the Queen would be under a legal duty (or at that the 
Queen would have a legal power) to refuse the Royal Assent.   By the same token, it 
would be plausible to say that the Queen has a legal duty in virtue of the principle of 
democracy to give the Royal Assent provided that such extreme abuses of legislative 
power are not apparent.
84
Before concluding this chapter, it will be instructive briefly to consider one very 
recent illustration of the way in which legal duties intertwine with political or 
constitutional duties.  This is the recent saga involving the shadow Home Office MP, 
Damien Green,  who was arrested  by  counter-terrorism police  for  the common law 
offense of ‘aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring misconduct in public office’ after 
passing certain sensitive  government documents to the press.    The intriguing 
constitutional question to emerge out of these events  was whether Mr Green enjoyed 
Parliamentary privilege against such incursion by the police (or such incursion by law) 
into  matters traditionally thought to belong within  the exclusive jurisdiction of 
Parliament.
    
85
                                                 
83 It should be noted that section 1 of the Royal Assent Act 1967 reads: ‘(1) An Act of Parliament is duly 
enacted if Her Majesty’s Assent thereto’ (my italics).    
     As if to bring out the difficulty involved in deciding whether Mr Green’s 
84 Another interesting possibility is that a minister may be under a duty to advise the Queen not to give the 
Royal Assent.  See the recent decision in R (on the application of Barclay & Ors) v The Secretary of State 
for Justice & Ors [2008] EWCA Civ 1319. 
85 Many commentators have observed in recent years that there is some uncertainty about the extent of 
Parliamentary privilege. Barber has argued that the question of which institution regulates the conduct of 
MPs is ‘indeterminate’.   See N Barber, ‘Sovereignty Re-examined: the Courts, Parliament and Statutes’ 
(2000) 20 OJLS 131-154.   172 
situation engaged political or constitutional right and duties, legal rights and duties, or 
both, Jack Straw, the Minister for Justice, adverted to three competing principles which 
he thought were relevant to the events described:
86
 
 
First, MPs must be free to go about the legitimate business on behalf of constituents and 
political party, especially if in opposition; 
 
Secondly, there is great importance attached to the independence and integrity of the 
police to pursue investigations without direction by politicians; 
 
Thirdly, there is great importance attached to protecting secrecy and confidentiality 
where it is necessary in Government.  This is a matter that affects all governments and all 
political parties. 
 
In the light of the uncertainty about how these and other principles apply to a situation 
such as that faced by Damian Green, and indeed how different principles apply in every 
area of British constitutional practice, it must finally be admitted that there can be no 
litmus test by which we can distinguish ex ante (that is, prior to, and independently of, 
arguments of political morality) between constitutional law and constitutional 
convention, or by which we can  distinguish between legal duties and political or 
constitutional duties of constitutional actors.    The classical enforcement test propounded 
by Dicey, I have said, mistakenly conflates the question of enforcement with the question 
of legality.  And the solution offered by Herbert Hart, while extremely appealing in its 
simplicity and neatness, cannot account for the distinctive character of disagreement 
about the requirements of a complex social practice.     
I have argued instead that the question of which rights, duties and powers a 
constitutional actor  has in a given situation will always involve a complex moral 
judgment about which principles justify those rights, duties and powers.    At the same 
time, I have maintained – in line with the overarching argument of this thesis – that the 
principle of legality is the controlling factor in the British constitution: one way or 
                                                 
86 Speaking on the BBC Radio 4 Today Programme, Dec 1.   173 
another, law speaks to each and every aspect of our daily lives.  The effect of these two 
arguments, I think, is to counter the argument often made in support of the view that the 
British constitution is ‘political’, namely the erroneous argument that British 
constitutional practice is governed predominantly by constitutional conventions.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusion: In Defence of the Moral Reading of the British 
Constitution 
 
 
‘It is sometimes said that Britain has no constitution, but that is a mistake.  Britain has as unwritten as 
well as a written constitution, and part of the former consists  in understandings about what laws 
Parliament should not enact.’
1
 
 
1. A Thesis Overview 
 
This thesis has had a negative aspect and a positive aspect.   In its negative aspect, I 
have attempted to expose a number of unsound philosophical assumptions to be found 
in traditional accounts of British constitutional theory and practice.  Above all, I have 
sought to debunk the twin ideas that Parliament is sovereign and that, as such, the law 
is that which Parliament intends.   These ideas, I argued in chapter 1, are rooted in the 
obsolete and discredited legal theory of the 19
th century jurist John Austin, a theory 
which has been perpetuated through the work of A.V. Dicey (whose writings have 
attracted an almost religious following in the  English  legal world).  In  its positive 
aspect, I have sought in this thesis to explore the different ways in which the legal 
theories of Herbert Hart and Ronald Dworkin can inform and enrich our 
understanding of the British constitution.  While Herbert Hart’s rule-based account of 
legal validity and political power ultimately proves to be unsustainable  in its own 
right,  I have suggested  that  Hart  provides one hugely valuable insight into  these 
matters:  namely, that we can only account for the powers of Parliament and other 
institutions by reference to a normative standard  which  is logically prior to those 
powers.
2    This normative standard, I have argued, is the principle of legality – the 
principle that officials  (or political and legal institutions)  must exercise power in 
accordance with standards established in the right way before that exercise.
3
In chapters 2 and 3, I argued that the principle of legality is best understood as 
reflecting the value of integrity or equality before the law.  This is to say that the 
‘standards’ according to which officials must exercise power (which standards 
    
                                                 
1 R Dworkin, Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford 1996) 16. 
2 See chapter 1, part 3. 
3 See chapter 2, part 1.   175 
determine the powers of officials) are the principles of justice, fairness and procedural 
due process to which the British political community is committed through its past 
institutional decisions.   I then sought in chapter 4 to demonstrate the way in which a 
conception of legality as integrity will shape or control our understanding of the many 
other  political  principles which underpin  British constitutional practice, principles 
such as the separation of powers, democracy, and individual human rights.     More 
broadly, I sought to demonstrate the way in which the discipline of British 
constitutional theory should be characterised by substantive arguments of political or 
constitutional morality about the justification for the powers of Parliament and courts, 
and the nature of the moral and legal rights of individuals.  It is these types of 
arguments  –  arguments which might be described after Dworkin  as  the ‘Moral 
Reading’ of the British constitution
4
The (admittedly abstract) arguments of this thesis  carry  several  important 
implications, I think,  for  our  understanding of the  British constitution.   Most 
importantly, these arguments deny the orthodox view that Parliament can ‘make or 
unmake any law’, or suspend or abrogate fundamental rights at will.  I have argued to 
the contrary that Parliament possesses only such powers as can be justified by legal 
principles, most notably the principle of democracy (the principle which justifies the 
fact that it is a Parliament as opposed to some other person or body which exercises 
legislative power).
 – which, in my view, have for too long been 
obscured by artificial and over-technical debates about the possible limits on 
Parliamentary sovereignty and the relationship between judicial review and the 
intentions of Parliament.   
5     Democracy, properly understood,  entails that individual 
members of a political community enjoy certain moral rights which will trump those 
collective decisions  which fail to treat people as equals.
6  And judicial review, 
properly conceived of in terms of the application of principle and not policy, I have 
argued, is the best way of safeguarding these democratic conditions of government.   
In this way, the principle of democracy forms the backdrop of principle against which 
government acts in the British constitution.    Far from being ‘antithetical to the 
principle demand of constitutionalism’
7
                                                 
4 This phrase is taken from Dworkin above (n 1)  
  and ‘being a concept which has much 
5 See chapter 4 (below), part 1. 
6 Ibid. 
7 See E Barendt, ‘Is there a UK Constitution?’ (1997) 17 OJLS 137, 141.   176 
political, but relatively little legal significance’,
8
 
 the principle of democracy, in my 
view, is a legal principle which lies at the foundations of British constitutionalism. 
2. The Political Objection 
 
In the remainder of this chapter, I shall offer an outline defence of my thesis against a 
set of  objections  which  I described collectively  at the start of chapter 5 as the 
‘political objection’.  Broadly speaking, the political objection holds that the British 
constitution is a political rather than a legal constitution; or, to put this differently, the 
objection holds that the British constitutional practice reflects (or should reflect) the 
political theory of  republicanism  rather than legal-liberalism
9  or  common  law 
constitutionalism.
10   Of course, there is much disagreement about the  meaning of 
each of these terms, and it may be that no two theorists who align themselves with 
any one of these political theories  occupy  precisely the same theoretical space.
11
 
   
Nonetheless, the political or republican objection can helpfully be reduced to the 
following two propositions, which can either work in combination, or independently 
of each other.   
First, the political objection rests on the descriptive  premise that the British 
constitution is unwritten in the sense that the there is no single document containing 
the main details of the constitution; rather, the objection runs, the British constitution 
is made up of a miscellany of statutory and common law provisions.  The many ‘gaps’ 
in between these provisions are filled by informal rules or constitutional conventions.    
 
Secondly, the political objection holds that, in the absence of any written constitution, 
(or Act of Parliament giving explicit rights to individuals), judges have no 
‘constitutional warrant’
12
                                                 
8 Ibid at 142. 
  to enforce such rights.    The many (unauthorized) 
principles applied by judges to the decisions of Government should be viewed 
9 For the term ‘legal-liberalism’ see M Loughlin, Sword and Scales: An Examination of the 
Relationship Between Law and Politics (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2000) 5. 
10 For a helpful survey of different theories of common law constitutionalism, see T Poole, ‘Back to the 
Future? Unearthing the Theory of Common Law Constitutionalism’ (2003) 23 OJLS 435.   
11 For evidence of disagreement about the nature of republicanism, see M Loughlin, ‘Towards A 
Republican Revival’ (2006) 26 OJLS 425-437; T R S Allan, ‘Our Republican Constitution’ 
(Publication Review) (2006) PL 172, 173. 
12 See M Elliott, The Constitutional Foundations of Judicial Review (Hart Publishing, 2001).   177 
therefore as illicit attempts to place politics within the ‘staitjacket of law’
13 or to 
establish the superiority of law over politics.
14   In this way, the theory of ‘legal-
liberalism’  or  ‘common law constitutionalism’  relegates political deliberation and 
political decision-making to the margins of constitutional practice: democracy is 
substituted for juristocracy.
15
 
 
Before considering these two propositions, we first need to distinguish two different 
versions of the claim that the British constitution is political rather than legal.   I 
suggested in chapter 1 that the theory of the political constitution famously espoused 
by John Griffith
16  is best understood as a sociological or functionalist theory about 
‘what happens’ in the British constitution.
17  Griffith observes  (in the manner of 
Herbert Hart’s ‘external point of view’) that, contrary to the views of those who 
contend that political power resides with Parliament and/or courts, it is the 
Government which in fact exercises power.  Others have similarly argued that power 
is concentrated in the Government in the British constitution in so far as it possesses 
exclusive powers of dominium (meaning the way in which it uses the resources of the 
state to pursue policy goals).
18
It is certainly intelligible, I think, to argue on this sociological or functionalist level 
that  power in the British constitution resides with the political branches of 
government (or, in reality, the Government).   Indeed, it may be that as a matter of 
brute power  Parliament  (at the behest of the Government) could  enact the most 
oppressive piece of legislation, or repeal the most fundamental statutes or common 
law principles (and that the courts would recognize such measures).   And it may be 
that the Government could instruct the police or military to detain judges who refuse 
to recognize such actions  (and that the (remaining) judges  would  recognize  such 
action).    These are not the types of claims with which I have been concerned in this 
     
                                                 
13 Loughlin above (n 9). 
14 See A Tomkins, Our Republican Constitution, (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2005) 11-14; ‘In Defence of 
the Political Constitution’ (2002) 22 OJLS 157-175, 162. 
15 A variation on this second type of proposition is that judges inevitably bring their own party political 
sympathies to bear on their decision-making.   For a robust argument against this view, see R Dworkin, 
‘Political Judges and the Rule of Law’ in R Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Harvard University Press, 
1985), ch 1. 
16 J Griffith, ‘The Political Constitution’ (1979) 42 MLR 1-21.  
17 See chapter 1, part 2. 
18  See  T.C Daintith, ‘The Techniques of Government’ in Jowell and Oliver (eds) The Changing 
Constitution  1
st  edn (Oxford University Press, 2000).  For a very helpful discussion, see Oliver, 
Common Values and the Public Private Divide (Cambridge University Press, 1999), 36 et seq.   178 
thesis, and these are not the types of claims that I want to address below.    My 
concern in this thesis, and the set of claims to which I intend to respond below, are 
normative or moral claims about the justification for the powers of each branch of 
government, and the justification for the moral and legal rights enjoyed by individual 
against the political branches of government.   To put this differently, there is a 
difference in kind between a  proposition  of type  a) that the Government  does 
dominate the legislative process; and  type  b) that the Government should  not be 
permitted to dominate the legislative process.
19   In a stable Western democracy, there 
is a strong case, I think, for directing our energies more towards making arguments 
about proposition  type (b) than proposition  type (a).
20
 
   In any event, this is the 
approach that I have taken in this thesis.    
A. The ‘Unwritten’ British Constitution 
 
Sir Stephen Sedley has said: 
 
‘But there is another and subtler sense in which it can be said that in this country we have constitutional 
law without having a constitution, not because our constitution is unwritten but because our 
constitutional law, historically at least, is merely descriptive: it offers an account of how the country 
has come to be governed; and, importantly, in doing so it confers legitimacy on the arrangements it 
describes. But if we ask what the governing principles are from which these arrangements and this 
legitimacy derive, we find ourselves listening to the sound of silence.’
21
 
 
In order to illustrate  his point about the absence of ‘governing principles’  in the 
British constitution, Sedley points to the ‘silent’ fact of British constitutional practice 
that the exercise of powers by ministers of the Crown are amenable to judicial review, 
but that the institution of the Crown in the person of the Monarch is not;
22
                                                 
19 See T R S Allan, ‘The Constitutional Foundations of Judicial Review: Conceptual Conundrum or 
Interpretative Inquiry? [2002] CLJ  87-125 at 91-2.   
 similarly he 
20 The first type of proposition would clearly be of far greater importance in relation to a developing 
nation in which a government paid little or no attention to law or the constitution.   See, for instance, H 
W O Okoth-Ogendo ‘Constitutionals without Constitutionalism: Reflections on an African Political 
Paradox’ in Greenberg D. et al (eds) Constitutionalism and Democracy: Transitions in the 
Contemporary World (Oxford University Press, 1993). 
21 Sir Stephen Sedley, ‘The Sound of Silence: constitutional law without a constitution’ (1994) 110 
LQR 270-291, 270.    
22 Sedley derives this proposition from the decision in M v. Home Office [1993] 3 W.L.R. 433 (H.L.).  
Sedley op. cit. 271.   179 
refers to the privileges of Parliament as the ‘Bermuda Triangle’
23
  Sedley’s concerns are symptomatic of a view that I have sought to resist in this 
thesis.   It is the (legal positivist) view that the law of the constitution is only that 
which is found in the clear language of statutory texts or decisions by courts; and that 
any norm or standard which is operative in the constitution, but which cannot be 
found in such texts, is necessarily non-legal or conventional.
 of the constitution.    
Indeed, throughout his article, Sedley highlights similar silences, gaps,  spaces  or 
lacunae in both the British (and US) constitution which he suggests are in need of a 
coherent legal framework.    
24  I have defended a very 
different  Dworkinian  account of law  and legality, an account  which holds that a 
proposition of law is true or valid, not when it is captured by some ascertainable rule, 
but  when it reflects  the  interpretation of the principles of justice, fairness and 
procedural due process which best justify the past political decisions of Parliament 
and courts (including the principles which justify the fact that Parliament and courts 
exercise power).     If we think of law in this way, then there may be law even where 
there is no statute, and even where no court has explicitly spoken; for we work out 
legal rights, powers and duties by extrapolating from general legal principles, or by 
thinking hypothetically about how general principles might apply to specific factual 
situations.
25
One consequence of thinking of law in this way, I argued in chapter 5, is that we 
cannot clearly demarcate the legal parts of the constitution from the political parts of 
the constitution (or legal duties from constitutional or political duties), for instance by 
designating certain areas or subject matter as being beyond the reach of law.   If we 
take the issue of the amenability of the decisions or actions of the Monarch to judicial 
scrutiny, the fact that there is no explicit statutory provision or judicial dictum which 
speaks to whether the Monarch has particular legal powers and duties says nothing 
about whether the Monarch has such powers and duties.  As I argued in chapter 5, we 
can argue quite plausibly – drawing on general legal principles – that the Monarch is 
     
                                                 
23 Ibid. 
24 Sedley belies his own argument elsewhere, I think, where he proposes the bi-polar sovereignty of 
Parliament and courts as legal  principles.   See S Sedley ‘Human Rights: a Twenty-First Century 
Agenda’ [1995] PL 386-400 at 389, and ‘The Common Law and the Constitution’, in Lord Nolan of 
Brasted and Sir Stephen Sedley (eds), The Making and Remaking of the British Constitution 
(Blackstone Press, London 1997) at 26.    
25 See N Stavropoulos, ‘Why Principles?’ (unpublished) available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1023758.   180 
under a legal duty to refuse the Royal Assent to a bill where it represents an extreme 
abuse of legislative power, and that the Monarch has a legal duty in virtue of the 
principle of democracy to give the Royal Assent (provided that such extreme abuses 
of legislative power are not apparent).
26
This brings us to the significance of there being no single document setting out the 
details of the constitution.   The crucial point to appreciate once again, it is suggested, 
is that the text of a ‘written’ constitution such as that in the US is no more 
determinative of the law than the text of statutes or common law judgments in Britain.    
The force and meaning of the abstract clauses of the US constitution depend, not on 
the literal meaning of words in the text, or on the meaning that the original drafters of 
the text intended, but  on the background principles of political or constitutional 
morality which judges bring to their interpretive task, principles which are always 
open to reinterpretation.
   We see then that, to the extent that different 
theories of the ‘political constitution’ depend on sharp distinctions between the legal 
and political areas of British constitutional practice, it must be accepted that such 
theories are unsustainable.   
27   This can be seen no more clearly that in the US Supreme 
Court decision in Marbury v Madison.
28   Notwithstanding that there was no explicit 
textual provision  or past judicial decision to  this effect, Chief Justice Marshall 
appealed to the principle of the separation of powers, embedded in the provisions of 
the constitution, and reasoned that judges of the US Supreme Court were under a duty 
to invalidate legislation that infringed the provisions of the constitution.
29
  In summary, it is my argument that judges in the British constitution face precisely 
the same challenge as those  in the US: in each case, they must settle on the best 
interpretation of the different principles of political morality which justify facts about 
legal and constitutional practice.  In this way, Dworkin’s advocacy of the Moral 
Reading of the abstract clauses of the US Constitution resonates just as much in 
        
                                                 
26 Sedley’s example of Parliamentary privilege would serve just as well to illustrate my thesis.  See the 
discussion of the Damien Green saga at the end of chapter 5. 
27 See R Dworkin, A Bill of Rights for Britain, (Chatto & Windus, London 1990) 27; Freedom’s Law 
above (n 1) ‘Introduction: The Moral Reading and the Majoritarian Premise’; cf. A Scalia, A Matter of 
Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law (Princeton University Press, 2007).    
28 5 US (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) 
29 R Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1986) 356; T R S 
Allan, Constitutional Justice: A Liberal Theory of the Rule of Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 
2003), 163.   181 
relation to the British constitution as it does in relation to the US constitution.
30
 
   
Three  recent judicial dicta, I think, bring out this parallel particularly clearly. In 
Simms, Lord Hoffmann explicitly likened the interpretive duty of English judges in 
giving effect to ‘constitutional ‘rights to the role of judges in the United States:  
‘In the absence of express language or necessary implication to the contrary the courts…presume that even the 
most general words were intended to be subject to the basic rights of the individual.  In this way the courts of the 
United Kingdom, though acknowledging the sovereignty of Parliament, apply principles of constitutionality 
little different from those which exist in countries where the powers of the legislature is expressly limited by 
a constitutional document.’
31
 
 
Similarly, Lord Steyn has said that 
 
‘Parliament does not legislate in a vacuum; it legislates for a modern European liberal democracy’
32
 
   
And Lord Justice Laws has  distinguished between ‘constitutional’ and ‘ordinary’ 
statutes  where the former type of statute  cannot  be impliedly repealed.   A 
constitutional statute, according to Laws is  
 
‘one which (a) conditions the legal relationship between citizen and state in some general, overarching 
manner, or (b) enlarges or diminishes the scope of what we would now  regard as fundamental 
constitutional rights.’
 33
 
 
Once it is appreciated that the existence of individual rights, and the proper scope of 
judicial and legislative power does not depend on questions of semantics about when 
words are sufficiently ‘express’,  or when rights are (or whether rights can be) 
excluded  by ‘necessary implication’, each of these dicta must be understood in 
precisely the way I have suggested above.    The meaning of the text of a statute, and 
the question of whether an earlier statute should give way to a later statute,  must 
depend on arguments about the most morally attractive  meaning of the text,  and 
                                                 
30 See T R S Allan, op.cit. 4-5. In a recent book, David Dyzenhaus has defended what he calls the 
‘commonwealth constitution’ in order to bring out the sense in which common principles underpin 
different constitutional orders.  See Dyzenhaus, The Constitution of Law, Legality in a Time of 
Emergency, (Cambridge University Press, 2006) at 5.   
31 R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte, Simms and Another [1999] 3 All ER 400 
at 412.     
32 R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p. Pierson [1998] A.C. 539 at 575.  
33 Thoburn v Sunderland City Council [2002] EWHC 195 (Admin) at 62.   182 
arguments about how best to justify the force of statutes.   In this way, we have no 
reason to condemn the refusal by judges to give effect to a purported ‘ouster’ clause;
34 
for the meaning of the text must depend on the proper understanding of the principle, 
embedded in British constitutional practice, of access to justice or access to a court.
35  
Similarly, we have good reason to think that the Westminster Parliament no longer 
possesses the power to legislate for former colonies (or the power to repeal statutes 
granting independence to former colonies); for strong arguments could be made, I 
think, to the effect that such  principles  as  protected expectations and legislative 
autonomy militate against Westminster retaining such powers.
36
 
   
B. Democracy or Juristocracy?   
 
I have suggested that there is no moral significance to the bare fact that the British 
political community does not possess a ‘written’ constitution (in the sense of a single 
document setting out the rights of individuals and the powers of institutions).   Yet if 
proponents of the political objection accept this much, they might nonetheless contend 
that,  irrespective  of whether a community possesses a written or unwritten 
constitution, it should be government (the legislature and executive) rather than the 
judiciary  which  has  the last word on controversial questions of principle.
37   For 
judges to seize final authority on these matters for themselves, the objection might 
run,  inevitably places the deliberations of legislative assemblies in the shadow of 
‘dogmatic’
38  and ‘individualistic’
39
                                                 
34 See, for example, Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147.   
  judicial theories  of  common law liberalism, 
35 For an excellent discussion of the role of constitutional principle in relation to purported ouster 
clauses, see T R S Allan, ‘Constitutional Dialogue and the Justification of Judicial Review’ (2003) 23 
OJLS 563, 576-8.  See the decisions in R. v Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex p. Leech 
[1994] Q.B. 198; R v Lord Chancellor ex parte Witham [1998] Q.B. 575. 
36 Again, for an excellent discussion of the role of constitutional principle in this context, see T R S 
Allan, Law, Liberty and Justice: The Legal Foundations of British Constitutionalism (Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1993) 254 and 288-290 (analyses of the decision in Madzimbamuto v Lardner-Burke 
[1969] 1 AC 645.  Cf M Elliott, ‘‘Parliamentary sovereignty and the new constitutional order: 
legislative freedom, political reality and convention’ (2002) 22 Legal Studies 340-376.  Elliott argues 
that Parliament may, over time, lose the power to legislate for former colonies on the basis that an 
appropriate constitutional convention to this effect might transmute into a legal principle.   For an 
argument against this approach, see chapter 5 (above) part 2. 
37 Jeremy Waldron has advanced his arguments against judicial review principally by reference to the 
role of judges in interpreting a written constitution.   See generally chapter 4 (above).  In this respect, 
Waldon’s argument cuts across the supposed divide between written/unwritten constitutions.  
38 T Poole, ‘Dogmatic Liberalism? TRS Allan and the Common Law Constitution’ (2002) 65 MLR 
463. 
39 A Tomkins, Our Republican Constitution above (n 14) 15-16.    183 
theories which mistakenly suppose that ‘we ought to be able to find the answer to all 
political disputes in law’.
40
I have attempted in this thesis to explain the very particular and necessary sense in 
which judges give effect to matters of principle in their adjudicative role.
      
41   I have 
suggested (after Ronald Dworkin) that judges are constrained by, or bound by, the 
value of (constitutional) integrity.
42    This is to say that judges are under a duty to 
identify and give effect to the principles and policies to which a political community 
is committed through the past decisions of its political and legal institutions.    This 
role, I argued, is democracy reinforcing in the sense that it is for judges to ensure that 
each member of the British political community is treated as an equal (the very point 
of  democracy).    The charge of juristocracy rests, in my view, on a parody of 
Dworkin’s theory of adjudication.  Few (if any) legal or constitutional theorists – least 
of all Dworkin – make the argument that judges have a licence to bring their own 
Utopian political philosophy to their adjudicative task without having regard for the 
past decisions of Parliament and courts.
43   And no theorist can plausibly argue, I 
think, that the judicial role is to resolve ‘political’ disputes (in the sense of making 
decisions about which collective goals or aims the British political community should 
pursue).   In short, the British constitution is neither ‘legal’ nor ‘political’: it is 
founded on principles, embedded in the past institutional decisions of Parliament and 
courts, which determine the rights, duties and powers of government, the judiciary 
and individual members of the British political community.
44
 
    
3. Closing Reflections 
 
One of my principal aims in this thesis has been to bring questions of legal theory to 
the forefront of British constitutional theory.   My focus has been the shortcomings – 
according to an anti-positivist, Dworkinian perspective – of a positivist account of 
British constitutional theory and practice, and in particular an account based on the 
work of John Austin or Herbert Hart.   It is by reference to the work of these theorists, 
                                                 
40 A Tomkins, ‘In Defence of the Political Constitution’ above (n 14) 172. 
41 See chapter 4, part 2. 
42 R Dworkin, Freedom’s Law above (n 1) 10-11.   
43 For one possible exception, see S Guest (whose theory I discuss in chapter 2 (above) part 3).   
44 Allan similarly describes the distinction between a ‘legal’ and ‘political’ constitution as a ‘false 
antithesis’.  See above (n 11) 174.    184 
I perceive, that  lawyers and academics have  increasingly  sought  to  defend  the 
traditional Diceyan vision of the British constitution.
45
Given the general aim that I have just described, and given my regular insistence in 
this thesis that constitutional theory must  keep apace with developments in legal 
theory, I am conscious of one notable failing in my project which awaits rectification 
in future research.     While Herbert Hart’s theory is rightly regarded as a major 
turning point in positivist legal theory, it can no longer be said that Hart’s theory 
represents the strongest version of legal positivism.   The new ‘battleground’ for legal 
and constitutional theory, I think, is the question of whether the work of Joseph Raz – 
Hart’s  protégé and joint-chief critic –  and Razian sympathizers meets the anti-
positivist critique of Ronald Dworkin (and vice versa).
  
46
   
    It is hope that enough has 
been said in this thesis to emphasize the importance for British constitutional theorists 
of joining this ‘battle’. 
 
 
 
    
   
 
 
   
 
 
 
                                                 
45 See, in particular chapter 1 (above). 
46 Joseph Raz has recently been highly critical of theorists who continue to attack Hartian positivism. 
See J Raz, ‘The Argument from Justice: Or How Not to Reply to Legal Positivism’ available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=999873. It is hoped that I have offered an adequate 
justification for my emphasis on Hart.      185 
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